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INTRODUCTION
( 1)
Abraham Lincoln is a man remembered for many things. Even though 
120 years have passed since* the close of the Civil War and Lincoln’s 
death, he is still remembered as his nation’s saviour. He is known as 
an individual who led his nation through the greatest crisis it ever 
faced, and, in the process, purified American democracy by destroying 
the institution of slavery.
Tn spite of the extent of Lincoln’s reputation, he is not well 
known for what is perhaps his most important contribution to the American 
experience— his impact on the structure and dynamics of the federal 
government.
Prior to Lincoln’s Presidency, the proper ^elation of the fed­
eral Union and the state governments was in doubt. Was the national 
government supreme in those matters which the Constitution delegated 
to it or did the state governments have complete control of all matters 
within their respective areas? More importantly, where was the allegiance 
of the people and sovereignty of the nation centered— the state govern­
ments or the federal Union? These were not merely abstract Issues. In 
1832, the nation was almost violently ruptured during the "nullification" 
crisis in South Carolina— a series of events and issues at the heart of 
which was the question of state versus federal jurisdiction.
Lincoln's Presidency resolved this question. In dealing with the 
secession crisis, Lincoln was forced to use every power that was available 
to him— -as well as many that did not appear available at first glance.
i
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The federal victory assured the institutional ascendancy of the national 
government, and, through his use of executive power, Lincoln widened the 
boundaries within which the government could operate in the future.
Nowhere was this change more apparent that in the Presidency 
itself. In the years after the Civil War, various Presidents wielded 
authority that was, at times, far in excess of the amount of power that 
Presidents had available to them prior to the Civil War. Certainly the 
gravity of certain events and the increasing complexity of American 
society served to justify this increase in authority, but justification 
was also found in the powerful executive precedent which Lincoln had set.
By taking actions such as the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the 
initiation of a draft, Lincoln stretched the limits of the office in which 
his successors would make national policy for future generations. Of 
course, the impact of his actions upon the Presidency was a subject that 
was secondary in his mind to the central concern of winning the Civil War.
Nevertheless, Lincoln's effect on the Presidency is a topic that 
is relevant to any generation of Americans. The differences between today’s 
Presidency and that of the antebellum period are due, in large part, to 
him. It is, therefore, important to understand something about both 
Lincoln and his tenure in office.
This is an examination of Lincoln and the Presidency. In essence.
It is an attempt to assess Lincoln's attitudes toward executive power and 
the general government prior to his inauguration, to determine whether he 
adhered to those attitudes while in office, and, finally, to gauge the 
extent to which he altered the executive's role In government.
ill
Abraham Lincoln believed wholeheartedly in republican government, 
and, to a great extent, his own life reflected the benefits that such a 
system confers upon both the individual and society. Born and raised in 
the backwoods of the frontier, he flourished in an open community that 
allowed him to rise as high as his own resourcefulness would propel him.
As matters turned out, he reached the nation’s highest station, and, 
throughout his career, praised the virtues of the Republic that had offered 
him such opportunity.
Like many other men of his day, Lincoln was very concerned with 
strengthening and preserving America’s “experiment" in freedom. He feared 
that, at some point, this system might be subverted and liberty extinguished. 
To Lincoln, the most obvious scenario in which such a disaster might occur 
was one in which the executive became too powerful, and eventually set him­
self up as a despot.
Thus, Lincoln had always favored a weak executive, not onlv because 
this would prevent a dictator from arising on Pennsylvania Avenue, but also 
because it would make Congress the dynamic and dominant branch of govern­
ment. He believed that Congress, with members from all over the country, 
best represented the people, and was, therefore, best suited to make policy. 
The President*8 role, In his view, was simply to Implement that policy.
Later in life, however, Lincoln himself was elected President, and, 
due to sectional hostilities, he was faced with a rebellion by the Southern 
states. He spent his entire term In office trying to crush that rebellion, 
and, in the process, he became, at least on the surface, a very different
(2)
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executive from that which his earlier attitudes had dictated.
He employed, at times, a policy of censorship and arbitrary arrests. 
He trampled on Congressional prerogatives concerning the use of funds and 
the composition and summoning of military forces. He instituted, on his 
own authority, a draft, and he also emancipated the slaves upon his own 
authority. He often ignored the Judiciary. In short, he seemed, to many 
of his contemporaries, to have become the dictator that he himself had 
feared.
The questions that immediately come to mind concerning Lincoln’s 
Presidency are whether or not he strayed from his previous belief in a 
weak executive and to what extent, if any, did his tenure in office alter 
the executive function. Did Lincoln, one wonders, somehow change upon 
his election in 1860 or were other factors responsible for his heavy- 
handed use of Presidential authority? Have other Presidents found justi­
fication for extreme action in Lincoln’s acts?
Full consideration of these questions leads one to the conclusion 
that Lincoln did not, ultimately, stray from his previous beliefs. Cer­
tainly, many of his actions contradicted those beliefs, but to consider 
only his actions, and not his objectives, is to see only half of the pic­
ture. Lincoln behaved in the manner that he did because it was the only 
way to preserve the Union and the experiment in popular government in 
which he elieved so strongly. To employ his Town logic: If he had
adhered strictly to his previous principles, he would have lost everything 
that was considered good under those principles. By acting outside his 
beliefs, Lincoln preserved for all time the republican system in which 
his principles would flourish.
VHe also altered the Presidency forever by establishing the pre­
cedent of crisis leadership. Reflecting upon Lincoln's success in the 
Civil War, later generations saw a justification for extreme action in 
the midst of grave danger i:« the nation. Indeed, in the wake of Lincoln, 
the use of harsh emergency powers to ensure national safety was looked 
upon as a legitimate executive function. Thus, along with a unified 
government and a free society, Lincoln also left behind him the notion of 
a "crisis" Presidency. If Lincoln's conception of the Presidency changed 
at all, it was only in the sense that he too came to believe that the 
executive should become strong if the Union were threatened. After all, 
he pioneered that form of leadership.
Thus, in the final analysis, Lincoln really did believe in repub­
lican government and a weak executive. He merely had the moral courage 
and intellectual flexibility to realize that he would have to "think and 
act anew" to preserve those values.* His plunge into executive power 
was not a case of thoughtless indulgence in expediency. Rather, it was an 
application of power that was minutely measured to meet the task at hand, 
and it was carefully controlled in order to minimize any potential damage 
to republican principles.
CHAPTER ONE
LINCOLN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENCY 
PRIOR TO TAKING OFFICE
To discuss Lincoln the politician, however, 
is only to scratch the surface of his Whig- 
gery, which sprang from the very depths of 
his being. To understand Lincoln the Whig, 
we must begin by trying to understand his 
ambitiousness....Yet we also know that 
there was an authentic humility about the 
man. In him, ambition meant not simply 
winning political office but transcending 
his early limitations. The kind of ambi­
tion that possessed Lincoln was no cheap 
desire to lord it over others but a driv­
ing urge to develop himself, to fulfill his 
destiny In ways that life as a farmer like 
his father never could. Winning elections 
validated his program of self-improvement by 
showing that he had made himself ’worthy' of 
others' esteem. And, at least as early as 
1848, he had his eye on the presidency.
-Daniel Walker Howe,
The Political Culture of the 
American Whigs
1
2Abraham Lincoln's political views were inextricably mixed with 
the stuff of his personal life. Lincoln rose through hard work and study 
in an environment of freedom, and he believed that every other citizen 
should have the same opportunity. Similarly, Lincoln valued his own per­
sonal freedom highly, and, therefore, he felt that society should be ever 
vigilant against such threats to freedom as imperious Presidents.
When Lincoln decided to act upon his beliefs and speak out on the 
issues of his day, he chose to affiliate himself with opponents of the 
Democratic party, later known as the Whigs. To his mind, the industrious 
and freedom-loving Whigs best represented his values. On the other hand, 
the Democrats did not appeal to Lincoln. In his opinion, they not only 
hampered the development of individuals and society, but they also elected 
Presidents, such as Jackson and Van Buren, who acted in a manner that Lin­
coln considered dictatorial.
It was against this background of personal development and the poli­
tical conflicts of the Jacksonian era that Lincoln developed his attitudes 
toward the Presidency, and, therefore, Lincoln's youth in the Jacksonian 
era is an appropriate point at which to begin this study.
( 1)
It was a common practice in the Presidential campaigns of Lincoln's 
day for political parties to put out short biographies of their candidates 
to show them in a favorable light. Soon after Lincoln's nomination in 
1860, the requisite authors were hard at work compiling an account of the 
Republican nominee's life. Very early in their endeavorB, however, the 
biographers discovered that they knew very little of Lincoln's youth and
3virtually no tiling about his childhood.
Lincoln was, therefore, asked to provide some information, and, 
in an interview with the Chicago Tribunes John L. Scripps, he summed up 
his childhood by quoting from Gray's "Elegy . . . the short and simple 
annals of the poor."^
Born on February 12, 1809, Lincoln grew up in conditions that were 
average for frontier America. He lived with his family in a log cabin 
and engaged in the hard-working life of the wilderness. He helped his 
father with chores about the cabin, such as chopping wood, and he helped 
with the farming by handling the plow or planting seeds. Lincoln had no 
real chance for a formal education. When time and the condition of the 
farm allowed, he attended rudimentary rural schools, and, since he was in 
school on a very erratic basis, he referred to it as education "by 
littles." He later wrote that "the agregate (sic) of all his schooling 
did not amount to one year."-*
In spite of this lack of formal training, Lincoln proved to be an 
eager student and a voracious reader— mastering such relatively difficult 
works as Robinson Crusoe and Parson Weem's Life of Washington.
In 1830, in Lincoln's twenty-first year, his family moved to 
Illinois. Lincoln went with them, but, when he was twenty-three, he left 
home. He went to the village of New Salem in Sangamon County, and it was 
there that Lincoln began to demonstrate the intelligence and ambition that 
would fuel his rise as a successful attorney and politician.
Lincoln quickly found a niche for himself in New Salem, and he 
befriended the most intelligent men in the village. Soon after his arrival, 
he decided, as he expressed it to a friend, that he wan fed tp "get ho-ld of 
something that was knotty," and, at the age of twenty-three, he announced
4himself a candidate for the Illinois House of Representatives. In a 
campaign letter, Lincoln admitted that he was "Young and Unknown," hut 
he set for himself the goal of "being esteemed of my fellow men."
Although he lost the 1832 election, Lincoln won two years later 
and began a legislative career that ended after he finished a single 
term in Congress. In addition to serving in the legislature, lie began 
studying law. Unlike most law students of his day, however, Lincoln 
did not study as an apprentice with a practicing attorney. Instead, he 
borrowed books from legislative colleagues and friends and taught himself 
the law. By 1836, he had absorbed enough knowledge to merit a license 
to practice with one of his fellow legislators, John T. Stuart/4
The salient themes of these early days of Lincoln’s life are 
personal industry and ambition. By the age of 27, he was both an attor­
ney and a member of the Illinois legislature, and he had accomplished 
all of this with less than a year of formal education. Indeed, when one 
considers the lack of facilities and leisure time in frontier Illinois, 
the depth of Lincoln's determination and ambition becomes clear. It 
took an incredible amount of diligence and sheer scrounging for resources 
to conduct either a legislative career or a legal education, and Lincoln 
managed to do both. In an era of the rugged individual, Lincoln was 
very much a self-made man.
( 2)
While Abraham Lincoln worked to establish himself in frontier 
Illinois, America was In the midst of a heated political debate. The 
early nineteenth century saw the formation of the second American party 
system. On the one hand, there was the Democratic party of Andrew
5Jackson, Martin Van Buren, and James K. Polk, and, on the other hand, the 
Whig party of Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.
When Lincoln finally decided to speak out on the issues of his day, 
he did so in the context of the Whig-Democrat conflict, and it was under 
the strong influence of this partisan contest that he developed his views 
of government structure and the Presidency. Thus, in order to understand 
Lincoln, it is necessary to understand the political system in which he 
developed.
The Whig party, which Lincoln eventually joined, was formed both out of 
opposition to the Democratic party, founded around the Presidency of Andrew 
Jackson, and in support of a series of proposals that were designed to 
foster economic diversity and growth. Although the Whigs drew support 
from a remarkable number of sources within society--including some disaff­
ected followers of Jackson, they cast an image that suggested the sober 
middle class. Their definition of the American Republic centered around 
a strong central government that would encourage individual and community 
improvement.
The Whigs translated their support of progress into proposed fed­
eral government programs meant to encourage economic development. In his 
study of the Whigs, Daniel Walker Howe described the Whig program in the 
following manner.
The Whig economic platform called for purposeful 
Intervention by the federal government in the form 
of tariffs to protect domestic industry, subsidies for 
Internal Improvements, and a national bank to regu­
late the currency and make tax revenues available 
for private investment. Taken together, the various 
facets of this program disclose a vision of America 
as an economically diversified country in which comm­
erce and Industry would take their place alongalde 
agriculture.
6Long before the formation of the Whig party, these ideas were advan­
ced as a combined program in Henry Clay’s "American system." The Whigs 
felt that these proposals would promote progress, and they planned to
implement them in order to develop the nation’s enormous supply of human
5
and natural resources. Not everyone, hov/ever, shared the Whig vision.
One of those who saw things differently was Andrew Jackson. Jackson 
served as President from 1829 to 1837, and he vigorously opposed many of 
the internal improvement projects as well as high tariffs and the forma­
tion of a national Bank. This was before the Whig part” had come into 
existence, when these ideas were being touted as the "American system." 
Indeed, one of the primary factors that led to the organization of the 
Whig party was the opposition of Jackson and his followers— a group known 
even after Jackson’s death as the "Jacksonians"— to the American system.
The Democrats were those who supported Jackson and the Whigs formed out 
of opposition to the Democrats and in support oT the American system.
Jackson feared that the young Republic was being subverted by wealthy 
special interests. He harkened back to the days of Thomas Jefferson and 
the first Republican party— to Jefferson's notion of an agrarian Republic 
based on the common man. He believed in a government that held service of 
all the people as its first objective, and he felt that an administration 
that catered to the whims of any single group or class was corrupt. Indeed, 
as Richard B. Latner notes in his study of Jackson's Presidency, "Jackson's 
principles reaffirmed the Republican party's concern for preserving liberty 
and republican government from the perilous influences of power and corrup­
tion." Jackson's philosophy was primarily "Jeffersonian in origin."
According to Latner, "Jackson displayed a keen sensitivity to the
7corrosive effects of special privilege, monopoly, and excessive power.”
He hated the "few monied Capitalists” who, he believed, were trying to 
subvert the common man’s government for their own selfish ends. Jackson 
and the Democrats viewed American democracy as a phenomenon best preserved 
by limiting the activities of the federal government. He felt that the 
central government should limit itself to those few concerns that were truly 
national in character, which really were important to all of the people. 
Anything more than this constituted, in his view, subversion of the central 
government to the advantage were of special Interests.**
And where did Jackson find these subversive machinations, these 
elitist schemes? He saw them in the programs of the American system. He 
felt that such proposals were an attempt by the wealthy to employ the gov­
ernment's powers for their own benefit. He opposed, therefore, the Bank 
of the United States, a high tariff to foster industrial growth, and many 
of the road and harbor projects that were referred to as "internal 
improvements.”
Consider, for example, this portion of Jackson's message vetoing the 
Maysville Road project— a proposed federal improvement located entirely 
within one state.
...such grants have always been professedly under 
the control of the general principle that the works 
which might be thus aided should be 'of a general, not 
local, national, not State,' character. A disregard of 
of this distinction would of necessity lead to the sub­
version of the federal system....In the best view of 
these appropriations, the abuses to which they lead far 
exceed the good which they are capable of promoting. They 
may be resorted to as artful expedients to shift upon the 
Government the losses of unsuccessful private speculation, 
and thus, by ministering to personal ambition and self- 
aggrandizement, tend to sap the foundations of public 
virtue and taint the administration of the Government with 
a demoralizing influence.^
8Many of these proposed public works, like the Maysville Road, were in 
only one state, and, therefore, Jackson opposed them as the schemes of 
special interests.
Jackson felt similarly about the second Bank of the United States, 
and he fought tooth ind nail against that institution. He vetoed an 
effort to give the Bank a new charter, and withdrew federal deposits 
from the Bank. He did this, of course, because he feared that the Bank 
offered another avenue by which the rich elites might gain control of 
the government. The following section from a memorandum Jackson wrote 
on the Bank illustrates his position.
The present Bank is dangerous to Liberty:
1. Because in the number, wealth, and standing 
of its officers and stockholders, in its power
to make loans or withold them, to call oppressively 
upon its debtors or indulge them, build houses, 
rent lands & houses, and make donations for poli­
tical or other purposes, it embodies a forceful 
influence which may be wielded for the aggrandise­
ment of a favorite individual, a particular Interest, 
or a separate party*
2. Because it concentrates in the hands of a few 
men, a power over the money of the country, which may 
be perverted to the oppression of the people, and in 
times of public calamity, to the embarrasment of
the government.
4* Because it always is governed by interest and 
and will support him who supports it. An ambitious 
or dishonest president may thus always unite all of 
its power and influence in his ’'support, while an 
honest one who thwarts its views, will never tail 
to encounter the weight of its oppositon.
As his arguments indicate, Jackson was very concerned that the Link, far
from encouraging economic growth, would only facilitate an ineren
the personal fortunes and Influence of a small group.
In order to protect the populace from such criminal plots, Jackson felt 
that he had to use his position as President to block the economic pro­
9
gram of the ’special interests,” and, to this end, he used the power of 
his office, especially the veto, to frustrate his opponents. After all, 
Jackson reasoned, the President was elected to represent the whole nation, 
and therefore, it was his task to protect all of the people against the 
schemes of a greedy few. He believed, in short, that the nation-wide charac­
ter of his constituency provided him with an implicit mandate to use his 
power
The Democrats, however, were not the only ones who feared the sub­
version of republican government. The Whigs feared the same catastrophe, 
but, as Daniel Walker Howe explains below, they saw the danger coming 
from a different direction.
Democratic and Whig spokesmen in Jacksonian America, 
often reading the same political writers, drew diff­
erent conclusions. Democrats saw the chief threat 
coming from economic changes and the emergence of a 
plutocratic elite. Whigs saw a more important threat 
in the perversion of the political process by demagogues 
taking advantage of the loss of an Independent spirit 
Tiong the people. 10
The i nu rats feared a conspiracy of wealthy interests. The Whigs, 
i the other lad, feared a demagogue— a man able to claim dictatorial 
ower because >1 »n apathetic electorate.
More sped' i ally, ^he Whigs feared a ’Caesar” or a ’Napoleon.”
Che numerous examples tators coming to power through the support
of the populace served is in ’ing reminders of the dangers which threaten 
i republic. Thus, Whi> leaders such a.> H nry often spoke out on
their fears of dictatorship.
10
Remember, he (Clay) urged in a language reminiscent 
of Patrick Henry, that Greece had her Alexander, Rome 
had her Caesar, England her Cromwell, France her Bona­
parte, and, that, if we would escape the rock on 
which they split, we must avoid their errors.
As the description of Clay’s speech makes clear, he and his fellow Whigs 
wished to avoid the mistakes of previous societies which had fallen under 
the sway of an absolute ruler. What were these mistakes? Specifically, 
they stemmed from a lack of interest on the part of the populace in main­
taining personal liberty. The Whigs reasoned that, because these socie­
ties had taken their liberties for granted and neglected to iraintain a 
vigilant watch for transgressions on their freedom, demagogues had been 
able to take power.^
Where the Democrats feared an oligarchical dictatorship arising 
from a wealthy elite in Congress and the financial community, the Whigs 
feared a dictatorship jirising from the effects of an overly ambitious 
politician seated in the Presidential chair. Thus, where the Democrats 
desired a strong President to defend the common man against elitist con­
spiracies, the Whigs desired a strong Congress as a check against execu­
tive usurpation of power.
These ideas also derived from the Whig and Democratic views of repub­
lican government. At a very basic level, both sides held the same concep­
tion of republicanism because each believed in freedom for the people.
There was a strong streak of economics in the Whig philosophy that 
was absent from Democratic thinking. The Whigs believed that popular 
freedom included not only the right to do whatever one wished under the 
law, but also the opportunity— primarily economic— to improve one's self 
and position in society. In addition to the traditional task of protecting 
individual liberty, the Whigs envisioned a government that worked to create
economic opportunity— thus ensuring a fluid society. A strong central 
government was necessary to provide the force and planning necessary to 
foster such opportunity, and, since Congress, with members from all over 
the nation, was the branch of government most responsive to the people, 
the Whigs wanted Congress to hold the reigns of that strong government.
The President's chief role would be to administer and implement policy.
The Democrats believed in a society that was similarly free. Rut, 
unlike the Whigs, they did not see economic development and opportunity 
as essential to liberty, and thc> certainly di’ not want to see a strong 
central government for any reason. Instead, they inclined towards a 
laissez-faire policy in which, at most, state and local governments could 
foster economic growth. They regarded Whig economics as a sort of finan­
cial plot and, therefore, they supported a strong Presidency that would 
fend off the assaults of Whig legislators and preserve the government for 
the common man. Democratic Presidents of this era, like Jackson and Polk, 
made extensive use of their power. Not only did the Whigs object to such 
strong use of the executive office, but they also considered Democratic
political rhetoric to be a base attempt to play on the fears of the unedu-
12cated masses— just as a demagogue would. Thus, while Democrats saw their 
feared oligarchy in the Whig party, Whigs saw their apocalyptic demagogue 
in Jackson, Van Buren, and Polk.
Predictably, political arguments during these years were unusually 
heated— especially in Illinois, where economic development was an important 
issue. As Abraham Lincoln charted his course on the murky political waters 
of the 1830's, he tolled under the influence of these two philosophies 
which then dominated the national horizon.
12
When Lincoln announced his candidacy for the state legislature in 1832, 
he also made a decision concerning his political allegiance. He chose to 
run as an opponent of Jackson, and, when the Whig party formed later, he 
became a Whig. In a general sense, this political allegiance confirmed 
Lincoln's attitudes about a myriad of social, economic and political issues.
Thus, when seeking to examine the development of Lincoln's attitudes 
about the Presidency, it is important to examine Lincoln's career in oppo­
sition to the Jacksonians— to learr. something about his particular "brand 
of Whiggery." This includes not only his thoughts about executive power, 
but also his concepts of democracy and government structure.
Even though Illinois was a primarily Democratic state, it is not at
all surprising that the ambitious Lincoln eventually chose the Whig par, y.
To begin with, Lincoln's Congressional district, the seventh, was the one
anti-Jackson stronghold in the state, but more importantly, the salient
aspect of Lincoln's personal life, his hard-fought rise in society, led him
13towards the Whig party.
Like most people, Lincoln based his political ideology on his personal 
experience, and most of his life had been spent in clawing his way from the 
backwoods into the legislature and the courtroom. It is interesting to note 
that, although Lincoln always considered himself to have been born into 
the worst circumstances, his childhood and family, measured against the 
standards of the frontier, were actually a good deal better than he indicated.
Lincoln's family, for Instance, was not filled with a bunch of nameless, 
under-achieving farmers. As Thomas Purvis pointed out in his study'Of’Lin­
coln's family background, Lincoln's ancestors and those relatives alive
(3)
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during his youth Included Revolutionary War captains and Justices of the 
Peace. These were achievements and positions that heralded individuals 
of standing in the community, and there is little doubt that Lincoln knew 
about the exploits of his family. Lincoln's father, far from being the 
humbling oaf that his son described, was a respected and prosperous 
farmer. As Purvis states, Lincoln's "family background could only have 
been a source of pride and strength."
Furthermore, Lincoln's family was not really poor— at least not by 
the standards of the frontier. Certainly, Lincoln's childhood and youth 
were not easy. He worked very hard, and received little education. Yet, 
he had a roof over his head and food in his stomach, and, as a number of 
perceptive writers have pointed out, those factors alone made him better 
off than many people on the frontier.
Why, then, did Lincoln consider himself poor? Some writers, such as 
Purvis, feel that Lincoln created this aura of poverty in order to collect 
the political rewards that a "self-made" man received in those days. 
Although Lincoln certainly benefited politically from his image as a common 
man, there is a strong body of scholarship that suggests a far more basic 
reason for Lincoln's belief that he was poor. In this view, Lincoln con­
sidered himself poor because he used the upper-class as a reference group 
to compare himself with instead of the frontiersman amoung whom he had
grown up. Compared to the elite classes of Springfield, Lincoln was
14undoubtedly destitute.
Considering the evidence, this "reference group" solution to the dis­
parity between Lincoln's statements and the realities of his childhood 
seems the most plausible. As Stephen Oates relates in his biography of 
Lincoln, the future president mixed with many individuals of greater wealth
14
in the legislature, and he spent much of his time mixing in the social 
circles of the upper-class. Eventually, of course, Lincoln took his wife, 
Mary, from a very well established family of Springfield and Lexington.
Upon meeting these individuals of greater wealth and prestige, Lin­
coln became very conscious of the shortcomings of his own background. It 
was much more than a matter of clothes, dwellings, or personal fortune.
The difference that he felt most deeply was his lack of formal education—  
especially because many of his acquaintances had gone to college. Once, 
while riding on the "circuit" to handle law cases, Lincoln attended a 
science and inventions show at a local school. Upon returning from the 
show, he described the things that he had seen for his fellow lawyers, 
and, after ending his discourse, he made a typical remark concerning his 
want of education.
Yes, he (Lincoln) said, sadly, 1 now have an advan­
tage over you in, for the first time in my life, 
seeing those things which are of course common to 
those who had, what I did not, a chance at an cduca- 
tion, when they were young. °
Coming from the background that he did, Lincoln had a great deal of which 
to be proud, but it seems that he rarely dwelled on how far he had come. 
Instead, as the remark above indicates, he seemed to emphasize how far he 
still had to go in order to close the gap between himself and the upper- 
class that he wished to enter.
Although a discussion of Lincoln's attitudes concerning his background 
may seem tangential to a study of his Presidency, such a discourse is 
actually very important. Lincoln, even more than most people, developed 
his political views out of the experiences of his own life, and the central 
event of his early life is his rise from the lower to the upper class.
15
Because he felt that his family was poorer and less noteworthy than It
really was, he was all the more keenly aware of the aspects of his personal
rise through hard work and opportunity.
This strong awareness of his personal development and the reasons
for It formed the real foundation of Lincoln's Whig political philosophy.
In his study of Lincoln and the American dream, C. S. Boritt touched upon
the relation between Lincoln's personal history and his political outlook.
Why should an enterprising young man who expected 
to get ahead in life reject the Whig view of the 
American system, which promised to pave his road 
and that of his countrymen? Lincoln sensed, to 
borrow the words of Marvin Meyers, that the Whigs 
tended to speak to the 'explicit hopes of Americans' 
and the Jacksonians to their"diffuse fears and 
resentments.'
As will be shown, economics, i nd a related vision 
of America, more than any other factor, made Lin­
coln a Whig from 1832 to 1854— and indeed to the 
end of his life.
As Boritt notes, the "enterprising" Lincoln was drawn to the Whig pro­
gram of economic development. The Whigs proposed to build the raw Repub­
lic into an economic power with opportunity for all. This appealed to 
the ambitious Lincoln, who identified strongly with the notions of oppor­
tunity and development. A man of great intellect, he was also drawn to 
what he saw as the sober reasoning of the Whigs.^
Throughout most of Lincoln's career, therefore, he pursued the advan­
cement of Whig candidates and policies. He fought for Whig programs in 
the Illinois House of Representatives, and he strongly supported the Whig 
party as a Congressman. And, even though Lincoln joined the Republican 
party after the demise of the Whigs, he carried many Whig principles with 
him into the new party. For the purpose of study! Lincoln's attitude 
about the Presidency, his career as a Whig is best examined from two
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perspectives— his philosophy and his practical politics. Through using
these two standpoints, Lincoln's views on the Issues that would later
become relevant during his Presidency are highlighted along with the
depth and continuity 1 etween his philosophy and politics.
Lincoln was unquestionably a very principled man, and, if there
was any idea in which Lincoln believed right down to the marrow of his
bones, it was that the American republic was a sacred project that had to
18be improved and preserved for the future generations of all mankind.
Lincoln understood very well that his own personal fortune in life was 
due to the opportunities of republican society, and he felt that everyone 
else should have the same chance. Thus, at the pure and basic level, 
Abraham Lincoln’s philosophy was founded on the value of republicanism, 
concerned with the question of how best to preserve and enhance the young 
American Republic.
And, for Lincoln, republicanism was not a narrow concept. It meant
a number of things. Primarily, Lincoln felt that it stood for full free-
dome of self-expression— political, social, and religious. It also stood
for the freedom of economic improvement, which was something that Lincoln
and his fellow Whigs felt the government ought to promote. Lincoln liked
to say that republicanism entailed, in large part, ensuring that "all have
equal privileges in the race of life."^ This did not mean that he thought
everyone should be in the same social and economic class; he felt, Instead,
that everyone should have the right to raise themselves into the highest
possible class. Some historians, such as G. S. Borltt, have even gone so
far as to state that Lincoln promoted "the right to rise as the central
20
Idea of the United States."
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While there is no question that Boritt is right in assigning an 
economic dimension to Lincoln*s philosophy, the other aspects of self- 
expresstlon, especially political freedom, were just as important.
Indeed, Lincoln felt, as most politicians of his day did, that only when 
the people exercised their political liberties to the fullest would the 
government, a reflection of the popular will, be at its best. Traveling 
to Washington as president-elect, he told the throngs that gathered where- 
ever he went that "if you, the PEOPLE, are but true to yourselves and the 
Constitution, there is but little harm that I can do."
Although Lincoln is known for many of the finest and most direct 
statements on the issues of his day, it is interesting to find that some 
of his best commentary exists, little known to the public, in his more 
obscure speeches and working papers. Consider the following "fragment 
on the Constitution and the Union" that Lincoln wrote in January of 1861. 
It is worth reproducing in full because, in his almost painstaking reason­
ing, Lincoln expresses his republican philosophy so well.
All this is not the result of accident. It has a 
philosophical cause. Without the Constitution and 
the Union, we could not have attained the result; 
but even these, are not the primary cause of our 
great prosperity. There is something back of these, 
entwining itself more closely about the human heart.
That something, is the principle of "Liberty to all*
— the principle that clears the path for all— gives 
hope to all— and, by consequence, enterprise, and 
industry to all.
The expression of that principle in our Declaration 
of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate. With­
out this, as well as with it, we could have declared 
our Independence of Great Britain; but without it, we 
could not, I think, have secured our free government, 
and consequent prosperity. No oppressed people will 
fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without the 
promise of something better, than a mere change of masters.
18
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the 
word ’fitly spoken’ which has proved an 'apple of gold’ 
to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture 
of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture 
was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to 
adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the 
apple— not the apple for the picture. So let us act, 
that neither picture, or apple shall ever be blurred or 
bruised or broken.
As Lincoln said, "the principle of 'Liberty to all'" is at the heart of the
American experiment, and, to his mind, It was at once the foundation, pillars,
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and roof of American society and government.
Lincoln's words indicate something else about his principles, too.
He believed that the freedom espoused in the Declaration of Independence—
"the principle of 'Liberty to all'"— was more important than the documents 
and institutions by which ’he government was created. As he put it; "The 
picture (government institutions) was made for the apple (freedom)— not the 
apple for the picture." Yet, although Lincoln valued republican liberty 
above the mere machinery of government he did not feel that liberty could 
survive without government institutions. The picture, while of lesser value 
than the apple, was necessary to "adorn" and "nreserve" the apple. Thus, 
for Lincoln, the foundations of American government— the Constitution and 
the Union— were inextricably bound up with the fate of liberty in the United 
States. While the Constitution and the Union meant nothing to Lincoln 
without freedom, he also knew that freedom could not survive without these 
supporting apparatus.
Furthermore, thebe words are significant because they demonstrate, 
outside of their meaning and sound, the extent to which Lincoln valued 
freedom as the foundation of his personal philosophy. Consider the time at 
which Lincoln wrote as well as the purpose for which he wrote that fragment.
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It was January of 1861 and Lincoln was a president-elect from the' all- 
Northern Republican party. Southerners were threatening to secede because 
the Republicans had captured the Presidency, and Lincoln’s fragment was 
undoubtedly his attempt to sort out and express why he thought the Union 
was worth preserving. And, to Lincoln, as he stated in that fragment, 
it was not the institutions and the charters of government that were impor­
tant. Instead, it was that "something back of these" government structures 
— liberty— that was important. The institutions and charters were framed 
to support and protect freedom. The real danger of secession, thererore, 
was not that the government might be destroyed. The institution meant 
nothing by itself. Rather, the reason Lincoln felt that ruining the gov­
ernment would be such a crime was because liberty, for Americans and all 
other men, would be ruined in the process. America’s example to the world 
would be forever lost. Thus, Lincoln felt it essential to make sure that
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"neither picture, or apple shall ever be blurred or bruised or broken."
Lincoln feared that this fine experiment in Republican government 
might eventually be subverted. Like his fellow Whigs, he was terrified by 
the possiblity that a demagogue might someday take over the government.
He saw such a man arising because of an apathetic and disorderly populace, 
and he believed that, when the people ceased to value and respect govern­
ment and law, the way was clear for some iron-fisted charlatan to assume 
power.
In 1838, sickened by a growing strain of mob violence highlighted by 
the killing of anti-slavery editor Elijah Lovejoy in Alton, Illinois, Lin­
coln delivered an address to the Young Men’s Lyceum in Springfield in 
which he expressed his fear of lawlessness and dictatorship. The speech
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was perhaps Lincoln's finest effort at oratory prior to the 1850's, and 
it was liis strongest statement concerning the threat that popular disorder 
and overly ambitious men posed to the country.
Lincoln began by reminding his audience of their obligation to pre­
serve the blessings of liberty. This portion of the speech illustrates 
his strong sense of responsibility as far as preserving and enhancing the 
Republic for future generations.
We, when mounting the stage of existence, found ourselves 
the legal inheritors of these fundamental blessings. We 
toiled not in the acquirement or establishment of them—  
they are i legacy bequeathed us, by a once hardy, brave, 
and patriotic, but now lamented and departed race of ances­
tors. Their's was the task (and nobly they performed it) 
to possess themselves, and through themselves, us, of this 
goodly land; and to uprear upon its hills and its valleys, 
a political edifice of liberty and equal rights; 'tis ours 
only, to transmit these, the former, unprofaned by the 
foot of an invader; the latter, undecayed by the lapse of 
time, and untorn by usurpation— to the latest generation 
that fate shall permit the world to know. This task of 
gratitude to our fathers, justice to ourselves, duty to 
posterity, and love for our species in general, all impera­
tively require us faithfully to perform.
In expressing his desire to strengthen the Republic, Lincoln demonstrated
not only the great esteem in which ht held republican institutions, but he
also showed his concern that something evil might befall the nation. If
there had been no danger, he would not have seen any need to admonish his
audience about their responsibility to transmit the Republic "undecayed"
to future generations.
Lincoln did, however, see a possibility that republican government 
might indeed be destroyed. The danger was not the armies of foreign nations. 
No army, he felt, could defeat the United States "in a trial of a thousand 
years." Rather* he saw the danger coming from within: "we must ou selves
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be" the "author and finisher" of the destruction of the Republic— if that 
were ever to occur.
Taking note of the recent incidents of mob violence, he expressed fear 
that the government would lose its "strongest bulwark"... the attachment 
of the people" because of "the operation of this moboeratie spirit." If 
"the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions, in 
lieu of the sober judgement of Courts" was allowed to continue unchecked, 
he reasoned, the government would lose the respect and loyalty of decent 
citizens. Why should such people, he asked, remain loyal to a government 
that did not protect them? Would the populace not then be susceptible to 
the machinations of a wily and ambitious demagogue? At the very least, 
the disaffected citizens might see no harm in changing from one brand of 
chaos to another. How could things get worse?
Fearing that his own generation was perhaps unwittingly bringing
about the destruction of the Republic- in this manner, Lincoln described
for his audience the kind jf man who might emerge as a leader from such
a tumult. This individual would aspire far beyond the highest stations
society could offer. He would be of "the family of the lion, or the tribe
of the eagle." He would thirst for challenge and glory, but, since the
glory of creating the Republic was "a field harvested" by the Revolutionary
generation, Lincoln believed that this demagogue would turn to other less
benevolent ways to earn his place in history.
The question then, is, can that gratification be found 
in supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been 
erected by others? Most certainly it cannot....Towering 
genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto 
unexplored. It sees no distinction in adding story to 
story, upon the monuments of fame, erected to the memory 
of others. It denies that it is glery enough to serve
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under any chief....Distinct Lon will be his paramount 
object; and although he would as willingly, perhaps 
more so, acquire It by doing good as harm; yet, that 
opportunity being past, and nothing left to be done 
In the way of building up, he would set boldly to the 
task of pulling down.
Thus, Lincoln feared that, since this zealous and intelligent man could 
not make a name for himself as a friend of republican institutions, he 
would seek notoriety as the sworn foe of them. If such a man, through 
the carelessness of the populace, ever became president, Lincoln saw 
little hope for the Republic.
Lincoln did not, however, fail to provide a solution to this poten­
tial threat. He offered his audience a defense against depotism that 
would also alleviate the mob violence that was sweeping the land. The 
essence of his solution was to encourage all Americans to respect the 
government and the laws.
The question recurs 'how shall we fortify against it?1 
The answer is simple. Let every American, every lover 
of liberty, every well wisher to his posterity, .swear 
by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the 
least particular, the laws of the country; and never to 
tolerate their violation by others.
Lincoln went on to embellish his advice with some fine oratory and verbal 
imagery, but his point was actually a simple one. Obeying the law is impor­
tant not only because it is necessary to prohibit certain acts for the
safety of all, but also because a Republic cannot function without respon-
23sible citizens and orderly conduct.
On this point of popular responsibility in a republic, several things 
may be said. The first is that Lincoln's belief that republican institu­
tions demanded responsible behavior is strong testimony to the depth of his 
love for the Republic. He certainly believed in liberty, but he parted
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company with the Democrats when it came to the "mobocr.it ic spirit." Un­
like the Jacksonians, he saw simplistic mob violence, even in its more mild 
forms, as irresponsible. Far from being grass-roots democracy, Lincoln 
saw it as a threat because through lawlessness and a lack of sober reasoning 
it paved the way for a dictator. Thus, it is certainly more apt to term 
Lincoln's political philosophy as "republican" than "democratic." This is 
not only because he held republican institutions as mankind’s highest aspira­
tion, but also because he espoused a more responsible, perhaps more pure, 
form of liberty as the only kind of freedom befitting a republic. He saw 
no constructive role for "mobocratic" behavior, and it certainly fell out­
side of his concept of liberty.
As a Whig, then, Lincoln's political and personal philosophy centered 
around the preservation and enhancement of republican Institutions. They 
meant everything to him because he knew from personal experience how indivi­
duals, like himself, could thrive and improve with full freedom of expression. 
He revered the Constitution and the Union because these were structures that 
were cornerstones of the Republic, and he felt that American freedom could 
not survive without these supporting institutions,
Lincoln's concept of republicanism was deep and profound. He believed 
in enhancing the Republic through protecting the freedom of expression and 
encouraging economic development and class mobility. In Lincoln's view, 
American institutions were a precious blessing— something not to be taken 
for granted. In addition to ensuring rights, they demanded a responsible, 
sober outlook and a willingness to obey the laws. In these attitudes, Lin­
coln found himself in the company of the rest of the Whig party.
Of course, Lincoln did not adopt the Whig philosophy merely as an
24
Intellectual lark. It was a philosophy that he intended to apply to the 
real problems of his day. Indeed, if it is true that philosophy is an 
attempt to reduce complex matters to basic principles, then it is also 
true, or at least it should be true, that politics is an attempt to apply 
one's basic philosophy to the complex realities of society. In Lincoln's 
case, the depth and continuity of the link between his personal philosophy 
and political positions was nothing less than extraordinary, and his prac­
tical expression of his principles exhibits much of the attitude toward 
American government and the Presidency that he developed during the years 
prior to 1861.
Not surprisingly, Lincoln supported the full Whig program of political 
and economic development of  the Republic. Since Illinois was a frontier 
area that was growing at a phenomenal rate, the debate over the Whig economic 
program took on increased meaning as Illinoisans considered various methods 
of promoting economic development in the state. As Paul Simon points out 
in his study of Lincoln's career as an Illinois legislator, both Democrats 
and Whigs supported internal improvements because Illinois was badly in 
need of an infrastructure. Unfortunately, the legislators of both parties, 
including Lincoln, voted the state into a terrible debt in the process of 
building improvements. To Simon, Lincoln's support of the internal improve­
ments scheme was a monumental blunder.^
On other economic questions, especially the Bank, the debate was as 
furious as it was anywhere else, and Lincoln and the other Whigs fought 
hard to support the Bank— both in Illinois and on the national level. In 
fact, Lincoln delivered a particularly noteworthy defense of the U.S* Bank 
against a Democratic scheme to replace it with a Sub-Treasury system.25
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In addition to promoting his version of economic progress, Lincoln 
showed the depth of his belief in republican institutions by fighting 
many of the less popular battles that concerned political rights in a 
Republic. In those days, every politician in America supported political 
freedom— for adult white males. Very few, however, were willing to carry 
freedom's standard on behalf of immigrants, women, and even the lowly black 
slave. Lincoln was different in that he advocated treating these groups 
fairly long before it was politically popular.
On March 3, 1037, while the Illinois legislature passed resolutions 
against abolitionists, Lincoln, along with another representative from 
Sangamon County, Dan Stone, placed a protest against slavery on the offi­
cial record of the legislature. Although Lincoln and Stone acknowledged 
that "the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends rather to Increase 
rather than to abate its (slavery's) evils," they felt "that the institu­
tion of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy." Given the 
strong antiabolition sentiment in Illinois, which often exploded into 
savage violence, Lincoln's statement, while not a complete call for the 
end of slavery, represents nonetheless a significant early commitment in 
opposition to slavery.^
This commitment is also apparent in Lincoln's attitudes about women 
and immigrants. Although Lincoln never made women's rights a major issue, 
he did state, in a letter to the Sangamo Journal in 1836, that he supported 
"admitting all whites to the right of suffrage, who pay taxes or bear arms, 
(by no means excluding females)." This shows his willingness to extend 
political power to all those who were willing to act responsibly. Later, in 
1844, Lincoln was a part of a Whig committee in Springfield that drew up
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resolutions condemning a series of anti-Catholic riots In Philadelphia 
in which the violence was primarily directed against Irish immigrants.
He further demonstrated his commitment to the rights of b l a c k s  and 
immigrants in a letter that he wrote in 1855 to his o!d friend Joshua K. 
Speed. In the letter* Lincoln vented his frustration and anger about the 
activities of the "Know-Nothing" party— a natlvist movement that opposed 
the extension of rights to blacks and immigrants* especially Catholic 
immigrants.
I am not a Know-Nothing. That is certain. How could 1 
he? How can anyone who abhors the oppression of negroes* 
be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our 
progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid.
As a nation, we began by declaring that "all men are 
created equal." We now practically read it "all men are 
created equal, except negroes." When the Know-Nothings 
get control, it will read "all men are created equal, 
except negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics." When 
it comes to this, 1 should prefer emigrating to some 
country where they make no pretence of loving liberty— to 
Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, 
and without the base alloy of hypocracy....
Lincoln railed against the narrow-minded views that the Know-Nothings held,
and his way of fighting such opinion was by supporting measures that helped
down-trodden groups such as blacks and immigrants. Indeed, by enlarging the
boundaries of freedom to include the oppressed , he believed that he was
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enriching the Republic for all.
In addition to advocating proposals that would enhance political and 
economic freedoms, Lincoln argued in support of a particular kind of govern­
ment structure which he felt would further strengthen and protect republi­
can institutions. Since Congress has members from all across the land, 
Lincoln felt that it best represented the will of the people, and, there­
fore, he believed that Congress should be the dynamic and policy-making
branch of the government. The President, in Lincoln's view, was supposed 
to administer the policies that Congress made. He thought that the Presi­
dent was completely unfit to make national policy because he was only one 
man In an isolated cilice. He could not possibly know the wishes of the 
entire people as well as the Congress with its diverse membership. Thus, 
because of Ills conception of po 1 i cv-tnka i ng, Lincoln wanted the President 
to play a secondary role in government.
This fit in well with Lincoln's fear of a demagogue. After all. the 
Presidency was the place at which a dictator would arise, if that ever 
occurred, and, as long as the office was limited in scope, Lincoln believed 
that there was less chance that anyone could subvert the government.
During the terms of strong-willed Democratic Presidents, like Jackson, 
Lincoln had plenty of opportunities to criticize what he viewed as usurpa­
tions of power by the executive. The Democrats, although they believed 
in a weak federal government, supported the strong use of Presidential power 
to frustrate the machinations of special interests in Congress— or what Lin­
coln and the Whigs regarded as a legitimate economic program. The vetoes 
and other uses of executive power employed by Jackson and his Democratic 
successors caused Lincoln and other Whigs a great deal of consternation.
In a speech in Springfield in 1839, Lincoln expressed his sentiments on 
the matter in a series of propositions, two of which concerned Jackson and 
his hand-picked successor, Martin Van Buren.
1st, That there had been a total change in the adminis­
tration of the Government, within the last ten years; 
and that change had been for the WORSE. 2d. That a new 
and corrupt system of tactics had been introduced into 
the National administration, unknown to former adminis­
trations.. . •
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Lincoln believed that Jackson and Van Buren, both of whom made frequent 
use of executive power, had changed the government for the "WORSE" by 
enlarging the role of the Presidency. In fact, he regarded any administra­
tion in which the President dominated many of the policy decisions that
-*8
were meant f o r  C ongre ss  as a " c o r r u p t  s y s t e m . "
Lincoln argued, instead, for an arrangement under which the President
allowed Congress a free hand In drafting legislation and making policy.
The following section from a "fragment" he wrote on the candidacy of Zachary
Taylor indicates that Lircoln thought that there were very few instances in
which the President ought to become involved in Congressional policy-making.
Finally, were I president, I should desire the legisla­
tion of the country to rest with Congress, uninfluenced 
by the executive in it's (sic) origin or progress, and 
undisturbed by the veto unless in very special and clear 
cases.
Obviously, Lincoln did not want to see the veto or other forms of executive 
power used to promote an "administration" position on any issue, but, rather, 
he wanted such power used only "in very special and clear cases"— which were 
those instances in which the legislation in question might conflict with the 
Constitution.
This concern about the role of the Presidency in government was not a 
passing worry for Lincoln and the Whigs. Given the propensity of the Demo­
crats towards a strong application of executive power, the proper place of 
the President was a constant issue. Consider, for example, the following 
resolutions which were issued by the Illinois Whig Convention of 1844.
Lincoln was on the committee which drafted the resolutions.
That the establishment of a sound currency, the practical 
restriction of the veto power, so that it may not be wielded 
to the centralization of all power in the hands of a corrupt
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and despotic Executive; the* limitation of the presiden­
tial office to one term; the noninterference of all offi­
cers of the government as such, in elections; an economi­
cal, faithful and impartial administration of the govern­
ment— and reform of all those abuses which have sprung 
out of the corrupt use of the power of appointments, are 
also objects which claim our approval, and challenge our 
untiring efforts to secure their accomplishments.
As a member of the Committee, Lincoln certainly endorsed the resolutions—
they agree to the letter with views which he expressed individually on other
occasions. Indeed, the resolutions reflect his determination to oppose any
Presidential efforts to make government policy outside of Congress.
Perhaps the clearest and most concise statement that Lincoln ever made 
concerning his view of the Presidency prior to 1861 is contained within a 
speech that he made on behalf of the candidacy of Zachary Taylor in Septem­
ber of 1848 in Worcester, Massachusetts.
He (Lincoln) maintained that Gen. Taylor occupied a high 
and unexceptionable whig (sic) ground, and took for his 
first instance and proof of this his statement in the 
Allison letter— with regard to the Bank, Tariff, Rivers, 
and Harbors, &c.— that the will of the people should do 
what— under the Constitution— they please, is a Whig 
principle. All that Gen. Taylor does is not only to 
judge and act for themselves. And this was no new doc­
trine for the Whigs. It was their ’platform* on which
they had fought all their battles, the resistance of 
Executive Influence, and the principle of enabling the 
people to frame the government according to their will... 
on that very ground, Gen. Taylor says that he should 
use the power given him by the people to do, to the best 
of his judgement, the will of the people.
In that speech, Lincoln not only enunciated his view of the Presidency in 
a very direct fashion, but he also indicated how much his particular con­
ception of the office meant to him. In urging the people to vote for 
Taylor, Lincoln made only passing reference to the fact that Taylor had 
adopted all of the Whig positions. Lincoln spent the majority of his speech
praising Taylor because of the fact that the old General believed "that the
will of the people should produce its own results without Executive in­
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f lienee." In oilier words* for Lincoln* the primary reason for supporting 
Taylor was not his complete adoption of Whig positions. Instead, tell­
ing his audience to vote for Taylor* lie chose to stress Taylor's adherence 
to the Whig Presidential model. Indeed* this speech demonstrates that the 
question of Presidential power was as important to Lincoln as the practical 
issues of the day.
Lincoln viewed the Presidency, therefore* as an administrative rubber 
stamp for the popular consensus as reflet ted in Congress, and the Presi­
dent's only role in decision-making was "to appeal to the people to Judge 
and act for themselves."
As he continued his speech in Worcester, Lincoln complemented his dis­
course on Taylor and the President'y with his views on the role of Congress 
in the government.
...it was clearly the intention and the true philoso­
phy of our government, that in Congress all opinions 
and principles should be represented, and that when 
the wisdom of all had been compared and united, the 
will of the majority should be carried out.
These words confirm Lincoln's view that Congress should be the dominant
policy-making organ of government. Only through emphasizing the role of the
most diverse, democratic branch, the legislature, could "the will of the
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majority...be carried out."
Of course, the well-being of the majority formed the central concern 
of Lincoln's practical political positions. In advocating the enhancement, 
extension, and preservation of republican institutions, Lincoln sought to 
implement a philosophy that he believed would benefit all of America and, 
eventually, all of mankind.
He advocated the extension of rights to groups who had few advocates 
in society, and he believed that the government should promote economic de­
velopment in order to enrich the opportunities that the Republic offered. 
He fought for a government structure that stressed Congress over the 
President because he thought that such an arrangement was the best way to 
preserve liberty.
Although Lincoln dealt with a wide variety of issues and events, 
his unswerving, unwavering belief in republican government always dictated 
his views. He was always for that measure which nourished the Republic, 
and* although he often had to lower the tone of his rhetoric because of 
practical political considerations, he never abandoned any of his posi­
tions. Clearly, Lincoln was a stout soldier of principle, and he was 
just as obviously not a political mercenary— willing to take any side 
that was popular.
It if. important to realize the strength of Lincoln’s republican phil­
osophy and to remember the particular kind of government structure that he 
advocated in association with that philosophy. Later, in the chaos of 
Civil War, Lincoln abandoned his notion of a weak presidency because his 
love of the Republic was so strong that he would do anything necessary to 
preserve it for posterity. The explanation for much of Lincoln's Presi­
dency lies, therfore, in the earlier years of his life, when he developed 
such a strong belief in the republican government under which he had 
grown from an uneducated laborer into a lawyer and a statesman.
(4)
Lincoln's legislative career was not confined to the Illinois House of 
Representatives. In 1846, he was elected to his single term in the federal 
House of Representatives. While he was there, he carried on the battle for 
republican government as the Whigs saw it, and he even drafted legislation
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that would have abolished slavery in the District of Columbia.
The primary reason for examining Lincoln*s Congressional career, how­
ever, is because the Mexican War was the salient issue of the 1847-1849 
term, and Lincoln’s reaction to the Polk administration’s handling of the 
conflict illustrates his attitude on the government’s war power— particu­
larly concerning the role of the Presidency.
Although Lincoln opposed the war vehemently, it is important to note 
that, contrary to popular mythology, his position was not nearly as unpopu­
lar as it was later thought. Writers such as Albert Beveridge and William 
Herndon fostered the mistaken belief that Lincoln had committed ’political 
suicide” in taking his Mexican War stand. In recent studies, however, 
both Mark Neely, Jr. and G. S. Boritt have demonstrated clearly that Lin­
coln was taking a position that Whigs everywhere were taking and that, in 
addition, the defeat of the Whig Congressional candidate in 1849 in Lin­
coln’s district was due to the man's poor speaking skills and not to
Lincoln’s war stand. As Neely pointed out, several of Lincoln's peers,
31even from the nationalistic West, argued against the war.
Even though Lincoln's anti-Polk stand on the Mexican War was not the 
idealistic heroism that it appeared to be, it demonstrates nevertheless, 
Lincoln's specific attitudes concerning the war power.
Lincoln began his opposition to the war by delivering his famous "spot” 
resolutions in a speech in the House. In the resolutions, he challenged 
James K. Polk to offer evidence to justify the administration claim that 
the Mexicans had invaded American territory and killed Americans. Lincoln 
wished to know if the'^pot” on which this incident took place was actually 
in Mexico, and he wanted to find out if the supposedly harmless citizens
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that the Mexicans attacked were actually U.S. soldiers.
Three weeks later, on January 12, 1848, Lincoln delivered a speech in 
the House in which he blasted the Mexican War as an unjust and unnecessary 
conflict. Examining all of Polk’s messages concerning the war, he picked 
his way through the President's case for the war like an experienced pros­
ecutor, and concluded that Polk was covering up the real circumstances in 
which the fighting started.
1 am now through the whole of the President’s evidence...
My way of living leads me to be about the courts of jus­
tice; and there, I have sometimes seen a good lawyer, 
struggling for his client’s neck, in a desperate case, 
employing every artifice to work round, befog, and cover 
up, with many words, some point arising in the case,
which he dared not admit, and yet could not deny. Party
bias may help to make it appear sc; but with all the allow­
ance 1 can make for such bias, It still does appear to me, 
that just such, and from Just such necessity, is the 
President's struggle in this case.
Lincoln, as the above passage from his speech shows, did not believe Polk’s 
explanation of the war's beginning. Consequently, feeling that the war was
unjustly begun, he stated that "the blood of Abel, is crying to heaven
against him (Polk)."^
Later, February 15, Lincoln wrote a letter to his law partner,
William Herndon, in which he reflected upon the deeper Implications of the
Mexican War for the Presidency. He was writing in particular in response to
a letter that Herndon had sent to him in which the case was made that the
President had the Constitutional right to, on his own authority. Invade a
foreign country in order to prevent an attack on the U.S.
But to return to your position: Allow the President to
invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it 
necessary to repel an invasion and you allow him to do 
so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary 
for such purpose*— and you allow him to make war at pleasure.
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Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this 
respect, after you have given him so much as you propose.
If, to-day, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary 
to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, 
how could you stop him? You may say to him, "I see no 
probability of the British invading us" but he will say 
to you "be silent; I see it, if you dont (sic)."
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making 
power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by 
the following reasons. Kings had always been Involving 
and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending gener­
ally, if not always, that the good of the people was the 
object. This, our Convention understood to be the most 
oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved 
to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold 
the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your 
view destroys the whole matter, and places our President 
where kings have always stood...33
Lincoln's words address the exact question with which he would later deal 
as President. In the days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, he feared 
an imminent rebel attack on Washington, and, on his own authority, he 
Invoked the war power, along with numerous other Congressional powers, in 
order to raise forces for the defense of the capltol and the defeat of the 
rebellion.
Granted, Lincoln was dealing with a domestic conflict instead of a for­
eign war. Yet, the oppression inherent In war is the same for both domestic 
and foreign conflicts, and thus his actions still contradicted the sentiment 
expressed in his letter to Herndon— that the war power should rest with 
Congress. What is important to note for the present, lit that, in the years 
prior to 1861, Lincoln flatly asserted that the war power of the government 
lay with Congress. This was not only because of Constitutional law, but it 
was also based on Lincoln's republican philosophy. He abhorred the idea of 
"one man" possessing "the power of bringing this oppression upon us."
In spite of his strong feelings on public issues, Lincoln chose to
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leave politics after his Congressional term expired. He had not enjoyed 
Washington as much as he thought he would, and, although there were prob­
ably several reasons for his decision, one major reason was certainly his 
disappointment at not receiving the political office that he sought from 
President Taylor. Lincoln wanted to be Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, hut all he was offered was the governorship of the remote Oregon 
territory. Instead, the commissionership was given to another man who had 
not even supported Taylor*s candidacy. Because he had campaigned hard for 
Taylor, Lincoln felt jilted, angry, and tired, and he left politics for 
his law practice.
In the following years, Lincoln concerned himself completely with 
legal activities. He worked very hard. Yet, he still kept in touch with 
politics; given his strong sense of principle, it was only a matter of 
time before he would again become involved in the political tumult of mid- 
nineteenth century America.
The event which brought Lincoln back was the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 
1854. Effectively clearing the way for the spread of slavery above the 
Missouri compromise line, this bill, along with the infamous Dred Scott 
decision, outraged opponents of the "peculiar institution"— particularly 
Lincoln.
He returned to politics with a passion that he had rarely known since 
his young and enthusiastic days. Motivated by a powerful and righteous 
anger, Llncol- made speeches all across Illinois in which he denounced 
the spread of slavery and those responsible for It. Since the Whig party 
had disintegrated in the fiery chaos of the sectional debate, Lincoln 
joined the new Republican party— an all-Northern organisation dedicated to
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preventing the spread of slavery.
In 1858, he ran for the Senate against Stephen A. Douglas, and, in the 
course of the campaign, the two agreed to meet in a series of debates around 
Illinois. These famous forensic duels drew an enormous amount of national 
attention to the Illinois Senatorial contest. Although Lincoln lost the 
Senate race, he became a national figute in the process.
In fact, with the fires of anger fanned high by the slavery debate, 
Lincoln was invited to go on a speaking tour throughout New England.
He was a smashing success, and, in 1860, he decided to run for the Presiden­
tial nomination. Lincoln was, from the start, a dark hose candidate, but 
the Republicans nominated him because they felt that he stood the best 
chance of election.
On November 6, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected the sixteenth Presi­
dent of the United States. He was elected solely on the basis of the 
Northern vote, and even a substantial amount of that was given to Stephen 
Douglas. His election was, in a sense, a hollow victory because it pro­
voked a massive secession movement in the South. Southerners began their 
attempt to destroy the government soon after Lincoln was elected President,
and, as he prepared to travel to Washington, the incipient stages of a
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catastrophic rebellion started to unfold before the nation.
For Lincoln, the situation was cruel indeed. He, who revered the Repub­
lic, was now faced with a conflict that threatened the republican institu­
tions that he loved so dearly. He, who believed in a weak executive as a 
matter of principle, would now very likely be called upon to act strongly 
in dealing with the looming crisis. If he failed to act strongly, there 
was a good chance that the American Republic and its institutions would
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vanish as a result of secession. He was 
the proverbial rock and the hard place.
in more ways than one, between
CHAPTER TWO
MR. LINCOLN'S WAR
"This Is essentially a People's contest”
-Abraham Lincoln 
July 4, 1861
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As the fires of secession spread across the South in the months foll­
owing his election, the President-elect, still residing in Springfield, 
worked on the numerous tasks which had to be accomplished prior to his 
inauguration. He had i:o form a cabinet. He had to plan his trip to Wash­
ington. He had to receive the multitude of groups and individuals who came 
to see him. Finally, on top of it all, there was a great deal of personal 
business that he had to finish before leaving Springfield.*
Lincoln's most important duty, however, was to make clear the policy 
of his incoming administration on matters which were already then becoming 
Important. As the months of December and January passed, Americans watched 
with horror, or perhaps elation if one were residing in the deep South, 
as the lower tier of Southern states, the cotton states, seceded from the 
Union, and, in the process, took possession of almost all of the federal 
property within their borders. Although President Janes Buchanan made 
worthy efforts to uphold federal authority, everyone knew that his adminis­
tration was a lame-duck regime without power. Buchanan's policies were
without force because his government, with only a few months left in office,
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lacked the strength of continuity.
Thus, even before Lincoln took office, people looked to him, the Presi­
dent for the next four years, to make clear the policy of the national gov­
ernment concerning secession and the seizure of federal property. Although 
Lincoln insisted that he would not reveal his policy on secession until he 
had taken office, he did, in private, write a great many of the nation's 
most Influential men— particularly leaders of the Republican party.
(1)
AO
In his letters, Lincoln urged Republicans to oppose the plans for
compromise which were then being proposed in Washington. Lincoln thought
that a lot of this compromise talk smacked of Stephen Douglas* old popular
sovereignty doctrine. Lincoln referred to popular sovereignty as "dangerous
ground" which could possibly "lose us everything we gained by the election."
If the Republicans "surrender(ed)" to Southern demands, he wrote, It would
be "the end of (the Republican party), and the government." Lincoln feared
that a compromise, far from preserving peace, would only lead Southerners
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to "repeat the experiment upon us ad libitum."
Even though Lincoln’s decision not to endorse a compromise raised the 
question of how he, as President, proposed to pull the seceded states back 
into the Union, he still appeared, judging from his remarks during his trip 
to Washington, to hold the same views of American government, society, and 
the Presidency that he had held previously.
Of course, republicanism was still the cornerstone of his personal 
ideology. During a stop in Philadelphia, he pointed to Independence Hall, 
where the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were formulated, 
and he stated that he had "never asked anything that does not breathe from 
those walls." Indeed, all of his "political warfare" was "in favor of the 
teachings coming forth from that sacred hall."*
Although Lincoln never touched on the subject of government structure 
directly, his speeches on that trip to Washington were filled with oblique 
references to his ideas of how the various branches of government should 
interact, and all of these remarks Indicate that he continued to believe
In a weak Executive and a strong Congress.
At Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, while making a politically
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appropriate remark about the tariff, he said the following about the role
of Congress in the government.
According to my political education, I am inclined to 
believe that the people in the various sections of the 
country should have their own views carried out through 
their representatives in Congress.... 5
Lincoln’s words express the old Whig notion that Congress— the brach of gov­
ernment which understood the desires of the nation best— should make policy. 
Indeed, this statement echoes his previous endorsements of a strong Congress- 
particular iy those he made while campaigning for Zachary Taylor.
Lincoln never discussed the issue of Presidential authority in any 
detail, but he made enough remarks concerning the strength of the people 
and his own humility to lead one to the conclusion that he st'll believed 
in a weak Presidency. In fact, Lincoln’s humility became ridiculous at 
times. He told a crowd in Steubenville, Ohio that, if they became dis­
satisfied with his performance, they should "elect a better man next time.” 
There were, he said, ’plenty of them.” At Indianapolis, Lincoln referred 
to himself as "an accidental Instrument . . .of a great cause.” Later In 
his remarks, he told the crowd that his reliance would "be placed upon you 
and the people of the United States."^
Such words are understandably viewed with skepticism by many. Unques­
tionably, one of Lincoln's reasons for demeaning himself was to build poli­
tical capital by appearing as a humble man. Yet the mere fact that he was 
able to express such sentiment demonstrates that he still believed In the 
notion that the leader of the republic should be, or should try to be, a 
humble man of the people— a wise old executive to administer the popular 
will as expressed in Congress. At the very least, certainly, Lincoln's
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words do not indicate any change in his view of the Presidency. One can 
scarcely Imagine men like Teddy Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy saying that 
there were "plenty" of men better than themselves, but such statements 
seem to fit Lincoln weli.
Perhaps one reason that Lincoln did not seem concerned about the 
possibility that he might have to employ extraordinary Presidential powers 
against the rebellion is that did not really believe that Southerners 
would actually attempt to make good on their secession ordinances. Obliv­
ious to all evidence to the contrary, Lincoln said that the "excitement" 
down South had "no foundation in facts," Trying to reassure the South 
that he would not, Indeed could not, strike at its institutions, he asked 
Southerners to "point us to anything in which they are being injured."
Since, as Lincoln hastened to point out, the South had sustained no real 
injuries, nothing so grievous as to Justify the disruption of the Union, 
he "felt all the while justified in concluding that the crisis, the panic, 
the anxiety of the country at this time is artificial." Without any founda­
tion of actual grievances, he could not see how even the most wily agita­
tor could lead the South out of the Union,7
At least, this was the opinion that Lincoln expressed In public.
Behind the scenes portents of the still rising tide of bitter Southern 
anger reached him every day. All across the lower South, military prepa­
rations and seisures of federal property served only to warn him that, If 
anything, secession sentiment was increasing and solidifying. The possi­
bility of Civil War was transformed from a remote and extreme scenario 
into a conceivable eventuality*
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Lincoln’s inaugural address indicates that he had come to recognize 
the seriousness of the situation. No longer willing to shrug off secession 
in public, he acknowledged that a "disruption of the Federal Union hereto­
fore only menaced, is now formidably attempted."® Directed completely 
toward the crisis,his speech is significant for many reasons. Perhaps the 
most inportant is that the speech illustrates a new dimension to Lincoln's 
attitude towards both the Presidency and the crisis. On that cold inaugura­
tion day in March, the old Whig from Illinois wrapped himself in the rhet­
oric and strategems of that old Whig nemesis, Andrew Jackson.
Jackson had dealt with a situation similar to the secession crisis 
when he was confronted with South Carolina's attempt to "nullify" the 
tariff of 1832. South Carolinians, angered by the fact that the tariff 
had not completely satisfied their demand for lower duties, made use of 
their previously asserted right to nullify, within their own state, any 
federal law which they felt was unconstitutional. State leaders threatened 
to take the state out of the Union if any attempt were made to enforce the
Q
tariff in South Carolina.
The controversy called the authority of the federal government and 
the nature of the Union into question. Jackson faced the contention that 
the states were the essential units of sovereign authority and could do 
pretty much what they pleased— even leave the Union. This was precisely 
what Southerners were telling Lincoln, although they were doing so in a 
more severe and belllegerent manner.
Thus, it is no surprise to learn that one visitor to Springfield in 
the early months of 1861 "found him (Lincoln) reading a history of the
(2)
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South Carolina nullification crisis of 1832, studying how President Jackson 
had handled that dilemma."^ A keen student of history, Lincoln adopted 
Old Hickory’s stragegy and ideas regarding nullification for use in his 
own situation.
In dealing with South Carolina, Jackson chose to pursue a multi-faceted 
course. While he asserted the authority of the federal government and made 
military preparations for the worst eventuality, he tried to conciliate 
Southerners by urging further tariff reform and by reminding them of the 
glorious future of the Union. In the course of his dialogue with South 
Carolina leaders, though, Jackson was careful to make it clear that he 
would not tolerate nullification and was prepared to use every means nec­
essary to resist lt.^
Lincoln acted in much the same manner. Indeed, an examination of 
the official statements they issued concerning their respective situations 
— Lincoln's first inaugural address and Jackson’s Nullification Proclamation 
— highlights the strong similarity between their attitudes.
In their statements, both men argued that the federal government and 
the Union were institutions which ultimately held the allegiance of all 
of the people. No state, they asserted, had sovereignty of its own.
Instead, the states had what political authority they legitimately held 
because they were inside the Union. Thus, they could never leave the Union. 
Where Jackson likened the Union to an unbreakable "compact," Lincoln com­
pared it to a permanent "contract" that could never be dissolved with any­
thing less than the consent of all parties Involved. Looking back on the 
nature of the Constitution and its ratification, Jackson asserted that the 
"Constitution of the United States . . .forms a government, not a league." 
Lincoln cited the Articles of Association and the Articles of Confederation
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as evidence in support of his contention that the "Union is much older 
than the Constitution." Indeed, he noted, "one of the declared objects 
for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was 'to form a more per­
fect union.
Lincoln and Jackson both pointed out the abusrdity of the so-called 
"right" of secession. For his part, Lincoln lectured Southerners on the 
dynamics of minority and majority rights in a democratic system. He argued 
that "unanimity is impossible" in any society and that "the rule of a 
minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissable." Thus, "rejec­
ting the majority principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all 
that is left." Lincoln concluded, therefore, that "the central idea of 
secession," which constituted a resounding rejection of majority rule, "is 
the essence of anarchy."
Jackson employed a comparable argument when he reminded the people 
of South Carolina that, under the Constitution, the laws and treaties of 
the federal government superseded the laws of the individual states. "And 
it may be asserted without fear of refutation," wrote Old Hickory, "that 
no federative government could exist without a similar provision."
Even though the two Presidents were committed to the Union to the 
extent of going to war, neither man desired war, and both used conciliatory 
language in an effort to defuse their respective situations. Pointing out 
the prosperity of the Union, Jackson urged South Carolinians to consider 
"this picture of happiness and honor and say, We too are cltlsens of America." 
Facing a far greater amount of resistance, Lincoln went a step further by 
promising only "to hold, occupy, and possess the property, and places belong­
ing to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts." Carefully
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choosing the least offensive language, Lincoln stated that "beyond what may 
be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion— no using of force 
against, or among the people anywhere." In addition to this, if Southerners 
were unwilling to provide officers to fill posts unrelated to the collection 
of revenue or the retention of federal property, he promised not to flood 
the South with "obnoxious strangers" to assume the offices. Lincoln entreated 
Southerners to allow the "mystic chords of memory" to "swell the chorus of
the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels
* „ „14of our nature.
Although conciliation was important in trying to resolve the two con­
flicts, it was not the order of the day in either case. Both Lincoln and 
Jackson made it perfectly clear that disruption of the Union was completely 
unacceptable— in fact, it was impossible in their view. Each man argued 
that, as President, he was expressly authorized, indeed obligated, to take 
it upon himself r.o hold the Union together. This is the strongest and most 
important resemblance between the policies of Lincoln and Jackson concerning 
secession. The phrases and ideas that the two Presidents employed in this 
regard were nearly the same. More importantly, Lincoln's use of Jackson's 
notions of the Presidency, in regard to secession, indicates a new dimen­
sion in Lincoln's thoughts concerning the Presidency— thoughts that were not 
inconsistent with his earlier views.
Consider, for example, the resemblance of the assertions that are made 
in each document concerning the strength and perpetuity of the Union. Jack- 
son wrote the words below.
I consider, then the power to annul a law of the United 
States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the axis-
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tence of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, 
inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, 
and destructive of the great object for which it was 
formed....The Constitution of the United States, then, 
forms a government, not a league; and whether it be form­
ed by compact between the States or in any other manner, 
its character is the same....To say that any State may 
at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the 
United States are not a nation...
In his address, Lincoln said the following concerning the Union.
I hold, that in contemplation of Universal law, and of 
the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpet­
ual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the 
fundamental law of all national governments. It is 
safe to assert that no government proper, ever had a 
provision in its organic law for its own termination.^
Although the wording of the two passages is different, the phrasing and
sentiment of each is nearly the same. Both deny the right of secession
and assert the sovereignty and strength of the Union. In fact, reading
Lincoln's words, one can almost hear Jackson speaking.
The most important similarity between Lincoln and Jackson, however 
relates to the role that each man assigned to the Presidency in dealing 
with secession. Both considered themselves obligated to take the lead 
in holding the nation together. Both used two bases of support to justify 
their claim of executive leadership in resisting secession— the Presiden­
tial oath and the American people.
In the Nullification Proclamation, Jackson told South Carolinians that 
he had "no discretionary power on the subject." Since he considered his 
duty to be "emphatically pronounced in the Constitution," Jackson warned 
the nulliflers that he would use any amount of force necessary to preserve 
the Union. Jackson argued, therefore, that, as President, he was bound 
by the duties of his position to resist secession by any means possible.
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In the course of reminding South Carolina that the Constitution 
formed an unbreakable bond between the states and a superior federal govern­
ment, Jackson repeated one of his favorite arguments in justification of 
Presidential authority. "We are one people in the choice of President and 
Vice President," he stated, and, thus, the “people, then, and not the 
States, are represented in the executive branch." Although this particular 
reference was used to demonstrate federal superiority over the states, 
Jackson was alluding to his argument that the President has the power to 
engage in national policy-making because the entire populace, and not any 
one segment as is the case with Congressmen, was his constituency. Since 
he was responsible to all of the people, Jackson felt that he had the right 
to act on behalf of all the people. To Old Hickory, therefere, both the 
letter of the law and his responsibility to his national constituency dic­
tated that he take strong action against secession,^
Such views are not at all surprising where Jackson is concerned, but 
it is both surprising and interesting to find Lincoln adopting essentially 
the same ideas in his Inaugural address.
I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution 
and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent 
of my ability, 1 shall take care, as the Constitution 
itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the lavs of the 
Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing 
this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and 
I shall perform it, so far as practicable, unless my 
rightful masters, the American people, shall withold 
the requisite means, or, in some authoritative manner, 
direct the contrary*••.The Chief Magistrate derives all 
his authority from the people, and they have conferred 
none upon him to fix terms for the separation of the 
States. The people themselves can do this also if they 
choose; but the executive, as such, has nothing to do 
with it. His duty Is to administer the present govern­
ment, as it came to his hands, and to transmit it, unim­
paired by him, to his successor.17
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Just like Jackson* Lincoln believed that both his oath of office and his 
obligation to the people, his "rightful masters," placed the responsibil­
ity squarely on his shoulders to see to it that "the laws of the Union be 
faithfully executed in all the States." In dealing with the secession 
crisis, therefore, he claimed, as President, the right to take the leading 
role.
On the surface, such an assertion of authority may seem to conflict 
with Lincoln’s earlier view of the Presidency. He had always expressed 
a firm belief that Congress, and not the executive, should be the dynamic 
branch of the government. In his inaugural address, however, he assumed 
leadership in dealing with the worst crisis the nation has ever faced.
Upon closer examination, though, one finds that these ideas are 
actually in agreement with Lincoln's earlier views. Lincoln adopted 
Jackson's policy of Presidential action to hold the Union together at any 
cost, but, unlike Jackson, Lincoln did not believe that his oath of 
office and nation-wide constituency empowered him to act on behalf of 
the people in any matter which came before the federal government. Rather, 
he felt that, under the law, the President was obligated to the people 
to carry out certain duties that were unquestionably assigned to his off­
ice. One of these was to ensure that the laws were enforced, and, there- 
fore, he believed the task of dealing with a situation which was essen­
tially a mass rejection of the laws fell to him, This did not Interfere 
with his belief that Congress should be the dynamic branch of government 
because Lincoln was confronting a problem that was within the realm of 
his office. If the great issue of the day had been the tariff, Lincoln 
would have probably made his opinion known and complied with whatever Con­
gress decided, Lincoln's reasoning concerning secession was the same as
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Jackson's. His application of that reasoning was simply far more narrow.*®
Yet Lincoln's position on the Presidency and secession, even if lim­
ited in scope, is significant. In may ways, it established the policy 
that he applied to the question of Presidential authority throughout the 
Civil War.
On inauguration day, Lincoln's position was that the Union was "un­
broken" and that, should an attempt at disrupting the Union be made, it
was his responsibility to resist it by every possible means. Like Jack-
son, he had "no discretionary power on the subject."
After the outbreak of the Civil War, when the scenarios Lincoln 
spoke of became reality, his chief object was to maintain the Union and 
its republican institutions. As the war dragged on and increasingly 
extreme measures were called for, Lincoln employed reasoning similar to 
that found in his Inaugural address. His duty, as dictated by his oath and 
his obligation to the citizenry, required that he preserve the Union at 
any cost, and his own personal beliefs supported the same commitment.
Thus, he was witling to stretch the limits of authority, if necessary, 
to save the federal government. Yet he preferred not to take any actions 
which might not be considered to be within his legitimate power. He did 
not want to create a new, more powerful Presidency. He balanced, there­
fore, the mandate for strong action which he found in the obligations of 
his office and his personal beliefs against his fear of paving the way for 
future dictators— or perhaps becoming one himself. The result was a 
power which was intended to fade away with the conflict that had justi­
fied It.
The entire question of secession pushed Lincoln into uncharted and
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dangerous terrain where only he, as President, was able to tread. Rebell­
ion constituted law-breaking of the highest order. Since the President 
was responsible for law enforcement, it was Lincoln’s task to respond to 
the crisis. Givi! War shifted the attention of the government to military 
plans for crushing the rebellion and the issue of anti-war activities in 
the North. Since Lincoln was Commander-in-Chief and First Magistrate, these 
were his concerns. In short the rebellion placed Lincoln, whether he 
liked it or not, in charge of the government’s primary activities during 
the most difficult and unpredictable period in the nation’s history.
Unfortunately for Limoln, he had formed his ideas of the Presidency
during a time when domestic policy and an occasional foreign war were the
chief concerns of the government. Outside of the nullification crisis,
19
he had not the slightest shred of previous experience to guide him.
Since the Civil War and the nature of the Union were the main issues of 
his Presidency, he had to formulate a new policy. In doing so, he returned 
to his basic belief in republican institutions, and he emerged with a 
view of the Civil War that held the preservation of the Union and its 
original republican structure as the great object of the struggle— a strugg­
le in which Lincoln was willing to sacrifice almost all.
But, on the day of his inauguration, it was not at all clear that the 
Civil War would actually occur, and, thus, as Lincoln outlined his atti­
tudes and responsibilities concerning secession, there was at least a small 
chance that his Presidency would not be consumed with the concerns of war.
On Lincoln's inauguration day, seven states— South Carolina, Florida, 
Alabam, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas--had already left the 
Union. Federal preperty in these states, including arsenals and forts,
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had been seized. The leaders of the deep South were in the process of cre­
ating their own nation— a cotton republic, founded on slavery and the ven­
eration of states’ rights.
The situation was one of the most difficult every faced by an Ameri­
can President. Although Lincoln had promised to ’hold, occupy, and possess 
the property, and places belonging to the government,” he had to act with 
caution because eight slave states were still in the Union. With the excep­
tion of Delaware, all of these states, including such important ones as 
Kentucky and Virginia, held strong Southern sympathies. If Lincoln even 
appeared to be contemplating aggression against the seceded states, there 
was no doubt in his mind that he would lose some of thene slave states 
which had, for the moment, foregone secession in favor of first seeing 
what policy he would adopt. This state of affairs was constantly on Lin­
coln^ mind because state legislatures and conventions were meeting in 
some of these states to discuss the conditions that would justify secession.
Yet, if the United States was to be worth anything as a nation, Lin­
coln could not afford to let the seceded states consolidate their separa­
tion from the Union. Even though inaction on his part might stop the fur­
ther spread of secession, failure to retrieve the seceded states would be 
disastrous.
The example of successful, unopposed secession would, by itself, spell 
the end of the nation in time. With every divisive issue that arose, the 
example of secession would appeal to whichever side lost the dispute.
America would never receive the respect of foreign powers because the soli­
darity of the nation would always be an open question.
Lincoln was also well waware of the threat that secession posed to
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the example that America's republican institutions set for mankind. Skep­
tics, both at home and abroad, would claim, pointing to a divided America 
as evidence, that republican Institutions and a federal government struc­
ture would always result In such chaos.
As if these considerations were not enough, Lincoln faced the imme­
diate prospect of displeasing the section that elected him and demoraliz­
ing his own political party. Although few advocated violence at this 
point. Northerners supported Lincoln in his stand that the Union was per­
petual and that the federal government would continue in possession of its 
property and collection of Its revenues. As the new President tried to 
balance this pledge against the sensitivities of the remaining slave 
states, he was accused of pursuing a policy of vacillation.
These first few weeks of Lincoln's administration were, therefore, a 
time of great uncertainty. As the nation teetered on the brink of Civil 
War, Lincoln and his cabinet searched for some way to maintain the author­
ity of the federal government without ruining their chances to bring the 
seceded states peacefully back into the Union.
One sure way to assert federal authority with a relatively low amount 
of provocation was to remain in control of the federal installations which 
had not already fallen into rebel hands Fortunately for Lincoln, two 
coastal forts, Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor and Fort Pickens off the 
coast of Florida, were still under Union control. He determined to hold 
onto them as symbols of continuing federal jurisdiction over the lower 
South.
Lincoln's plans, though, were not free of problems. First, the re- 
demanded that the federals withdraw from the sovereign soil of the
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"Confederate States of America." In order to show that they were serious, 
they surrounded the forts, especially Sumter, with troops and artillery. 
Lincoln faced even more difficulty in that the garrison at Sumter could not 
hold out much longer without fresh supplies.
Resolute in his determination to hold the forts, Lincoln consulted with 
the commander at Fort Sumter, Major Robert Anderson, and learned that 
"twenty thousand good, and well-disciplined men"— and the ships to trans­
port and support them— were necessary to attempt a full-scale relief ex­
pedition to Fort Sumter. For this the government simply had not the re­
sources*
Worried about the demoralizing effect a withdrawal would have on the 
North, Lincoln decided to reinforce Fort Pickens Instead. By building 
Pickens into a bastion of federal authority, he felt that Northerners 
would then be able to accept the evacuation of Sumter as a "military ne­
cessity." A relief expedition was launched that was Intended to reach 
Pickens before it would become necessary to abandon Sumter.
Unfortunately, due to what was later termed a "quasi armistice of the 
late administration," the commander of the relief expedition decided not to 
even attempt to reinforce Fort Pickens. By the time word of this reached 
Lincoln, there was no time to send a new expedition to Pickens before a 
"crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter."
Lincoln decided that there was no way that he could abandon Sumter 
without reinforcing Pickens. Even with a full explanation of the difficulty 
at Pickens, he saw no chance that such an action would be viewed as any­
thing other than complete capitulation to Southern pressure. Consequently, 
he sent out another relief expedition, this time headed for Fort Sumter. 
Lincoln informed the Governor of South Carolina that the ships would only
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deliver supplies, no men or arms, to the Fort. Furthermore, he informed 
the Governor ’that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be 
no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or 
in case of an attack upon the Fort.
Lincoln’s message prompted South Carolinians to demand that the gar­
rison surrender. When their request was refused, they bombarded Sumter in­
to submission. With this act, the rebels demonstrated that they had no In­
tention of returning to the Union peacefully. They had, in the most 
unambiguous manner, left Lincoln no choice but to employ force to resolve 
the conflict.
On April fifteenth, Lincoln Issued a proclamation in which he called 
for 75,000 militia ”to cause the laws to be duly executed." He also order­
ed the secessionists to disperse and called Congress into special session 
on July fourth.
Not surprisingly, the proclamation provoked outrage throughout the 
slave states. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas left the 
Union within a month after Lincoln's call for troops. The new Confederate 
States of America, bolstered by the addition of four states, moved its cap- 
itol to Richmond.
In Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, the so-called "border" states, 
there was indecision as to whether or not secession was the proper res­
ponse. In these areas, Unionist and Secessionist sentiment was more evenly 
balanced than anywhere else. In fact, Kentucky even considered adopting a 
neutral stance toward the entire conflict. For Lincoln, the mere chance 
that any of these states might secede posed a major threat. If Maryland, 
for example, left the Union, Washington itself would be isoltaed inside of
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the Confederacy.
The new President faced many such headaches during the first months of 
his administration. Although Lincoln had committed himself to a policy of 
force, he still had to form a command structure and a strategy for the mil­
itary. For that matter, he still had to form a military. During this per­
iod in which he lacked any substantial military force, he had to hold the 
border states in the Union and pray that Southerners did not organize for an 
attack before the North was ready to fight. As Lincoln glanced about, 
searching for some hidden source of strength which might carry him through
the perilous months ahead, he looked in the end to the powers which might
20
be found in his office.
(3)
With Lincoln's call for troops and the secession of the upper South, 
there was no longer any question about whether or not war would come to 
America— it had arrived in its most potent and terrible form: Civil War.
It was a war which leaders on both sides had sought to avoid, but it was 
a war from which neither side was willing to shrink.
Once he had satisfied himself that war was the only way to preserve 
the Union, Lincoln was willing to fight. Lincoln's attitutdes about the 
war— why it was worth fighting and what goals he sought to achieve through 
it— are an essential requisite for understanding his use of Presidential 
power, for understanding his willingness to fight. It is important, there­
fore, to find out exactly what threat he saw in secession and how he view­
ed it.
If the rebellion were successful, Lincoln believed that the Union and
56
its republican institutions would vanish as the nation disintegrated with 
further rebellions in the future. The time would come, Lincoln feared, 
when North America would contain nothing more than a collection of weak, 
bickering states. He also realized that republican institutions and the 
federal government structure would forever be regarded as failures— overly 
simplistic and idealistic concepts that would invariably lead to anarchy 
and disunion.
Thus, Lincoln’s greatest fear was that America’s free institutions 
would cease to exist both for the benefit of Americans and, through ex­
ample, those abroad. In his message to the special session of Congress on 
July fourth, he summed up his view of what the Civil War meant;
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United 
States. It presents to the whole family of man, the ques­
tion, whether a constitutional republic, or a democracy—  
a government of the people, by the same people— can, or 
cannot, maintain its territorial integrity, against its own 
domestic foes. It presents the question, whether discon­
tented individuals, too few in numbers to control admin­
istration. ..can always, upon pretences made in this case, or 
on any other pretences, or arbitrarily, without any pretence, 
break up their Government, and thus practically put an end to 
free government upon the Earth...This is essentially a 
People's contest. On the side of the Union, it is a strug­
gle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance 
of government, whose leading object is, to elevate the con­
dition of men— to lift artificial weights from all shoulders—  
to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the 
race of life,..this is the leading object of the government 
for whose existence we contend. 21
As his word8 make clear, Lincoln was fighting to "maintain" republican gov­
ernment. With this objective in mind, he was able to view the war in uni­
versal terms as the trial of mankind's finest aspirations and ideas.
This was a theme which Lincoln stressed throughout the bitter strug­
gle. As the nation's knees buckled under his increasing demands for sacri­
fice, he reminded Americans over and over that the war was being fought for
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a worthwhile cause. At Gettysburg, he delivered a classic address that
characterized the war as a "testing" of whether republican America, "or
22
any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure."
Later in the war. In a speech to an Ohio regiment, Lincoln stated his
conception of the Civil War in even plainer terms:
...1 almost always feel inclined, when I happen to say 
anything to soldiers, to impress upon them in a few brief 
remarks the importance of success in this contest. It is 
not merely for to-day, but for all time to come that we 
should perpetuate for our children’s children this great 
and free government, which we have enjoyed all our lives.
I beg you to remember this, not merely for my sake, but 
for yours. I happen temporarily to occupy this big White 
House. I am a living witness that any one of your children 
may look to come here as my father’s child has. It is in 
order that each of you may have through this free govern­
ment which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance 
for your Industry, enterprise, and intelligence; that you may 
all have equal prlveleges In the race of life, with all its 
desirable human aspirations. It is for this the struggle 
should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright—  
not only for one, but for two or three years. The nation 
is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel.
Plainly, then, Lincoln was fighting to maintain in America a free, united,
and sovereign republic—  this was his notion of the war’s "central idea."
But, his great respect and love of republican freedom went far beyond mere
rhetoric. One must actually look deeply into Lincoln's own life to find
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the real wellsprlngs of his emotional pro-Union stance.
A former flatboat man, surveyor, store keeper, and laborer, Lincoln 
the President was well aware that his own fortune in life was as much the 
result of the opportunities made available to him in a republican nation as 
it was the result of his own hard work. Having risen from a poor and un­
educated young man to a politician and a lawyer, he had in many ways lived 
the ideal life for a citizen of a free nation. This was why he sought to 
preserve and proliferate "that form, and substance of government, whose
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leading object is, to elevate the condition of men— to lift artificial 
weights from all shoulders— to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for 
all— to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race 
of life.”
It is imperative to take note of the reasons for Lincoln’s strong 
commitment to victory in the Civil War because it was on the basis of his 
overriding concern for the preservation of republican government that he 
made his major decisions on wartime policy. Lincoln felt that the war 
would pass final judgement on the question of whether or not republican 
institutions would survive in America and spread abroad. He saw beyond 
the mere question of union or disunion because he identified so strongly 
through the experiences of his own life with the notion of a society in 
which ensuring opportunities for individual growth and improvement was the 
primary concern of the government. "The nation," as he put it, "is worth 
fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel."
(4)
Lincoln was faced with tough decisions about the wartime use of execu­
tive power almost from the very beginning of the conflict. During the early 
days of the war, when his government lacked the security of having a large 
army at its command, he faced trouble in both the "border" regions and 
within his own government.
The difficulty with the border states arose because these states were 
extremely confused in orientation. Ho Union or Confederate sympathy «ans 
clearly dominant in these areas, and, thee, the bordtf Vas an indiscernible 
mixture of northern and Southern seotinent inetetd of a rigidly defined
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boundary. This was particularly true of three of the slave states that had 
remained in the Union— -Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.
This phenomenon, this entanglement of sympathies, is a common aspect of 
civil strife, and it caused hardships for both sides in the American case. 
For Lincoln, the problem was particularly acute in those first months of 
the war. Since it is always easier to destroy than to maintain, momen­
tum was behind the secessionists. Lincoln had to find some way of halting 
the spread of rebellion before it carried some of the border states out of 
the Union and threatened the government. The District of Columbia was in­
side the state of Maryland. Rebel activity in Maryland, therefore, was of 
great concern to the government.
Signs of the depth of secessionist sympathy in Maryland were not long 
in coming. Four days after Lincoln’s proclamation, on April nineteenth, 
a Baltimore mob attacked a Massachusetts regiment that was marching through 
the city. The troops, who had left their trains because of obstructions 
placed on the tracks by angry citizens, eventually made it through Balti­
more to Washington, but not before thirteen people, including four sol­
diers, had been killed. Believing that any further attempts to move troops 
through Baltimore would lead to more bloodshed, the Mayor of Baltimore and 
the Governor of Maryland ordered the railroad bridges on the routes to Bal­
timore disabled— effectively cutting off Washington’s rail links to much 
of the North*
As if the loss of the railroad lines was not enough, secessionists in 
Baltimore soon struck again— only two days after their assault on the sol­
diers— by 8iesing the local telegraph offices and cutting off Washington’s
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wire communications with the rest of the country.
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Even though the ferocity of rebel activity and the location of Wash­
ington made Maryland the most important of the border slave states, the 
situation in other states of the border was scarcely less precarious. In 
both Kentucky and Missouri, there was strong pro-Southern sentiment to con­
tend with an equally, or perhaps slightly less strong Unionist sentiment. 
Governor Magoffin of Kentucky and Missouri’s Governor Jackson both supported 
the secessionists within their states. Thus, the situation presented a 
grave problem for Lincoln. He realized only too well the enormous boost 
in men and territory that the Confederates would receive should either or
both Kentucky and Missouri secede. He understood .* s well that the secession
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of either state would foment rebellion in southern Illinois and Indiana.
Another problem confronting Lincoln was the extent of rebel sympathy 
within his own government. Upon entering office, Lincoln assumed control 
of the federal bureaucracy, and, like the nation itself, the government was 
divided. Particularly in the military, high ranking officers resigned in 
droves to fight for the South. And these resignations were not insignifi­
cant. Fine officers such as Robert E. Lee left the service of the United 
States to fight on the side of the rebellion. In fact, Lincoln was so 
fearful of sabatoge from within his own government that, in the early days 
of the conflict, he enlisted the aid of prominent civilians to spend trea­
sury funds on supplies because he did not trust the Treasury department's 
26
officials.
The problems that Lincoln faced within his own section— unrest in the 
border states and disloyalty in the government— dramatically increased his 
concerns during the early days of the war. In foreign wars, America has 
mobilised with little danger of direct attack because of the geographic ob­
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stacles posed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Lincoln had no such 
luxury. Instead, he had to deal with a hostile enemy within walking dis­
tance of his own home and enemy sympathizers spread out across his own ter­
ritory. Thus, during the mobilization period for the Civil War, there was 
a real question as to whether or not the federal government would be able 
to survive until it had raised an army to defend itself.
Outside of the few regiments which had managed to find their way to 
Washington, Lincoln had no substantial military forces to speak of during 
the first weeks of his administration. Washington was virtually unde­
fended, and, given the extent of secessionist activities in Maryland, it 
was going to be difficult to reinforce the capitol with any kind of speed. 
Rumors of an imminent Southern attack abounded. Wild stories circulated—
such as the claim "that Virginia authorities could put seven thousand men
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into Baltimore in twenty-four hours."
As it turned out, the rebels were no more ready to fight than their 
federal adversaries. Lincoln himself, however, showed the signs of strain 
when he spoke to some Massachusetts soldiers. He said that he had begun 
"to believe that there is no North...You are the only real thing," Even if 
Southerners were unprepared, it is perhaps more important to remember that 
people in Washington, including Lincoln, feared that they were ready to 
fight.
And preparing to meet an attack was not easy. Although the troops 
were initially slow in arriving, Washington was, from the start, deluged 
with offers of men— a consideration that an Innocent populace affords its 
leaders in the opening phases of a conflict. Lincoln's correspondence from 
this time period was preoccupied with wrangling ovar how many ragiments
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each staje would be permitted to send. Offers of soldiers were nice* but
It would take time to equip and train the men. It would take time to join
the various regiments into an army. And, considering the situation in
places like Maryland, time was the one thing which Lincoln could not af- 
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lord to waote.
Thus, the full parameters of the crisis with which Lincoln had to deal 
are apparent. With no army to speak of, he had to try to hold the border 
slave states in the Union. With fierce secessionist activity in his own 
section, he had to restore Washington's communications and transport what 
soldiers there were to the capitol. On top of it all, he could only pray 
that the Confederacy would not attack. In short, his immediate task was to 
hold his own section together as best he could while preparing to strike 
back against rebels both North and South.
(5)
Although he lacked the military force necessary to deal fully with the cri­
sis, Lincoln nevertheless moved decisively to quell disorder in the North 
and build armies to fight in the South. What he lacked in disciplined 
troops, Lincoln made up for with a unique and admittedly questionable use 
of expanded executive power.
As Jamtc G. Randall has pointed out in many of his books on Lincoln 
and the Civil War, the new President had, through his proclamation, "com 
mitted the government to a definite theory of the nature of the war." Es­
sentially, he refused to characterize the conflict as a war bewteen con­
tending nations, but, instead, termed the war a domestic insurrection—  
thereby denying Southern claims of legitimate status as a nation at the 
very outset. As Randall pointed out, Lincoln was, through his postion on
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the conflict, technically holding Southerners guilty of treason, but in
actual practice the Union extended belligerent rights to the Confederate 
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military.
Congress would not meet until July fourth, but certain aspects of 
building a solid war effort against the South could not, in Lincoln’s 
opinion, wait until the legislators assembled. The troops would, he hoped, 
reach Washington long before mid-summer. Expenditures had to be made in 
order to outfit the soldiers. Consequently, Lincoln placed $2,000,000 
of federal money in the hands of trustworthy private citizens— John A. Dix, 
George Opdyke, and Richard Blatchford— with instructions to meet "such re­
quisitions as should be directly consequent upon the military and naval 
measures necessary for the defence and support of the government." Lincoln 
did this because he feared that if he attempted to spend the money through 
the normal treasury structure, his efforts would be frustrated by seces­
sionist elements within the government. He also took this measure because 
he believed that Immediate expenditures were essential if the military 
build-up was to proceed smoothly. Nonetheless, the Constitution strictly 
places the purse strings of the government in the hands of Congress, and
Lincoln clearly usurped Congressional power by appropriating the money on 
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his own.
Lincoln also usurped Congressional power when, on May 3, he authorised 
the expansion of the regular army and navy. The Constitution specifically 
gives Congress the authority to determine the composition of the regular 
armed forces of the United States, but Lincoln argued that "existing ex­
igencies demand immediate and adequate measures for the protection of the 
National Constitution and the preservation of the National Union*..to which
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end a military force in addition to that called forth by my proclamation of
the fifteenth day of April in the present year, appears to be Indispensably
necessary." He also promised that the "direction for the increase of the
regular armv, and for the enlistment of seamen hereby given...will be sub-
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mitted to Congress as soon as assembled."
Strangling the South economically was an important part of Lincoln’s 
war plan, and he wasted no time in waiting for Congress before he set about 
implementing measures that were designed to suffocate rebel commerce.
Since the South was an agrarian section that depended heavily on export­
ing cotton to Europe, the central aspect of Northern economic warfare was 
an attempt to shut down Southern trade.
The effort to destroy Southern exports took the form of a naval block­
ade which Lincoln proclaimed on April nineteenth for the lower South and 
later expanded to Include the ports of the upper South. The use of a 
blockade called into question the definition of the war which Lincoln had 
put forth in his initial proclamation. He had characterized the con­
flict as a domestic insurrection, but, in proclaiming a blockade, which is 
a wartime measure between opposing nations, he seemed by implication to 
view the war as a conflict with a foreign power.
Although Lincoln's intention was certainly to treat the secessionists 
as rebels, his proclamation of a blockade raised the question of whether or 
not, by taking an action which was definitely in the realm of international 
war, he was again usurping Congressional authority. He had the power to 
declare the existence of an insurrection, but only Congress could declare 
war. Thus, Lincoln's use of the wartime measure of blockade was a shaky 
venture Into the gray area of authority between the President and Congress.
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Typically, Lincoln wrote in his blockade proclamation that his measure
was in effect "until Congress shall have assembled and deliberated on the
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said unlawful proceedings, or until the same shall have ceased."
The most controversial of Lincoln's emergency measures, however, was 
his suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus. Convinced that he could not 
allow the secessionists in the North to hamper the crucial war effort and 
believing that normal legal procedures were unequal to the task, Lincoln 
authorized the commander of the Army, General Winfield Scott, to suspend 
the writ of Habeas Corpus and arrest Individuals who interfered with mili­
tary activity along the crucial lines of communication. Later, he extended 
this order to include the state of Florida.
The suspension of Habeas Corpus provoked a great deal of debate. The 
Constitution permits the suspension of the writ in cases of severe civil 
disturbance, but it does not specify which branch of government is to au­
thorize that suspension. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the law. 
Habeas Corpus was, and still is, identified as the most Important of an 
individual's rights— the essential protection against unwarranted arrest. 
Thus, it is no surprise that Lincoln's suspension of the writ struck many 
as dictatorial.
One person who certainly felt that way was Roger B. Taney, Chief Jus­
tice of the Supreme Court. Taney was in Maryland during the crisis. He 
was petitioned to order the release of a man named Merryman, who was sus­
pected of secession activities and had been Imprisoned under the provi­
sions of Lincoln's suspension. Taney ordered the military to turn Merry- 
man's case over to the civil authorities for a normal hearing, and, when 
his request was rebuffed, he sent Lincoln "an opinion vigorously denying
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the President’s right to ’suspend the writ.*"
Lincoln chose to ignore Taney’s order. Since the Constitution did
not specifically empower any single branch of the government to suspend the
writ, he could not claim the full sanction of the law. But, since the
Constitution did allow for the suspension of Habeas Corpus in time of civil
disorder and did not say that the President could not suspend the writ, he
was able to argue that he had violated no law. Additionally, he appealed
to the difficulty of the situation. Normal judicial procedures were not
adequate to counteract the threat from Northern secessionists. Since the
very existence of the government was at stake, he saw no choice other than
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to order the suspension.
( 6 )
Lincoln’s measures in the period between his initial proclamation and 
the convening of Congress, then, comprised his first venture into the use 
of extraordinary executive power. As Randall noted in his study of Lin­
coln's Presidency, these actions and his justifications for them are es­
pecially significant because they set up much of the rationale which he 
would apply to the question of executive power throughout the war.
As discussed in a previous section, Lincoln viewed the Civil War as a 
struggle to preserve the Republican Institutions which he revered* He was 
unique in his ability to see through the dry Interpretation of the war as 
merely a struggle for union over disunion. Instead, he characterized the 
contest in a universal manner as an Irrevocable referendum on mankind's 
finest ideas. The probability that Lincoln might lose that referendum 
seemed high in those early days of the war. As his administration tried
6 7
to build an army, the President could only watch as secessionists ran ram­
pant in the border slave states and the Confederacy built its own military. 
Sitting in the White House, undefended and isolated, Lincoln reacted to the 
crisis vigorously by employing any means at his disposal to ensure the gov­
ernment’s survival.
When it came time to explain his free-wheeling application of power 
to Congress, Lincoln stressed both the gravity of the crisis and its uni­
versal meaning. Since the war would decide the fate of the Union and its 
republican institutions, Lincoln believed that he was obligated to lead the 
North to victory at any cost. He found Justification for his policy of ex­
treme executive authority in the grave dangers which beset the government 
during the first months of the war, and he found further support for his 
measures in the value of what was at stake in the conflict— the future of 
republican government. Lincoln's use of exceptional Presidential power 
reflected, therefore, a strong commitment to the preservation of the 
American experiment in popular government. There was a noticeable absence 
of any attitude on his part that the Presidency was legitimately empow­
ered, under the Constitution, to take extreme action. Instead, he returned 
for support always to the nature of the situation in which he found him­
self. Evidence upholding these assertions is readily found in Lincoln's 
state papers and private correspondence.
The document in which Lincoln gave the most extensive treatment to his 
use of executive power during this period is of course his July fourth mes­
sage to Congress. Before commenting upon his policies, Lincoln related 
both the serious threat posed by secession and his universal view of the war 
as a contest for republican government.
After providing Congress with this backdrop of events and
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ideas, Lincoln proceeded to justify and explain his use of extraordinary 
power. Where he could, he tried to show that he had not broken any laws, 
but he relied primarily on the nature of the conflict to support his arg­
uments. Consider his explanation for the enlargement of the regular 
armed forces.
These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ven­
tured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, 
and a public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress 
would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing 
has been done beyond the constitutional competency of 
Congress.
Lincoln had acted because the crisis presented both "a popular demand and a 
public necessity" for strong measures. While acknowledging that he had 
acted beyond the limits of his office, he argued that he had not acted be­
yond the limits of the government in general and Congress in specific.
Since the measures were required by "public neAssity," he felt that it was 
alright to impinge temporarily on Congressional prerogatives, and he ex­
pected that "Congress would readily ratify" what he had done.
Lincoln also dealt with the suspension of Habeas Corpus in his mes­
sage. Acknowledging that "the legality and propriety of what has been done 
under the suspension, are questioned," he chose to defend his administra­
tion In the following way:
Of course some consideration was given to the question 
of power, and propriety, before this matter was acted 
upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be 
faithfully executed, were being resisted, and falling of 
execution, in nearly one third of the States. Must they 
he allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been 
perfectly clear, that by the use of the means necessary to 
their execution, some single lew, made in such extreme ten­
derness of the citizen's liberty, that practically It 
relieves mote of the guilty, than of the Innocent, should, 
to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the ques­
tion more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go un­
executed, and the government Itself go to pieces, lest
69
that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not 
the official oath be broken, if the government should 
be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding 
the single law would tend to preserve it?
Once again, he appealed to the practical considerations of controlling a
dangerous rebellion to demonstrate the necessity of taking extreme action.
Lincoln stated the issue in the starkest possible terms when he nsked
whether or not "the government itself (should be allowed to) go to pieces,
lest that one (law, Habeas Co pus) be violated?" Lincoln felt, in short,
34
that he had a logical justification for suspending the writ.
Although the July fourth message contains perhaps the best known ex* 
planations that Lincoln put forth for his initial actions, there are other 
scraps of evidence which tell an equal amount about his intentions and at­
titudes concerning that first use of extensive power.
In a letter to Congress in May of 1862, for example, Lincoln touched 
on his appropriation of treasury funds for the purchase of military sup­
plies by civilian agents.
The several departments of the government at that time 
contained so large a number of dliloyal persons that it 
would have been impossible to provide safely, through of­
ficial agents only, for the performance of the duties 
thus confided to citizens favorably known for their 
ability, loyalty, and patriotism....! believe that by 
these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, 
some of which were without any authority of law, the gov­
ernment was saved from overthrow.
Here, too, Lincoln chose to highlight the gravity of the crisis— the need 
to build a military force quickly and the presence of "disloyal persons" in 
the government— to justify his policies. He did not try to claim that the
appropriation of funds was within the scope of legitimate presidential pow-
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er. Rather, he argued that the situation left him no choice.
Lincoln intended his extreme policies to be limited In scope. It
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would have been very easy, for example, for Lincoln to Issue a general 
suspension of Habeas Corpus, but, Instead, one finds that the Initial sus­
pension order contains a painstaking, detailed description of the precise 
location of the military lines effected. The same sort of constraint is 
apparent in Lincoln’s proclamation suspending the writ in Florida. Instead 
of authorizing a suspension throughout the rebellious states, which would 
have been understandable, Lincoln limited the action to Florida. This 
high degree of attention that Lincoln seems to have paid to limiting, 
wherever possible, the suspension of Habeas Corpus demonstrates his concern 
for trying to control the nature and extent of the use of emergency powers. 
An inkling of how Lincoln felt about the suspension of Habeas Corpus 
is provided in a small note that he scribbled to himself during the middle 
of May, 1861. ’Unless the necessity for these arbitrary arrests is man- 
ifest, and urgent,” he wrote, ”1 prefer they should cease.”
This statement neatly sums up Lincoln's entire attitude toward the use 
of emergency powers. Although he wished that ’they should cease,” he was 
willing to avail himself of them "while the necessity...is manifest.”
And the necessity was manifest. The war was a great testing of the 
Republic, and it had to be won at all costs. At the very outset, the gov­
ernment had not the manpower resources to defend itself and quell the wild 
winds of secession. Consequently, Lincoln employed every power within reach 
of his office to preserve the government while an at w  tailed*
This in no way made him a dictator. It only demonstrated the depth of 
his concern for preserving republican institutions and his own i n t e l l e c t u a l  
flexibility in realising that he would haUe to a c t  eutiiie of his beliefs 
if he were to save the wellapriug of thoae beliefs.
CHAPTER THREE
THE FIERY TRIAL
...THAT WE HERE HIGHLY RESOLVE THAT THESE DEAD SHALL 
NOT HAVE DIED IN VAIN— THAT THIS NATION, UNDER GOD, 
SHALL HAVE A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM— AND THAT GOVERN­
MENT OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE, 
SHALL NOT PERISH FROM THE EARTH.
— Abraham Lincoln
From the Gettysburg Address 
November 19, 1863
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Part of the reason that Lincoln was able to act so decisively during 
the initial stages of the rebellion was that Congress was not in session. 
With the legislators out of town, he was free of the fear of an immediate 
and formidable institutional protest against his policies. He well under­
stood, though, that since much of what he had done trampled on legislative 
prerogatives, he would have to seek retroactive approval from Congress for 
the steps which he had taken.
Legislators are renowned for jealously guarding the rights and privi­
leges of their branch of government, but, in Lincoln's case, Congressional 
sanction was rather easily obtained. Of course, there was some grumbling 
about certain facets of bis program, such as the suspension of Habeas Cor­
pus. Without Southerners in Congress, however, the bulk of the opposition 
to Lincoln was gone. Northern Democrats, for the most part, Initially 
sided with him in his efforts to maintain the Union, and legislation was 
passed which read "that all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the 
President" concerning the military "are hereby approved and in all respects 
legalized and made valid, to the same Intent and with the same effect as if 
they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and di­
rection of the Congress of the United States." As for the question of 
Habeas Corpus, Lincoln was content to allow the matter to rest on an opin­
ion prepared by his Attorney General, Bates, which supported his suspension 
1
of the writ.
Lincoln could now afford to breath a little easier. Re had obtained 
Congressional approval for hie extreme measures, and soldiers were pour­
ing into Washington. Sven though the border states were not completely se­
( 1 )
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cured for the Union, the position of the federal government was visibly 
strengthening and solidifying. With each passing day, less and less of 
the original allure and excitement of secession remained and the President 
found himself with more and more soldiers to deploy. For the present, the 
storm had blown over in the North. Turning his attention to the South, 
Lincoln settled into the role of commander-in-chief and grand strategist.
Although Lincoln's call for 400,000 men in his July fourth message 
comprised, along with his other war measures, an indirect acknowledgement 
that it would take a substantial effort to win the war, no one, not even 
the perceptive Chief Executive, expected a four-year inferno. The Army 
at Washington was soldiered primarily by three-month militia, and it was 
widely hoped that this force would hurl a knockout blow at the outset of 
the fighting and perhaps even capture Richmond.
Brimming with a naive overconfidence, the people were spoiling for a 
fight. In spite of the fact that the Army was still building itself into a 
credible force, enormous pressure was placed on the Lincoln administration 
to hurry up and launch an attack on the Confederacy. "Forward to Richmond" 
was the cry that was on the lips of every patriotic Northerner. Forward 
Indeed.
Finally, in July, the Army began to move. Urged on by Lincoln, Irwin 
McDowell, tactical coanander at Washington, produced a battle plan that 
called for one Union fore?., under himself, to attack the main Confederate 
army in Virginia, under Beauregard, while another Union force, that was 
defending the Shenandoah valley, pinned down a second Confederate army that 
was in front of it. Unable to link up with other Confederate unite, 
Beauregard would be no match for the numerically superior McDowell.
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The plan was adopted, and, on July 21, McDowell's forces attacked 
Beauregard's troops at Manassas. At first, the battle seemed to go well 
for the Northerners. They fought steadily and managed to advance against 
the Southern opposition. Unfortunately for the Union, however, the second 
Confederate army managed to slip away from the force that was assigned to 
cover it. These fresh rebel soldiers reached Beauregard by railroad, and 
the tide of the battle began to turn in favor of the Confederacy. Soon, 
the federal lines began to show signs of crumbling. Incipient cracks 
widened into gaping holes as the raw, inexperienced soldiers began to flee 
in panicky disarray. All hope for an orderly withdrawal ended when the men 
lost any semblance of order, threw down their rifles, and ran away. For 
all intents and purposes, the U.S. Army at Washington, the famous Army of 
the Potomac, ceased to exist as an organized and coherent fighting force.
Far from being cowardly, the behavior of the Northern soldiers was 
certainly understandable. It was a natural reaction to hot, flying lead 
and screaming, charging rebels with bayonets poised. But, no one In the 
North was In the mood to be understanding in the aftermath of what ap­
peared to be— in spite of the equality cf the casualty figures— a complete
debacle. The defeat at Manassas served as a sobering and painful signal
2
to the North that tough fighting lay ahead.
In fact, four years of tough fighting lay ahead— four years which would 
require every ounce of national strength, four years which would determine 
the course of mankind, four years of a "fiery trial" In which Abraham
Lincoln would be called upon to make momentous decisions amidst the clouds
3
of doubt* And just how, otn might ask, did Lincoln make these decisions?
Although it Is dangerous to try to simplify complicated events and 
complex Individuals, there is more than a mere particle of truth in the
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proposition that Abraham Lincoln made the important decisions of his 
administration on the basis of two factors. The first was his clear and 
strong philosophical concept of the war as a final referendum on re­
publican government— “that form, and substance of government, whose lead-
4
ing object is, to elevate the condition of men." He saw the war as a life 
or death struggle for the institutions and society in which he had develop­
ed from an uneducated, poor young man into a lawyer and a statesman.
This factor affected his thinking in a couple of ways. To begin with, 
it provided an ultimate justification for his policies. Even if what he 
was doing was unheard of, caused hardship, and provoked intense oppostion, 
he could always tell himself that it was necessary for the greater good, 
for the preservation of republican government. This commitment to free 
institutions also greatly expanded the boundaries of his thinking and pro­
vided him with that Intellectual flexibility which was the greater part 
of the genius of his leadership. Essentially, since the war was being 
fought to preserve what he believed in most deeply, any action necessary
to win the war was worthy of his consideration. "Necessity," he told a
5
complaining Northern Governor, "knows no law." Unwilling to fail in his 
duty if he could at all help it, Lincoln's determination and commitment 
opened up a myriad of possibilities to him where less determined and less 
cogent minds seemed only able to operate under old assumptions. "Still I 
must save this government if possible," Lincoln wrote in that dreary summer 
of 1962. "What X cannot do» of course 1 will not do$ but it may as well be 
understood, once and for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving 
any available card unplayed."
This does not mean that Lincoln was out in front of his party, ahead 
of even the abolitionists. It does not m a n  that he implemented any policy
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that ame to mind, no matte how radical, regardless of the consequences.
On the contrary, there was a certain logic and rationale behind the actions 
that he took as a matter of necessity and expediency. If intellectual 
flexibility formed one part of his genius, then a reasonable caution— a 
sober judgement in the midst of panic— formed the other part. For Lincoln 
was only willing to employ extreme measures to the extent that the situa­
tion, the state of the war effort, required it. Thus, the condition of 
the war effort— as Lincoln saw it—  was the second factor which weighed 
heavily in his thoughts.
In one sense, this had the same Influence on him that his commitment 
to republican government did. The North's fortunes in war— if they were 
bad, which they often were— justified new and difficult policies to pre­
serve the government. If the Northern position seemed very bad, which it 
sometimes did, the grave state of affairs provided a further impetus for 
Lincoln to search outside of the accepted norms for ideas to bolster fed­
eral strength.
Yet Northern standing in the war could also act as a restraint on 
Lincoln. Every action that he took as President cost him something. If 
he struck at slavery, for example, he risked losing the border states. If 
he did not Impose the draft in the North, there was a chance that his ar­
mies would lack the requisite manpower. If the North was not doing badly 
enough for the advantages of extreme action to outweigh the disadvantages, 
Lincoln would forego such action. "I have been unwilling to go beyond the
pressure of necessity in the unusual exercise of power," he wrote in his
7
message to Congress in December of 1861. This sentiment irritated the 
rabidly anti-Southern, abolitionist wing of the Republican party to no end. 
But, for Lincoln the Issue rested upon the costs and benefits of the policy
7 7
in question, and, of course, he would choose whatever best served his pri­
mary goal of saving the Union and the Republic.
Lincoln's commitment to free institutions and republican government was 
a constant with him. It never changed because it was rooted so very deeply 
in the stuff of his soul. What did change over the course of the war— the 
variable factor if you will— was Lincoln's assessment of the strength of 
the Union effort. In fact, the extent to which Lincoln felt compelled to 
employ his Presidential powers was very much a function of the extent to 
which the Northern military was able to make headway against the South. If 
the soldiers were capable of crushing the rebellion in fairly short order, 
then there was no need for him to use his emergency powers to support their 
efforts. On the other hand, if the Confederates managed to hold their own 
on the battlefield, then measures in addition to the use of force were ne­
cessary.
The war which Lincoln often observed from the White House windows was 
in many ways a conflict unlike any that mankind had previously seen. Most 
of the wars of the past had been isolated and controlled— characterized by 
uninspired mercenary armies fighting ame another with rudimentary weapons 
in relative isolation from the civilian populace. By 1861, warfare had 
changed considerably. The dmetieeit Civil War mmrkmi the first time that 
the two great forces then new to the wowii pnpu ler ideology and industrial 
technology— joined in that awful and deadly combination, modern war. Un­
like hie disinterested predecessors in the armies of monarchical Europe, 
the ceenen eoldier in the Civil Wet was imbued with the same prim, deter­
mined idaoloav tint netivetted hie leaders. And he wee much better armed.
7 8
too. The old "Brown Bess" musket, long the standard Infantry arm of the 
world’s armies prior to the Civil War, had an effective range of about fifty 
to seventy-five yards. The muzzle loader used by Union and Confederate 
soldiers was lethal at a half mile. The mixture— fierce determination 
throughout the ranks on both sides and radically improved armament—  
produced far and away the most deadly conflict in American history. Over
600,000 tost their lives through combat, disease, and a myriad of other fa-
8
tal possibilities. Countless more were wounded.
The battlefields of the Civil War bore very little resemblance to the 
plains of Yo^ktown or the wheat Helds of Waterloo. Places like Shiloh 
church and Sharpsburg were more akin to bloody, bottomless pits which suck­
ed in vast numbers of men, tons of equipment, millions of dollars, and un­
told quantities of human spirit and determination. Each clash literally 
took something out of both sides. Both were left with fewer men, less 
money, less equipment, and less spirit. Perhaps the onlv difference was 
that the winner had cause to rejoice and the loser did not. But what 
kind of rejoicing was there really for the winner of such a battle? Often, 
the fighting decided nothing significant, and what joy there was in de­
feating the enemy was tempered by the losses Incurred in combat. In any 
event, enormous resources— physical, mental, and institutional— were re­
quired to conduct such a war. Ultimate victory in the Civil War was as 
much a function of the depth of sectional resources as it was a function of 
good strategy.
A strong industrial base wee needed to provide enough rifles and 
artillery pieces to arm vast numbers of troops. It took a large populace 
to provide the manpower necessary to build large armies. An extensive and 
efficient transportation system wee required to move soldiers end supplies
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to a variety of points along a front that ran for a thousand miles. A 
sound financial system was necessary to fund the entire endeavor. In short, 
a vibrant, diversified economy and a large populace were needed to provide 
the* physical resources ot war.
But wars are r a r e l y ,  i f  ever, won or. physical resources alone. I n  a 
democratic n a t i o n - - a m i  bo th  s i d e s  i n  t he C i v i l  War s t v l e d  themseJved as 
such--it Is e s p e c i a l ?v impor t a n t  f « t  the peop l e  to he committed to the goals 
for which the war is [ n r  f ought  In order t o  build armies, men must be 
induced to enlist in the arm* <1 forces o f  their own free will. If the econ­
omy i s  to run at peak e f f i c i e n c y ,  the working man must he convinced of the 
correctness of his nation’s muse. In order to line up strong political supp­
ort and lots of tax dollars, the entire electorate must be won over to the 
idea of war. During wartime, dissei . is no longer a welcome guest in a 
democracy. A sign of strength in peacetime, it is a sign of weakness in 
war. It is proof positive that a nation is not unified behind its leader­
ship. And what if dissent should arise? What if it should manifest itself 
in attempts to interfere with the war effort? What then? In this eventual­
ity, a frequent occurrence in protracted conflicts, it is necessary to dis­
pense with peacetime niceties and suppress such activities. A government 
cannot stand idly by and watch its demise be engineered by disenchanted citi­
zens .
Thus, there are nor-material resources— in addition to political and 
military leadership— that are just as important for success in war as loco­
motives and iron foundries. There must be a solid base of popular support 
for participation in the conflict, and, in the absence of such support, a 
government must have the coercive power, the institutions! strength, to
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ensure at least a sullen popular cooperation. The course of the war was 
determined to a great extent by the balance of resources— both physical and 
non-physical— be tv/een the contending sections. The fortunes of both North 
and South depended heavily on economic strength, population size, popular 
support, and institutional strength.
The Northern economy was ideal— eminently suited to the tasks of mod­
ern war. Industry was well developed in the section, particularly in the 
Northeast, and factories, foundries and mills were sprouting up all over the 
place. As James G. Randall and David Donald have pointed out in The Civil 
War and Reconstruction, Industry in the state of Massachusetts alone "was 
producing annually nearly 300$ per capita." Randall and Donald went on to 
note that not "alone in Massachusetts, but also in Rhode Island and Connec­
ticut, in lower New York in the Delaware River area, along the Erie Canal, 
and in the areas of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Chicago, and St. Louis, 
were found the seats of America's industrial empire." Arordlng to statis­
tics compiled in I860, roughly four-fifths of the nation's railroad track, 
or 20,082 miles, lay within states that remained in the Union. New York 
and Philadelphia were centers of commerce and banking wheve wealthy Northern 
tycoons like John Jacob Astor and Cornelius Vanderbilt salted away their
millions. Northern harvests produced enough corn, wheat, and other products
o
to feed the section and export to Great Britain.
With the fa c to r ie s  to  produce the weapons, the tra in s to transport her 
arm ies, the farmers to  feed s o ld ie r  and c iv i l ia n  a l ik e ,  the North was rich  
in  th e m aterial resou rces of modern war. And what was more, she had the  
manpower as w e ll. In I8 6 0 , there were roughly 3 1 .5  m illio n  Americans. Around 
2 7 .5  m illio n  o f  th ese  were fr e e  c i t l s e n s .  Of th ese  fr e e  c l t l s e n s ,  roughly
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22 million resided within states that remained in the Union. Only about 5.5 
million free Americans lived in states that seceded— which placed the Confed­
eracy at a marked disadvantage In terms of manpower. With far more men,
the North could field more armies and replace more of those who fell in com-
. .  10 
bat.
The South, by comparison, was poorly equipped to fight a modern war.
Her free population numbered only about 5.5 million, and her economy was sim­
ply not equal to the task of sustaining a major war effort. As historians 
like Randall have pointed out, it is a mistake to characterise the South as 
completely dominated by slave-based plantation agriculture. In the decade 
prior to the Civil War, Southerners had made great strides in building up 
their own Industry. There had to be, as Randall reminded his readers, div­
ersity in a section that stretched from West Texas to Charleston.**
With all due consideration for whatever diversity there may have been 
in the South, however, there is truth nonetheless in the proposition that 
the Southern economy was primarily agricultural and, Indeed, rested to a 
great extent on the export of cash crops. By 1860, the South was producing 
upwards of five million bales of cotton a year. She also produced sugar, 
hemp, tobacco, and rice. Southerners did not engage in industrial or commer­
cial activity to any great extent. Certainly there was nothing in the South 
to rival the modern economic c o l u m n s  that was rearing its head in the North. 
Only a fifth of the nation's railroad mileage lay within states that seceded. 
The fact of the matter was that the South was not at all prepared to compete 
with the North in regards tc the physical resources of w a r . ^
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to discuss some of the prob­
lems that the Confederacy endured in the course of the war due to a lack of 
physical resources. In 1862, for example, desperate work was underway to
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complete two iron-clads In New Orleans in time to defend the city against an
impending attack from the U.S. Navy. Unfortunately for the rebels, they
were unable to locate facilities that were capable of building the propeller
shaft and armor plating for the boats in time for them to face the federal
fleet. When the Northern ships steamed up river, the iron-clads were of
no use to the city's defenders and were destroyed. Events such as these
simply would not have happened in the industrial North— which eventually
13
filled the oceans and rivers with both wooden and iron-clad warships.
An even more poignant account of the Inadequacy of Southern resources 
1b found in the history of the civil War written by Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis. Davis wrote that, during the summer of 1861, the Confed­
erate Congress passed "a war-tax of fifty cents on each hundred dollars of 
certain classes of property." Included among the items subject to taxation 
were "real estate of all kinds" and "slaves." Davis went on to report that 
**8lx months after the passage of the war tax . . • the popular aversion to 
Internal taxation by the General Government had so Influenced the legisla­
tion of the several states that only in South Carolina, Mississippi, and 
Texas were the taxes actually collected from the people." In 1863, the 
Congress made a second attempt at taxation— this time, slaves and land 
were carefully exempted. Yet, as Davis wrote, "about two thirds of the 
entire taxable property of the Confederate States consisted in land and 
slaves."1*
D avis' sto ry  p o in ts  to  a number o f  Southern w eaknesses. The most 
g la rin g  was a lack  o f " liq u id "  c a p ita l in  th e  South. U nlike the North, 
where f in a n c ia l and in d u s tr ia l in t e r e s t s  combined to  make la rg e  amounts o f  
ready investm ent c a p ita l a v a ila b le  to the war e f f o r t .  Southern money wee 
locked Into land and s la v e s .  "Constantly in  need o f c r e d it  to  fin an ce
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themselves until the crops were sold or to buy more slaves and land,'1 one 
author wrote, "Southerners tended to think of banks primarily as institutions 
to manufacture paper money rather than to serve as depositories of accumu­
lated capital**' Without "accumulated capital" to draw on the Davis administra­
tion tried to tap Southern wealth by taxing the physical manifestation of 
that wealth— land and slaves. Even if the scheme had worked, land and slaves 
were not nearly as capable of generating funds as were industry and commerce.**
There is another point to be made on this subject as well. As noted 
earlier, the resources of war are not merely physical. They are also psycho­
logical and institutional. The inability of the Confederate government to 
effectively tax its populace demonstrates a real lack of institutional 
strength. Especially in war, a government must have unobstructed access to 
important resources. Unable to tax the only real property within its borders, 
the Confederacy resorted to financing the war through bond issues— a policy 
which eventually proved disastrous. The reason that secessionist leaders 
had to resort to this policy was that, as Lincoln had pointed out in his 
message to Congress on July Fourth, 1861, they had committed the fatal error 
of building a government on disunion and localism. The result was a struc­
ture In which the states could effectively frustrate the general government's
16
policies— even during wartime.
The South was not, however, entirely inferior to the North In resources. 
Although both sections were severely divided internally on certain of the 
war's issues, it is a fair Judgment to say that people in the South were, on 
the whole, more committed to the war than people in the North. Secessionists 
had to be more committed. They were fighting for their independence and 
not for the subjugation of the North. They only wanted to be left alone.
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As long as Union soldiers assailed them* Southerners had no choice but to 
fight. It is in this sense that they had to be more committed to the war 
than Northerners. This is not to say that the Confederacy was solidly uni­
fied. The fact that the mountainous areas of the South— especially East 
Tennessee and West Virginia— offered open opposition to secession is often 
overlooked in popular history. Still, Southerners had the war's most impell­
ing reason, with no slight Intended to the cause of universal democracy, to 
take up arms: enemy soldiers invading their territory.**
Northerners, on the other hand, could find a number of reasons to give 
up the fight. Lincoln had defined war objectives which were certainly worth 
fighting for— republican government and Union— but which were nonetheless 
abstractions. Northerners did not have to fear living under the heel of a 
Southern government in the event of a Confederate triumph. Thus, under the 
duress of a protracted conflict, it was far easier for people in the North 
to contemplate surrender. This was especially true when Lincoln added the 
destruction of slavery to the Union war aims. Unlike the war's other objec­
tives, this was not something upon which everybody could agree. Luckily, 
there were enough people in the North who believed in republican government 
and hated slavery to see the Union through ftve years of fighting. But, the 
fact that these people were in the majority was not at all clear during the 
middle years of the war. Indeed, anti-war feeling almost proved to be an 
Achilla's heel for the North.
To begin w ith , th ere were th e border s t a t e s .  Here, th ere was s i g n i f i ­
cant pro-Southern sentim ent. These were, a f te r  a l l ,  s la v e  s t a t e s ,  and strong  
t i e s ,  reaching back to the f i r s t  days of se ttle m e n t, e x is te d  between p la ces  
l ik e  Kentucky and Maryland and th e  deep South. At the beginning o f the war,
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Lincoln had managed— relying on what pro-Union sentiment there was along 
with his emergency powers— to keep these states In the Union. His posi­
tion in these areas, however* was always precarious. If they supported 
the North* people along the border did so because they wished to preserve 
the Union. They did not sympathise with the abolitionists of New England*
and therefore, when Lincoln Issued his Emancipation Proclamation, the Union
18
position in the border states deteriorated markedly.
In fact* the Proclamation had this effect on many Northerners outside 
of the border as well. Lincoln had carried almost all of the free states 
in 1860, but he did not win in the North by any vast margin of popular votes. 
Stephen A. Douglas ran a close second. Many of those who had voted for 
Douglas, and perhaps even some of those who had voted for Lincoln, were not 
at all thrilled with the Idea of emancipation. Caring not a bit for "mili­
tary necessity," they viewed Lincoln's policy as radical, unlawful, and 
potentially disastrous for Northern society. Consider, for example, the 
words that physician Dr. John H. Van Evrle wrote in 1861 on the subject of 
slavery. A New Yorker* Van Evrie was convinced that blacks were an inher­
ently inferior race. "If the people of the two great sections of the coun­
try could change places*" he stated* "the vast 'anti-slavery' delusion 
would be exploded in sixty days . . . the negro is a different and subordin­
ate being* and in his normal condition at the South." Van Evrie was cer­
tainly not alone in the North. There were many who detested Southerners 
and things Southern but had no desire to see the structure of slavery rup­
tured. When Lincoln issued his fateful ultimatum on slavery on September
ia
22, 1862, he lost the support of these people. 7
As if the vast well of anger tapped by the Emancipation Proclamation
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were not enough, Lincoln had to contend, after the first major battles of 
the war, with discontent over the efficiency and prowess of the military and, 
later, with widespread war-weariness. As the Army of the Potomac lost bat­
tle after battle in the show-case Eastern theater, people first railed at 
Lincoln and his Generals for the poor showing and then, as death seemed to 
reach into every household, despaired of the effort altogether. Was the 
Union, they asked, worth all of this slaughter? Was there not any chance 
of negotiating an armistice which would still preserve the Union?
None of these divisive factors— pro-Southern sentiment, anger over 
emancipation, and war-weariness— reared its head in simple solitude. They 
all mingled to produce a throng of eager followers for the anti-war move­
ment which sprang up in the North— a movement that at one point threatened 
to unseat Lincoln and end the war. Urging people to oppose the President 
and his policies, these anti-war Democrats, derisively referred to as 
"Copperheads," even went so far as to discourage enlistments in the military. 
This kind of dissent even the rights-consclous Lincoln could not tolerate, 
and he reacted with a series of harsh measures designed to ensure that the 
government had unobstructed access to the essential human and economic 
resources of war. Although he tried to temper this with a healthy respect for 
legitimate forms of protest, Lincoln's policy was nevertheless regarded 
by many as illegal and repressive. The fact that Lincoln was able to employ 
a rigorous structure of law and policy to hold the nation together during 
the difficult days of the war demonstrates that, unlike the Confederacy, 
the federal government possessed the Institutional strength to fight a 
long war. But, before the conflict was over, the entire situation became a 
vicious circle with extreme war measures creating discontent which only led
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to more extreme war measures.
Im summation, however, the balance sheet of strategic resources read 
strikingly in favor of the North. The Union had the industry, the manpower, 
and the institutional strength to successfully conduct a modern war. The 
South was resource-poor and her government was ill-suited to utilize what 
resources she had. Even if Southerners had the more substantial basis for 
commitment to the war, it is difficult to see how they could have ever 
hoped to overcome the physical shortcomings of their section to win inde­
pendence.
Indeed, considering the vast superiority which the North enjoyed in 
almost every kind of resource, one feels Impelled to inquire how the Confed­
eracy managed to stave off deleat for so long. How is it that the secession­
ists managed to defy Lincoln and his legions until 1865? Not surprisingly, 
the answer lies in military leadership— another of war's many intangible 
factors. In one of those odd twists of fate upon which history is so often 
determined, the South possessed the best Generals during the first years of 
the war.
While he may not have had a multitude of well armed men, Jefferson Davis 
did have Robert E. Lee and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. Commanding the Army 
of Northern Virginia, these two men managed to fend off numerous Union 
attacks and even Invaded the North a couple of times. The Armv of the Poto­
mac, the federal force in the region, was commanded during the early years 
of the war by some of the worst military talent the United States has ever 
produced. George B. McClellan, who took over McDowell's position and was 
also given command of all other U.S. forces, was a superb organiser who 
lacked the boldness and initiative to take advantage of the opportunities
20
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for victory which were obvious to many around him. John Pope suffered the 
extreme misfortune of having to work alongside a jealous George McClellan. 
Neither Ambrose Burnside nor Joseph Hooker possessed the skills needed to 
plan and successfully execute a military campaign with a force the size of 
the Army of the Potomac. A lack of success led to bickering between the 
various commanders, superiors and subordinates, civilian leaders and sol­
diers, and, for a time, it seemed as if there was no way to build effective 
leadership for the Eastern troops.
Thus, when the Army of the Potomac attempted to strike back at the Con­
federacy after that first defeat at Manassas, they were defeated again and 
again— and again. At the second battle of Manassas, at Fredericksburg, at 
Chancellorsville, the Easterners suffered shattering setbacks at the hands 
of Lee and his trusted and wily subordinate, Jackson. And these were more 
than mere temporary reversals. They were catastrophes that left thousands 
upon thousands of dead and wounded men littered over the battlefield and 
ripped the spirit out of the proud soldiers. Other times, such as In the 
peninsular campaign and the infamous "mud march," federal troops endured 
the privations of extended campaigning only to withdraw back to Washington 
with nothing to show for their work. Their lone victory during this dis­
couraging period— at Antietam— was more of a gruesome draw— a sort of vic­
tory by default which could have been a great success if only McClellan 
had acted boldly upon the enemy plans which had fallen into his hands.
The first years of fighting in the Western theater saw only slightly 
more success for the North, Poorly defended everywhere, the Western Con­
federacy was wide open to federal attack, and, from the outset, the fed- 
erals plunged deep into this enemy territory, using the major rivers as
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avenues of attack. And they won some Important victories, too. U.S, Grant’s 
men captured the important Confederate strongholds Fi n  Henry and Fort Donel- 
son. Farragut's fleet captured New Orleans, Yet, here too the Union seemed 
to be experiencing defeat in the sense of unutilized potential. These Wes­
tern states were ripe to be taken, but cautious commanders such as Henry 
Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, and William Rosecrans seemed almost afraid to 
act. Thus, instead of balancing defeat in the East with victory in the
West, the impression far and wide was that military Inefficiency had blunted
Union efforts in the West. As effectively as l.ce rrd Jackson might have done,
incompetent Generals frustrated federal attempts to quickly reestablish con-
21trol over the crucial lower Mississippi river region.
The initial course of the war was what today's political scientists
would term a"worst-case" scenario for Abraham Lincoln. Since the South never
had any hope of winning through invading and subjugating the much stronger
North, there were three ways that the Civil War could end. The North could
subjugate the South, which is, of course, what eventually happened, or the
South could win by one of two means. Either people In the badly divided
North could despair of the war and concede Southern Independence, or Groat
Britain miglf recognize the Confederacy and intervene in the war on her
behalf— thus providing the South the the resources necessary to win. "It
rather quickly boiled down to a business of hanging on and hopiug that the
people in the North would finally get tired of the struggle and give up,"
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wrote historian Bruce Catton.
And when the federal forces seemed to make no impression upon the 
rebels, when the death lists reached unheard of lengths, people in the 
North began to get very tired and Lord Palmerston and his cabinet eyed the
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Confederacy with a new respect. Of all the things which could have happened, 
the Confederacy’s early victories menaced the Union Goliath at his only vul­
nerable points— public opinion and Her Majesty’s Government.
Fortunately for the Union, the dedicated and intelligent Lincoln was in
command. ”1 expect to maintain this contest until successful,” he wrote in
the summer of 1862, ”or till 1 die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or
Congress or the country forsake me.” Lincoln understood that all the North
had to do was apply her superior forces in a coordinated effort and success
against the South was bound to occur somewhere. His personal papers are
filled with meditations on the nature of the war and with orders trying to
force his reluctant commanders into the kind of offensive he envisaged.
There is good reason for T. Harry Williams, an expert on the military aspects
of the period* to term Lincoln ”a great natural strategist.” With a powerful
mind that was uncluttered by old Napoleonic tactics, the President was far
more capable than his Generals of seeing the realities of modern war and
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adapting accordingly.
Eventually, of course, Lincoln found Generals who were capable of exe­
cuting his plans and the South capitulated soon after. In the meantime, 
however, the only difference between victory and defeat was the edifice of 
leadership and policy that Lincoln created to keep the North in the war 
until good Generals could be found. He could really do little about British 
intervention except hope that his emancipation policy, which anti-slavery 
Britain favored, would soon be accompanied by military successes to dis­
courage the Confederacy's English sponsors,
He needed soldiers to fight in the armies and he needed political supp­
ort so that Congress and the people would continue to provide the materials
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of war. Menaced by the widespread disillusion and anger that defeat, eman­
cipation and wartime measures had created, he resorted to his extreme Presi­
dential powers to keep the armies in the field duri Mic crucial period 
between difficult defeats and Impressive victories.
It is in this light that the extreme measures of Lincoln's wartime 
Presidency must be viewed. Certainly he acted in a manner that was far and 
away more despotic than any of his predecessors— men that he himself had 
criticized for behaving as dictators. Certainly he violated every practi­
cal precept concerning the Presidency that he had enunciated in his long 
political career prior to 1861. But did he really violate his beliefs?
Did he really do injustice to his vision of a unified, republican America 
presided over by a weak executive? Put more forcefully: Could he have
done better justice to his ideas by failing to act when Internal dissen­
sion and rebel troops threatened to destroy the nation? Could he have 
achieved better results by adhering rigidly to his old doctrines in the 
face of overwhelming evidence that change was necessary?
Lincoln saved his vision of America by acting outside of his beliefs—  
by demonstrating the Intellectual flexibility that was the hallmark of his 
genius. He acted in a way that was, ultimately, in harmony with his pre­
vious attitudes. He did not jump quickly to taking extreme measures. In­
stead, after he had exhausted less radical options, and perhaps the military 
situation had gotten worse, he was ready to act. Lincoln's Presidency and 
its axtreme nature are thus best understood when examined from the perspec­
tive of Lincoln's ultimate objective— preserving the republican institutions 
and the nation so that a day might again come when a strong presidency would
be unthinkable.
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"I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the insti­
tution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful 
right to do so,M Thus spoke Abraham Lincoln during his first inaugural add­
ress. In an attempt to reassure Southerners that he intended no harm to 
their property, Lincoln chose to quote one of his earlier speeches in which 
he had expressed his oft-repeated position that the government had no right 
to Interfere with slavery in the states where it already existed. This was 
the position that Lincoln held, when he entered office, on the Institution 
which was the greates. wedge between North and South, the catalyst of hos- 
tilities.24
It was a position that would change over the course of the Civil War. 
Adopting an emancipation policy in order to weaken the South and strengthen 
his own section, Lincoln acted to deprive Southerners of what was their 
legitimate property in peacetime. Emancipation was Lincoln's most extreme 
and controversial war measure. When he freed Southern slaves he opened a 
well-spring, some would have said a Pandora's box, of emotions and possibili­
ties. Unquestionably, there are several aspects of emancipation and the man 
who enacted it which could form the basis of legitimate discussion. Only 
one aspect is of interest here— the question of how Lincoln justified his 
action. Put in other words: Where did he derive the power to free the
slaves?
This is not an attempt to analyse how Lincoln felt personally about 
blacks and slavery. Some have written that the wartime President was a 
racist who cared nothing for black freedom and really wanted to preserve 
slavery along with the Union. The overwhelming body of evidence demonstrates
( 2 )
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that, on the contrary, Lincoln considered slavery an abomination, an ana* 
thema to all of those things which he held sacred* The only differnece 
between Lincoln and the abolitionists was that Lincoln was practical enough 
to realise that slavery was a legally protected and politically entrenched
25
institution in which millions of Americans, both North and South, believed.
This is, however, a study of Abraham Lincoln and Presidential power, 
and, therefore, Lincoln's personal attitude on the Issue is of secondary 
Importance to the question of how he, as President, determined to promulgate 
an emancipation policy. Examining Lincoln's own documents as well as the 
comments of some of his cabinet members, the inescapable conclusion Is that 
he was forced to issue the emancipation edict by the noor military fortunes 
of the Union and the combined danger from the anti-war movement and the 
possibility of British Intervention. It was a policy which he believed in 
personally, but, as President, it was a step which he took only because the 
gravity of the situation led him, as Commander*in-Chief, to act.
Lincoln's movement towards emancipation and his reasons for It are best 
seen in the evolution of his official position on slavery. Lincoln's will* 
lngness to employ an emancipation policy grew with, indeed was correlated 
with, Union military misfortune. Initially unwilling to consider emancipa­
tion at all, he first attempted to employ a carefully constructed plan to free 
the slaves in the loyal border states, and later, when this plan had failed, 
he moved to emancipate the South's slaves with his own power.
Commenting in his diary on Lincoln's attitude toward emancipation early 
in the war, Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, wrote that "whenever 
the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any 
way alluded to, he (Lincoln) had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any
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Interference by the General Government with the* subject." Mindful of pro­
slavery sentiment in the border states and among Democratic voters in the 
North, Lincoln adhered to the moderate sentiment that he had expressed in 
his inaugural address, and, whenever he had the opportunity, he reminded his 
fellow citizens that the war was being fought to preserve the Union and not 
to free the slaves. M1 have been anxious and careful that the inevitable 
conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and remorse­
less revolutionary struggle," he wrote in his December message to Congress 
in 1861. "I have, therefore., in evtrv case, thought it proper to keep the 
integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest on 
our part." In this position, Lincoln was fully supported by Congress which 
passed the Crittenden resolution proclaiming that the conflict was only for 
the preservation of the Union.
Lincoln backed up his words with tough policy decisions, too. As fed­
eral troops attempted to subjugate the slaveowners of the South, the issue 
of slavery was bound to arise. Twice within the first year and a half of 
the war, federal commanders Issued edicts proclaiming all of the slaves, or 
certain slaves, within their jurisdictions free, and, ir both cases, Lincoln 
repudiated the orders.
On August 30th, 1861, John C. Fremont, commander of Union forces in 
Missouri, issued a proclamation which, among other things, asserted the inten­
tion to liberate the slaves of those who supported the rebellion. Lincoln 
wrote Fremont and asked him to modify the proclamation to conform with 
legislation passed by Congress, the so-called first Confiscation Act, which 
set guidelines for the selsure of rebel property— guidelines which effec­
tively excluded slavery. By way of explanation, Lincoln wrote Fremont that
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his proclamation* in its original form, would "alarm our Southern Union 
friends* and turn them against us— perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for 
Kentucky." Lincoln’s words demonstrate that his concern with pro-slavery 
sentiment in sensitive areas like the border states was the central con­
sideration behind his position on emancipation— at least initially, In his
reply* Fremont asked Lincoln to "make an open order for the modification of
27the proclamation*" which Lincoln "very cheerfully" did.
Later, on May 9* 1862, General David Hunter, commander of the Depart­
ment of the South* Issued an order proclaiming ail of the slaves in South 
Carolina* Georgia, and Florida "forever free." Lincoln responded by Issuing 
his own proclamation in which he wrote that he "had no knowledge* information* 
or belief, of an intention on the part of General Hunter to issue such a pro­
clamation. And further," continued Lincoln, "that neither General Hunter, 
nor any other commander, or person, has been authorised by the Government 
of the United States, to make proclamations declaring the slaves of any state 
frees and that the supposed proclamation, now in question, whether genuine 
or false, is altogether void, so far as respect& such declaration." Thus, 
nearly a year after Fremont's initial proclamation, Lincoln still held the 
same position concerning emancipation.^**
At least, he held this position in public. Behind the scenes, an inter­
esting alteration was taking place. Indeed, there was evidence of this change 
in the same proclamation in which Lincoln revoked Hunter's emancipation order. 
"I further make it known," Lincoln wrote, "that whether it be competent for 
me, as Commander-In-Chief of the Afmy and Navy, to declare the Slaves of any 
state or states, free, and whether at any ttae, in any case, it shall have 
become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government, to
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exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility,
1 reserve to myself.M This was certainly a marked change from the position
that he had assumed in his inaugural address, from the sentiment which Gid-
eon Welles had observed. No longer treating the idea of emancipation like
a sacred idol not to be touched, Lincoln served notice in this proclamation,
and in other statements, that he considered emancipation an open question
29
which he would decide on alone.
How had this change come about? What had happened in nine months time 
to cause so radical a shift in Lincoln's thinking? There was a hint of the 
motive behind Lincoln's new stand in those very same words in which he ter­
med emancipation a real possibility. He wrote not simply about freeing the 
slaves, but, instead, referred to the decision in terms of determining whether 
or not emancipation had "become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance 
of the government."
For the cautious Lincoln, emancipation would only be "indispensable11 if 
two things happened. First, the military situation had to deteriorate to the 
point where some sort of emancipation plan would become necessary. Union mis­
fortune had to be so severe that Incurring the wrath of the border states 
and conservative Northerners would be a price well worth paying for the opp­
ortunity to strike at Southern slavery. Lincoln also had to satisfy himself 
that less extreme options would not suffice in the place of harsher action.
Not a man to leap to extraordinary positions, Lincoln would always try to 
implement a less upsetting policy in an effort to achieve his goal without 
the greater difficulty that would accompany a more extreme plan.
There is ample evidence that the poor Northern military showing is 
what led Lincoln to consider emancipation. When he first discussed the idea
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with Gideon Welles, the Navy Secretary wrote that Lincoln "dwelt earnestly
on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given
it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that It was a military
necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must
free the slaves or be ourselves subdued*" Certainly, conferring with a
trusted subordinate like Welles, Lincoln could speak his mind without fear
of alienating any supporters. In this open forum, then, Lincoln indicated
that it was his fear of being "subdued"— a possibility that he would resist
with all the means at his disposal— that was fueling his movement towards
ordering freedom for the slaves. Commenting on this same conversation with
Lincoln, Welles elaborated on this fear of losing the war.
...the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power 
and dimensions of the Insurrection, which extended through 
all the Slave States, and had combined most of them in a 
confederacy to destroy the Union, Impelled the administra­
tion to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national 
existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were 
in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers 
and producers, but thousands of them v’ere in attendance upon 
the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, 
and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed 
by them..
Welles might have also noted in this regard that emancipation would discour­
age British intervention in the war— a possibility that seemed likely in 
the summer of 1862.
Lincoln's conversation with Welles took place in July of 1862. As 
Wells's account indicates, Lincoln was already on the verge of issuing an 
emancipation order on his own authority. The U.S. Army appeared incapable 
of crushing the rebellion and it looked as if Britain might recognise the 
Confederacy at any moment. In the months prior to that summer, when things 
were not quite so bad, but bad enough, Lincoln had tried to Implement a less
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extreme emancipation program dealing only with the slaves in the border 
states. In addition to the continuing deterioration of the war effort* the 
failure of this plan convinced Lincoln of the necessity of freeing the 
Southern slaves through executive action.
Essentially, Lincoln proposed to offer federal financial aid to the 
border states in order to fund a gradual emancipation program which, of 
course, the states themselves had to adopt. He Included In his plan the 
promise of a colonisation program for the freedmen in order to allay white 
fears of racial destabilization. He felt that, if the border states approved 
of his plan, it would be a clear indication to the Confederacy that it had 
no hope of winning these states— a blow from which Lincoln thought the reb­
ellion might not recover.
The first Inklings of this policy emerged in late 1861 when Lincoln 
wrote a couple of drafts of a bill for Delaware to emancipate her slaves 
with Federal assistance in compensating the owners. Later, on March 6, 1862, 
he formalized his suggestions when he sent Congress a message urging the 
law-makers to pass legislation granting financial assistance to any state 
which would gradually abolish slavery.
"The leaders of the existing insurrection,11 Lincoln wrote in his mess­
age, "entertain the hope that this government will be forced to acknowledge 
the Independence of some part of the disaffected region, and that all of the 
slave states North of such part, will then join the Confederacy." Lincoln's 
reasoning on this point was certainly forceful. If the border states 
destroyed within their own enclaves the great Institution of the Confederacy, 
the repudiation of the deep South would be unmistakable— and of enough force, 
Lincoln hoped, to tip the scales of war in favor of the Union.
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He argued that the cost of eighty-seven days of the war would pay for 
all of the slaves in the loyal states "at four hundred dollars per head." 
Furthermore* he promised to back up his emancipation policy with a sound 
colonization plan— transporting the former slaves to good land in Latin 
America* Forever, he hoped to remove the issue of race from the American 
scene. This then was Lincoln's alternative to full emancipation. He pro­
posed to weaken the rebellion through robbing it of any hope of winning over 
the border states, and, through having the citizens of these states destroy 
slavery themselves, he hoped to strengthen the Union position there— leaving
him with less to worry about. In short, he did everything he could to make
32
the whole idea acceptable to conservative whites throughout the North.
But when he tried to sell his plan he was rebuffed in no uncertain 
terms. In July of 1862, he wrote out a draft of a bill mandating federal 
financial assistance for those states that adopted a compensated emancipa­
tion program. That same month he met with the border states' Congressmen 
to push his idea. "You and I both know what the lever of their (the Confed­
eracy's) power is," Lincoln told them. "Break that lever (slavery) before
33
their faces, and they can shake you no more forever."
He reminded the border states' men that his program was gradual, com­
pensated, and Included provisions for colonization. "How much better for 
you, and for your people, to take the step which, at once, shortens the 
war, and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be lost 
In any other event," were hla words on the subject. His appeal fell, how­
ever, on deaf ears. The majority of the Congressmen argued against his 
34
program.
With the failure of border states' Mancipation, Lincoln realised that
100
he would have to resort to a more extreme approach to the Issue of slavery. 
The pressure on him to net was intense. As Stephen Oates, the historian who 
has written most perceptively on this aspect of Lincoln’s Presidency, has 
pointed out, the abolitionist winy, of the Republican party, which included 
powerful Senators within Its ranks, lobbied intensively in an effort to 
force Lincoln’s hand on emancipation. These were voices that he could not 
ignore. The refusal of the border states' Congressmen to adopt his gradual 
plan occurred in July of 1862— the same month that Lincoln broached the idea 
of issuing an emancipation proclamation with cabinet members like Gideon 
Welles. In that very same month, the Republican-dominated Congress passed 
a second Confiscation Act concerning the seizure of rebel property. This 
Act provided for the confiscation of the slaves of those who could be shown 
to be supporting the rebellion. It was not. an emancipation measure by any 
means. In order to liberate a person's slaves, his complicity in the rebel­
lion had to be proved in court. Lincoln initially vetoed the Act for Con­
stitutional reasons, but later signed it when Congress removed his objections. 
Still, the message was very clear to Lincoln. He had to dispense with water­
ed down measures and act forcefully— or his own party and Congress would do 
it for him.-*5
Considering the military situation, the failure of his gradual plan, and 
the strength of the Congressional pressure, Lincoln decided that the time had 
come to act. He could no longer afford the luxury of deferring to conserva­
tive Northern opinion. On July 22, 1862, he wrote out a preliminary Eman­
cipation Proclamation in which he promised, "as a fit and necessary mili­
tary measure," to free the slaves In any area still in rebellion as of 
January 1, 1863. Discussing the measure with his cabinet, Lincoln was par-
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suaded by his Secretary of State, William Seward, not to Issue the edict 
until after a Union victory lest it be viewed as a frantic last grasp at 
survival. Soon after this, Lee was defeated at Antietam, Thus, on Septem­
ber 22, 1862, Lincoln issued his preliminary Proclamation calling upon South­
erners to return their allegiance to the federal government and threatening 
to emancipate their slaves if they refused. On January l, 1863, the rebel- 
Uon had not, of course, ceased, and Lincoln, "by virtue of the power in 
. . . (him) . . .vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the 
United States in time of actual and armed rebellion against authority and 
government of the United States," freed the Southern slaves. He also made 
it known that freedmen would be recruited for such secondary military chores 
as garrison duty.36
It is important to note that this was a measure that Lincoln took as 
a military necessity and that he justified it on the basis of his power as 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. Unlike the border states, where he knew 
that he had to act through appropriate channels— the state legislatures and 
Congress, the South was under military law because of the rebellion and 
Lincoln and his soldiers did not have to resort to normal, peacetime proced­
ures to form a policy. Lincoln's language on these points in the Proclama­
tion is proof positive that he did not consider emancipation an act which 
he would normally have the power, as President, to employ. Admittedly, there 
can be little doubt that Lincoln's words in this regard were also intended 
to deflect criticism from conservatives in the North. But, when one considers 
the careful and reasoned way that Lincoln arrived at his decision— acting 
out of desperate need and after exhausting other options— it also becomes 
apparent that there is a real sincerity in his words about military necess­
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ity. He had to act In order to save the nation. Gideon Welles described 
the Proclamation best when he termed it "an arbitrary and despotic measure 
In the cause of freedom.,,J
Or perhaps Lincoln summed up his whole emancipation policy better when 
forced to defend it during his 1864 campaign for re-election. In a letter 
to Kentucky editor Albert Hodges on April 4, 1864, Lincoln argued eloquently 
and perceptively for the measure. In his words, the wartime President not 
only outlined how he determined that emancipation was necessary, but also 
said a great deal in justification and explanation of emancipation that app­
lied to all of hls extreme measures.
"If slavery ie wrong, nothing is wrong," he wrote. Indeed, he. could "not 
remember when...(he)...did not so think, and feel." Still, upon taking off­
ice, he did not believe that "the Presidency conferred upon...(him)...an 
unrestricted right to act officially upon this Judgment and feeling."
It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of 
my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constltu* 
tion of the United States. I could not take the office 
without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might 
take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using 
the power. I understood, too, that In ordinary civil 
administration this oath even forbade me to practically 
Indulge my primary abstract Judgment on the moral question 
of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and 
in many ways. And I aver, to this day, that I have done 
no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment 
and feeling on slavery.
But Lincoln saw hls oath as more than a simple promise to conform to dry 
legalities. He believed that at the heart of hls duties was an implicit 
obligation to preserve the government***to transmit it, as he liked to say, 
unimpaired to later generations. Understandably, he viewed this task of 
preservation as his greatest and most profound responsibility. After all, 
what good would it do to adhere rigidly to hls oath in regards to respecting 
the law if, in doing so, the government Itself was overthrown?
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I did understand however, that my oath to preserve the con- 
stitution to the best of my ability, impssed upon me the 
duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that gov­
ernment— that nation— of which that constitution was the 
organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet 
preserve the constitution? By general law life and limb 
must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to 
save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a 
limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, 
might become lawful, by becoming Indispensable to the 
preservation of the constitution, through the preservation 
of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and 
now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my 
ability, I had even tried to preserve the constitution, if, 
to sa^e slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the 
wreck of government, country, and Constitution all together.
Thus Lincoln took an expansive view of the powers of his office during a
national crisis.
And yet, at the same time, he did not believe in a careless applica­
tion of the mandate for extreme action that he saw in his oath. Instead, he 
consulted that second great consideration of his thinking on such matters—  
the state of the Union war effort, the judgment as to whether or not a cer­
tain policy had become"indispensable" to the preservation of the Union and 
republican government. It was in this vein, as he told Hodges, that he han­
dled the question of emancipation.
When, early in the war, Gen. Fremont attempted military 
emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think 
it an indispensable necessity. When a little later, Gen.
Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of 
the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an 
indispensable necessity. When, still later, Gen. Hunter 
attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, 
because I did not yet think the Indispensable necessity 
had come.
When the time for indispensable measures came, Lincoln attempted to adopt the 
least extreme measure possible. He made a careful determination of the 
seriousness of the situation, and he tried to Implement a policy that would 
not be harsh in excess of what events had necessitated. He tried, in other
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words, to conform to the laws to the greatest extent possible. His emancipa­
tion plan for the oorder states was unquestionably undertaken in this spirit. 
"When, in March, and May, and July 1862 I made earnest, and successive app­
eals to the border states to favor compensated emancipation," he wrote, "I 
believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation, and arming 
the blacks would come, unless averted by that measure."
But, if his less extreme policy failed, as it did in the case of eman­
cipation in the border states, he was then willing— justified by both necess­
ity and the failure of his attempt to act in a less radical fashion— to 
employ more extreme measures.
They (the border states) declined the proposition; and 
I was, in my best Judgment, driven t/> the alternative 
of either surrendering the Union, and with it, the Con­
stitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored ele­
ment. I chose the latter.
In other words, in the final analysis, Lincoln would take any action necess­
ary to achieve what he viewed as the highest good— the preservation of repub­
lican government and the Union. Since he believed in a weak executive and 
adherence to the laws, however, he sincerely hoped and attempted to violate 
the law as little as possible.
Lincoln's letter to Hodges was a written report of a conversation that 
Lincoln had had, in Hodges' presence, with officials from Kentucky. Before 
closing, Lincoln included some additional thoughts which were "not in the 
verbal conversation." "In telling this tale," he wrote, "1 attempt no com­
pliment to my own sagacity* I claim not to have controlled events, but con­
fess plainly that events have controlled me." In these final words, Lincoln 
concisely stated the logic that he had employed concerning the use of his 
extraordinary powers* He had not planned to emancipate the slaves from the
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start. Indeed, he had not even been sure that emancipation would prove 
fruitful when he issued his proclamation. Thus, his "sagacity”— his 
ability to control and plan events— deserved "no compliment." Instead, as 
explained it, he made up his mind early that he would save the nation at 
all costs— that whatever he did toward that end was ultimately legal. How­
ever, as a sort of corollary to this attitude, he felt that he should act 
in an extreme fashion only to the extent that "events" required it— thus 
respecting his peacetime obligations to the law to the highest degree pos­
sible. In this sense, under this frame of mind, "events" dictated to what
extent he had to act harshly— to what degree he had to put aside his pre- 
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vious beliefs.
(3)
Lincoln's emancipation policy was unquestionably beneficial to the 
North. Over 100,000 blacks served in the Union armies at a time when both 
sides desperately needed men. In fact, the need to fill the ranks of the 
military was a constant concern for Lincoln— particularly when it became 
clear that the war would involve bloody fighting and after he Issued his 
controversial emancipation proclamation. The anti-war movement which 
sprang up in the North did everything that it could to discourage enlist­
ments and cast Lincoln, the military, and the war in an unfavorable light. 
Additionally, Southern sympathisers in the North, encouraged by Union dif­
ficulties, made active efforts— such as sabotaging military installations
or providing Information to the Confederate military— to hinder the war ef- 
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fort.
Faced with this kind of opposition within his own section, Lincoln
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felt that he had no choice but to act outside of established statutes In 
pursuit of that greater legality— the preservation of the government. He 
suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus so that his administration could de­
tain individuals that it considered dangerous. He Invoked martial law to 
deal with those who purposefully interfered with the military— even in 
areas which were In no way threatened by rebel armies. He also suppressed 
the news media— employing a variety of means to stifle reporting that the 
administration considered damaging to military operations. In taking these 
steps, Lincoln behaved in the same manner that he had concerning emanci­
pation, He did not immediately leap to harsh policies. Instead, he moved 
slowly in the direction of radical measures because of the force of events 
and the failure of less extreme alternatives.
And yet there is a significant difference between Lincoln's handling of 
wartime dissent and his emancipation policy— a difference which it is 
doubtful could have been avoided. As far as emancipation was concerned, 
the policy only necessitated, in the most basic sense, a stroke of the 
Presidential pen and the ultimate triumph of the Union armies. Controlling 
dissent, on the other hand, required an efficient and extensive system of 
of administrative authority with a clear policy. After all, the objective 
of the policy— the suppression of unfounded spiteful invective as well 
as activities intended to Interfere with the Union war effort, while at the 
same time allowing legitimate forms of protest— was a much more abstract, 
and therefore difficult, goal to achieve than freeing all of the slaves.
The necessary system of administration simply did not exist among the 
patchwork, layered, hodgepodge of military, federal, and state juris* 
dictions— all dealing to at least some extent with the question of what was
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willfully disloyal and what was legitimate dissent. Predictably* some in­
nocent people were subjected to hardship In the shuffle— for which Lincoln
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has been Justly criticized.
Thus* while the policy Lincoln employed shows the same careful de­
liberation* respect for law, and ultimate dedication to the Republic which 
permeated the rest of his Presidency, the matter got somewhat out of hand 
at the level of application. Nevertheless, as with Lincoln's other emer­
gency measures, a careful examination of his actions demonstrates that he 
did not relinquish his belief in a weak Presidency, but only acted to save 
his nation so that there might come a day when a President might again 
serve his term in a unified and peaceful country.
Saving the nation was certainly foremost in his thoughts when he is­
sued his first suspensions of Habeas Corpus. As discussed earlier, the 
first months after the bombardment of Fort Sumter were particularly dan­
gerous ones for the new administration. Lincoln was trying to put the 
government on a war footing, with no significant military force to speak 
of, in the midst of widespread secessionist activity in the border states. 
Because of the location of Washington D.C., the violent outbursts of pro- 
Southern sentiment in Maryland were of especial concern to Lincoln. Se­
cessionists dismantled railroad bridges, seised telegraph offices, and 
attacked federal troops in the state— effectively shutting down lines of 
communication which had to remain open If the government were to persevere 
through the opening stages of the rebellion.
Needing desperately to put a halt to such activities, but without time 
to engage in the legal niceties of investigating and indicting those who 
were suspected of seceseionlst activities, Lincoln authorised the commander 
of the Army, General Winfield Scott, to suspend the writ of Habeae Corpus 
along the crucial military lines of communication and simply arrest and de­
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tain anyone suspected of hindering the military. Hundreds were arrested. 
But, Maryland and the other border states reriined in the Union and the 
soldiers eventually made It to Washington.
Yet, although Lincoln’s policy was obviously appropriate and success­
ful, he was not free from opposition. Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, issued a writ of Habeas Corpus for a Baltimore secessionist 
named Merryman. When the writ was refused, Taney entered an opinion 
against Lincoln ordering Merryman*s release— which Lincoln proceeded to 
Ignore. The President did not, however, ignore the issue in his message to 
Congress when that body met in special session on July 4, 1861. Lincoln 
reminded the legislators that the Constitution, while providing that the 
writ of Habeas Corpus may be suspended in times of rebellion, does not 
state who is to determine the existence of a rebellion and suspend the 
writ. Since there was clearly a rebellion under foot in the country, and
the Constitution does not say that the President may not suspend the writ,
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Lincoln felt that he had "violated no law."
This might have been the end of the Habeas Corpus issue altogether had 
the North managed to win the war in the few weeks that many predicted in 
that Innocent early summer of 1861* Instead, however, over the space of 
the next year in particular, the North was dealt a series of shocking de­
feats. Defeats that forced the government to adopt the first draft in 
American history and that compelled Lincoln to issue his emancipation 
proclamation. In the wake of these events, the war became very unpopular 
with many in the North. No longer seeming to be a war to preserve the 
Union, the conflict struck many people as a fight to free the slaves— cer­
tainly not the most popular of objectives. Also, as many battles had 
shown, war was far more lethal than glorious. Young men no longer ran off
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to join the Army at the first sight of a recruiting officer, and the draft, 
while it may have forced men into the ranks, did nothing to erase their 
feelings about military service. Thus, it was little surprise to percep­
tive observers in the North when some citizens of that section moved ac­
tively to harm the war effort— through sabotage, helping Confederate sol-
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dlers, discouraging enlistments, and many other means.
Confronted with these activities, Lincoln reacted vigorously to en­
sure that the military and the draft operated unimpeded. On August 8,
1862, "United States marshals and local magistrates were authorized to im­
prison persons who discouraged enlistments or engaged in disloyal prac­
tices." In addition, persons arretsed for these offenses were to be tried 
by military commissions.
More importantly, on September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation 
in which he stated that "all Rebels and Insurgents, their aiders and abet­
tors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer en­
listments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, 
affording aid and comfort to the rebels.•.shall be subject to martial law 
and liable to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military Commis­
sion." Lincoln also suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus in regards to
43
those arrested for these offenses.
This was a far-reaching and legally questionable step. Although 
Lincoln could claim to have the right to suspend Habeas Corpus because the 
Constitution did not specifically prevent suspension, he certainly had no 
right to employ martial law in areas unthreatened by the rebellion and 
where the civil courts were functioning. Yet, when hie proclamation was 
carried into effect, individuals arrested for the specified offenses were 
subjected to martial law in areas of the North which— unlike Kentucky, for
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example— were under no threat of Southern Invasion and where the regular
courts were able to handle cases. Also, as James Randall pointed out in
his study of Constitutional difficulties during the Lincoln administration,
many of the cases brought before these military tribunals had no relation
to military law— indeed, many cases seemed to hinge on issues of a poll- 
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tical nature.
Still, Lincoln was largely maintained in his policy by Congress, which 
passed the Habeas Corpus Act on March 3, 1863. At first glance, the legi­
slation might have appeared to be a constraint on the executive. Al­
though authorized to suspend Habeas Corpus anywhere in the United States 
"during the present rebellion," the administration was required to sub­
mit lists of those arrested under the suspension to the federal courts. 
People held In this manner were to be released unless formally Indicted. 
But, the really Important aspect of the Act is in what it did not stipu­
late. It did not prohibit the use of military commissions in dealing with 
those arrested, and, as Interpreted by the Lincoln administration, persons 
brought before military commissions were not subject to mention In any 
lists or allowed release due to the absence of an indictment. Thus, the 
Act explicitly gave Lincoln the power to suspend Habeas Corpus, and it im­
plicitly authorized the use of martial law.
On Septmber 15, 1863, Lincoln, Invoking the authorization provided him 
In the Act, suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus "throughout the United 
States" for cases ranging from "prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or 
abettors of the enemy" to individuals guilty of "any other offence against 
the military or naval service." In short, he suspended the writ for any 
parson who attempted to Interfere with the war- effort. Later, on July 5, 
1864, Lincoln reacted to rebel activities in Kentucky by suspending Habeas
I l l
Corpus and establishing martial law throughout the state. Although limited 
to Kentucky, this proclamation was, in a sense, Lincoln’s most far-ranging. 
Instead of dealing with only a certain class of offenses, as he had done in 
his previous edicts, Lincoln placed an entire geographic area under com- 
lete martial law. It seems that he was conscious of the dangers inherent 
in such a broad application of power, however, because he included in his 
order an admonition to military authorities to respect civil government in 
all instances possible— to apply martial law only in those cases where the
Intent was to harm "the military operations or the Constituted authorities
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of the Government of the United States.1'
Throughout the Civil War, therefore, the Lincoln administration, act­
ing under these various proclamations, arrested and held people without due 
process and tried many of those arrested before military commissions— in 
areas where the civil courts were unimpeded and for offenses which often 
had no foundation in military law. The "commissions, as well as the of­
ficers arresting and holding persons," wrote one historian at the turn of 
the century, "gave the most liberal interpretation to the words aiders and 
abettors of the enemy, so that almost any criticism of the policy of the
Administration was in danger of being construed as giving aid and comfort 
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to the enemy."
In the most noteworthy arrest and trial conducted under this policy, 
Clement L. VallandIngham, a former Ohio Congressman, was arrested by order 
of General Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Department of the Ohio, 
for making a particularly inflammatory apatch. Tried before e military 
tribunal,Vallandingham was baniehad to the Confederacy. The entire affair 
raised a storm of protest in the North. But, in a note to Burnside,
Lincoln said that, although "the cabinet regretted the necessity of ar-
1 1 2
resting...Vallandingham," it "being done, all were for seeing you through 
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with it."
The Lincoln administration also considered much of the press coverage 
of the war to be tantamount to aid and comfort to the enemy. Anti-war 
newspapers routinely published sensitive military information as well as 
articles and editorials intended to discourage cooperation with, and en­
listment in, the military. Throughout the war, milder types of press con­
trol-such as censoring the reports of war correspondents, excluding news­
papers from the mails, or frcrm certain regions of the country— were em­
ployed. In a few cases, however, editors were arrested and printing 
presses were seized. On June 1, 1863, Burnside ordered the suppression of 
the Chicago Times for printing particularly scathing editorials in con­
nection with the Vallandlngham case and other aspects of the war. The 
paper's offices were seized and the edition then being prepared was de­
stroyed. Later, on Nay 18, 1864, the New York Herald was similarly sup­
pressed, including the arrest of its editors, for printing bogus Presi­
dential directives— this suspension was by direct order of Lincoln him­
self. In both cases, the suspension of publication was lifted within a 
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matter of days.
Having thus given a brief account of Lincoln's policy concerning war­
time dissent, it may perhaps be hard to see how one could make the case 
that he acted with respect for civil rights, out of extreme necessity, and 
initially attempted to employ milder measures. Yet, this is indeed the 
very manner in which the policy was adopted, and it is additionally assert­
ed that the excesses that occurred under this policy were due to the dif­
ficulties inherent in trying to administer such measures. And Lincoln, in 
fact, did his best to rectify any wrongful punishment in the numerous cases
1 1 3
brought to his attention*
Lincoln’s high regard for civil liberties is exemplified by his han­
dling of the Habeas Corpus issue in the months following the bombardment 
of Fort Sumter. His proclamations suspended the writ within carefully spe­
cified areas. This demonstrates an extreme sensitivity for the rights of 
the ordinary citizen. After all, finding himself in the midst of a wide­
spread and threatening insurrection, he might have easily suspended the 
writ throughout broad areas of Maryland. Instead, he had the presence of 
mind and the great esteem for the individual, to carefully tailor his ac­
tion to apply only in those areas where it was absolutely necessary to de­
tain persons who might interfere with the war effort.
Although Lincoln*s later edicts suspending Habeas Corpus and invoking 
martial law were certainly more far-reaching in their impact, the same com­
mentary applies to them as well. Like all of the state papers crafted by 
this man, these proclamations were carefully constructed documents limit­
ing the effects of broad-ranging powers to those cases which were related 
to the war effort. Thus, while the most extreme and far-reaching measures 
were implemented, Lincoln was careful to limit their effect to what was 
Indispensable to the nation— the maintenance of the military. A person 
with less intelligence or less respect for Individual rights might have 
easily issued a sloppy and dangerous policy which would have impinged far 
more on the rights of the citizen than was necessary.
Unfortunately, some of those who were enforcing Lincoln's policy did 
not have the capacity that Lincoln had for carefully discerning what was 
damaging to the military and what was not. In all fairness, it must be 
said that such a determination was often next to impossible. Certainly, 
shooting at federal troops or sabotaging military equipment constituted
114
the kind of offense that Lincoln sought to punish. But who was to say 
whether an inflammatory speech constituted legal protest against Lincoln 
or aid to the Confederacy by stirring up anger against the Army? In the 
inevitable confusion, ’frivolous and unwarranted arrests were not infre­
quently made...and it cannot be denied that some individuals suffered un­
justly.” But, it must be pointed out that Lincoln himself, along with the 
senior members of his administration, devoted a great deal of time to rec­
tifying any wrongs done under the policy— thus tempering the various mea­
sures with considerable restraint. His official papers ate filled with 
pardons not only for soldiers accused of desertion or sleeping on guard 
duty, but also for those mistakenly arrested for secession activity or per­
haps punished too harshly for it. Again, an executive who was less sensi­
tive to civil liberties would not have taken time to examine the individual 
cases to ensure that his measures were applied fairly. Lincoln did, and, 
along with the careful language in his orders concerning Habeas Corpus and
martial law, it la proof positive that ha acted with a healthy respect for 
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the Individual.
This same regard for liberty is also apparent in the position which 
the Lincoln administration took towards the press. Civil War newspapers 
continually printed sensitive military information and the anti-Lincoln 
press made it a common practice to castigate both the administration and 
the war. The Confederacy could certainly make use of the details of Union 
troop movements, and criticism of Lincoln and his policies— particularly 
when unfounded and virulent— damaged morale at home and in the ranks. Xn 
spite of this, Lincoln showed an extraordinary amount of patience In tol­
erating the excesses of the media. Examining the extent of ill-founded and
1 1 5
damaging reporting during the war, historian James Randall was surprised
that there was not a more stringent set of controls placed over the press
in the North. Outside of a few well-known cases, newspapers and editors
were left unhindered in going about their business. In fact, there was not
even very much control exercised over correspondents at the front lines.
War reporters had a great deal of freedom in filing their reports— even
thuogh such reports often contained valuable information. Although there
were cases in which martial law was invoked— In regions clearly free of
combat activity— to suspend newspapers or arrest editors, the suspensions
and arrests,as in the cases of the Chicago Times and the New York Herald,
were shortlived. Thus, in spite of great provocation, Lincoln only applied
a loose set of press controls— only those measures which the war really 
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did necessitate.
Lincoln acted to constrain civil liberties only after his previous, 
less extreme policy in this regard proved obviously inadequate to the situ­
ation. Early in the war, when active Interference with the military was a 
threat only along the vital lines of communication between Washington and 
the rest of the North, Lincoln employed a suspension of Habeas Corpus that 
was intentionally limited to the areas around these lines of communication. 
Later In the war, when the threat to the government was in the form of ac­
tive discouragement of enlistments and other pro-Southern activity, it was 
clear that the old, limited suspension of the writ would not suffice. After
ell, anti-war activities were occurring in every corner of the North.
%
Thus, Lincoln was forced to adopt a more general suspension of Hebees 
Corpus— one that applied throughout the nation. It was also important that 
rebsl sympathisers bs punished vigorously— both to discourage others who
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might engage in such activity and to bolster Union morale. For this, a set 
of laws which placed strict limits on anti-military activity was necessary. 
The civil courts and legal code were not suited to provide the kind of 
justice that Lincoln felt was necessary. Thus, whether threatened by 
rebel armies or not, Lincoln placed all sections of the North under martial 
law in regard to anti-military offenses and used courts martial to handle 
pro-rebel activity,
It is significant that Lincoln was careful to limit the impact that 
his use of martial law might have on civil authority, in his first procla­
mation of martial law, he Invoked the military code only for cases specifi­
cally related to military operations. When he placed Kentucky under martial 
law, he was even more specific.
The martial law herein proclaimed and the things in that 
respect herein ordered will not be deemed or taken to 
interfere with the lawful holding of elections, or with 
the proceedings of the constitutional legislature of Ken­
tucky or with the administration of justice In the courts 
of law existing therein between cltisens of the United 
States In suits or proceedings which do not affect the 
military operations or the constituted authorities of the 
Government of the United States.
Thus, here one finds Lincoln again taking precautions to ensure that his
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extreme policy was applied only In those situations that required it.
Unquestionably, Lincoln felt that he acted with great justification.
The "whereas" clauses of his proclamations— In which he stated the reasons 
for his orders— were full of references to the harmful exploits of the dis­
loyal. In the first clause of his proclamation of September, 1862, he 
referred to "disloyal persons • . • not adequately restrained by the ordin­
ary processes of law from hindering this measure (the draft) and from giving 
aid and comfort In various ways to the insurrection."52
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In June of 1863, Lincoln wrote a lengthy reply to resolutions that he 
had received from a public meeting In Albany, New York. The resolutions 
supported Lincoln in his efforts to restore the Union but deplored his 
"unconstitutional action such as military arrests," Lincoln answered in 
depth- He reminded the men who had sent the resolutions that the very per­
sons attempting to invoke Constitutional laws for their protection were also 
trying to destroy the Constitution
From this material, under cover of "Liberty of speech"
"Liberty of the press" and "Habeas corpus" they (the sec­
essionists) hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most effi­
cient corps of spies, informers, supplyers, and alders 
and abbettors of their cause in a thousand ways.
Lincoln could see no reason, then, to adhere rigidly to the Constitution for
the sake of those who were trying to overthrow that document.
He also felt that the use of martial law was an eminently practical 
answer to the peculiar difficulties the national authority faced in Civil 
War.
Nothing is better known to history than that courts of 
justice are utterly incompetent to such cases as rebel­
lion. Civil courts are organised chiefly for trials of 
individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in 
concert; and this in quiet times, and on charges of crime 
well defined in the law...Ours is a case of Rebellion—  
so called by the resolutions before me— in fact, a clear, 
flagrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion.
Finding it necessary— indeed, imperative— to quickly administer justice in
a number of cases of disloyalty— an offense without basis in civil lair, Lin*
coin saw martial law as a justified measure. Furthermore, he believed that
there were other, more basic, and practical reasons for military suppress­
ion of anti-war activities. "Must 1 shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who 
deserts," he asked, "while I must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who 
Induces him to desert? • . . .1 think that in such a case, to silence the
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agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great 
mercy."
Lincoln believed that he was justified in taking his measures by the
Constitutional clauses authorizing the suspension of Habeas Corpus and by
the greater consideration of saving the government. He made it clear that
he did not see his actions as setting any precedent but only as temporary
measures to speed the national recovery.
Nor am 1 able to appreciate the danger, apprehended by 
the meeting, that the American people will, by means of 
military arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of 
public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, 
the law of evidence, trial by jury and Habeas Corpus, 
throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust 
lies before them, any more than I am able to believe 
that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emet­
ics during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding 
upon them through the remainder of his healthful life.
Lincoln's words indicate a further, deeper view that he held concerning his
wartime measures. He considered them "emetics"— harsh medicine to see a
sick man through trying times. Of course, which medicine he chose to admin-
13
liter to his patient depended on the nature and phases of the illness*
( 4 )
A final point on the use of extreme war powers remains to be made con­
cerning conscription. In July of 1862, Congress passed an act that "provided 
Hbst whenever the President should call the militia Into Federal service He 
might specify the period of such service. . . and might issue rules to coyer 
defects in State laws to provide for enrolling the militia and putting rhi 
act into execution." Under the act, all male citizens between the ages of 
18 and 45 were considered eligible for militia duty.
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On August 4, 1862, Lincoln ordered the drafting of 300,000 militia. 
Quotas were then given to the states to provide certain numbers of men. Lin­
coln justified this in a legal sense by pointing to the section of the act 
which empowered him to make rules to correct state laws. Still, his action 
was a usurpation of the Congressional power to make laws. Employing one of 
the .let’s provisions, Lincoln had ordered something clearly not contemplated 
in the act.
Lincoln’s justification for all of this— in a deeper sense— is rather 
obvious. The nation needed men and volunteering had dropped off in the 
wake of Union military defeats. Thus, Lincoln acted again out of military
C  i
necessity— not out of any disregard for Congress.
CHAPTKR FOUR 
RECONSTRUCTION
With malice toward none; with charity for al}; 
with firmness in the right, as God gives us to 
see the right, let us strive on to finish the 
work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; 
to care for him who shall have borne the battle, 
and for his widow, and his orphan— to do all which 
may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting 
peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.
Abraham Lincoln
From the Second Inaugural Address 
March 4, 1865
1 2 0
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Reconstruction— the restoration of normal relations between the con­
quered Confederate states and the rest of the nation— was the last great 
issue of Lincoln's Presidency— a final and unfinished act in .? triumphant, 
yet tragic, performance. It is a poition of Lincoln’s tenure in office 
best termed incomplete because, while the task of reconstruction was supp­
osedly carried on to conclusion after Lincoln’s death, his own role in the 
restoration process was cut short by his murder. Unlike his extreme war 
measures, Lincoln’s reconstruction policies met with vehement Congressional 
opposition, and, therefore, when Lincoln pushed his ideas in spite of Con­
gress, the issue of Presidential power was raised In the stark light of 
executive relations with Congress.
Reconstruction was bound to be a difficult task— a divisive isaue.
"It Is fraught with great difficulty," said Lincoln in his last public 
address. "Unlike the case of a war between independent nations, there Is 
no authorized organ to treat with. No ona nan has authority to give up the 
rebellion for any other man. We simply must begin with, and mould from, dis­
organized and discordant elements." Certainly, as Lincoln was trying to 
point out on that night in mid-April of 1865, it wae no easy task to nego­
tiate a lasting, equitable, and pain-free peace with a region that was within 
one's own nation.
And it was all the more difficult when the victors could not agree 
amongst themselves as to the terms on which peats should be secured. This 
*|i the unfortunate scenario in which Lincoln found himself from the very 
firat nonant that Morthsmera began to discuss the possibility of victory 
***** the South. "!§or is it a smell additional anharaesnant," he said, "that
( 1)
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we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and 
means of reconstruction.” The differences Lincoln referred to arose basi­
cs liy out of the question of how best to preserve the freedom of the slaves, 
protect loyal Southern whites, and ensure that control of the reconstructed 
states did not fall to former secessionists. These fundamental considera­
tions conjured up a myriad of issues. Had the seceded states ever left the 
Union? If they had left, did their absence really matter as long as they 
were back? What was the best method by which to determine if a rebellious 
state was ready to be reconstructed? Should the citizens of these states 
be required to profess their loyalty by uttering one oath or two? Who 
would be allowed to take the oath(s)? Would slavery be left Intact now 
that the ’military necessity” for -mancipation no longer existed? If freed, 
would the former slaves be allowed to vote?*
Obviously, reconstruction was a complicated task. And the disagreement 
between President Lincoln and certain Republican members of Congress confused 
the process further because, unable to compromise on a single program, they 
both decided to promulgate their own reconstruction schemes. The resulting 
clash raised the question of executive relations with the legislative b r a n c h -  
adding this squabble to the Issues of reconstruction. This episode was far 
and away the worst quarrel that Lincoln ever had with Congress. In defense 
of his own views on reconstruction, he Issued the only significant veto— a 
pocket veto— of his Presidency, and In anger over the veto, his Congressional
opponents cr ied  out th at a "more stu d ied  outrage on the l e g i s l a t i v e  au th ority
2
o f the people has never been p e r p r etra te d .”
Although t h is  paper concerns th e Issu es o f ex ec u tiv e  power. I t  I s  never* 
th e le a s  u sefu l to  note here th a t L incoln g e n e ra lly  pursued the same g o a ls In
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reconstruction that his Congressional critics— dubbed the "radical” wing of 
the Republican party— did. Famous radicals like Charles Sumner and Thaddeus 
Stevens sought to ensure full rights to the black man In the South. Their 
objective, in short, at least as far as the freed slaves were concerned, 
was to have them treated equally with whites. Lincoln desired this too. In 
a letter in January of 1864, he wrote that the "restoration of the Rebel 
States to the Union must rest upon the principle of civil and political 
equality of both races." On another occasion, he wrote that during his 
"continuance" in office, "the government will return no person to slavery 
who is free according to the proclamation, or to any of the acts of Congress." 
Lincoln also felt, however, that the restoration of the South "must be sealed 
by general amnesty." This was a proposition with which the radicals did not 
agree, and it was only the initial divergence between their path and Lin­
coln’s.^
The President felt that his wartime emancipation measures were only tem­
porary. Since he had freed the slaves as a military measure during a time 
of dire need, a sound argument could easily be made that returning blacks to 
slavery was legally Justified once peace had been restored* Slavery was, 
after all, a Constitutionally protected Institution. Although Lincoln felt 
that the return of slavery would constitute "a cruel and astounding breach 
of faith," a tragedy he hoped to never see, he glumly admitted that blacks 
might Indeed be re-enslaved if "such return shall be held to be a legal duty, 
by the proper court of final resort."
but Lincoln desired to ensure black freedom. He strongly advocated 
therefore, a Constitutional amendment banning slavery, and he sought to build 
a consensus of loyal citlsens in each of the reconstructed states that would
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both support that amendment and abolish slavery within the state as an addi­
tional sign of Its commitment to emancipation. He understood that the Con­
federate defeat, the end of slavery* and the complete prostration of the 
South were bitter enough pills for the former rebels to swallow. He also 
understood that the freedom of the blacks* or at least the quality of that 
freedom* depended on Southern whites ultimately accepting emancipation. Con­
sequently, while he held the same goals that the radicals did* Lincoln des­
ired to achieve these goals through building a peace that was as beneficent 
as possible. As he so eloquently put it: "With malice toward none; with 
charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the 
right* let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's 
wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle* and for his widow* 
and his orphan— to do all which may achieve and cherish a Just, and a las­
ting peace* among ourselves* and with all nations
Hake no mistake about it* however, Lincoln intended to reconstruct the 
South on the basis of emancipation and the exclusion of those who had parti­
cipated extensively in the rebellion. His letters are filled with encourage­
ment to Southern Unionists to build state governments that excluded the dis­
loyal. (>If a few professedly loyal men shall draw the disloyal shout them," 
he wrote the military commander of Louisiana* "and colorably set up a state 
government! repudiating the emancipation proclamation, and re-establishing 
slavery* I cannot recognise or sustain their work. I should fall powerless 
in the attempt. This government* in such an attitude, would he a house div­
ided against itself.0 As historian Stephen Oates has perceptively pointed 
out, the notion that Lincoln, in his quest to "bind up the nation's wounds*° 
would allow the Southern states to return to the Union exactly as before the 
war is unfounded. When he promulgated his reconstruction policy, Lincoln
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was careful to exclude from political power those who had held substantial 
office in the government or military of the rebel states or who had left 
such offices in the United States to join the rebellion. Prisoners of war 
and parolees were required to seek executive clemency if they sought poli­
tical rights. Only those who willingly came forward, whether soldiers or 
not, and swore an oath of allegiance to the United States and in support of 
Presidential and Congressional anti-slavery measures would be allowed to 
participate in reconstructed governments,^
The argument here is that, contrary to the claims of his Congressional 
critics, Lincoln's reconstruction policies did not amount to an executive 
usurpation of legislative power. Admittedly, Lincoln took a very expansive 
view of Presidential power over the restoration process. Yet his view of 
his own role was also carefully reasoned, legalistic, and respectful of 
Congress. Indeed, with the Constitution as his guide, he charted the Pres­
idential course in the entirely new domain of reconstruction with admirable 
skill and a real awareness of the limitations of his own office. He was 
very careful to claim only those powers that the Constitution delegated to 
him, and he readily admitted that other important powers lay with Congress.
In the considerable gray area between executive and legislative responsibil­
ity concerning reconstruction, Lincoln never made a sweeping claim of Pres­
idential jurisdiction. Rather, he promoted a policy which even he admitted 
was not the final word on the subject. He supported that policy with those 
powers which he felt were legitimately his, and he conceded that Congress had 
powers which allowed it a role in reconstruction as well.
It is important to note also that Lincoln considered the teak of recon­
struction to be as essential to the future of the Republic as was the teak
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of winning the war. As he often expressed it: If black freedom and the
position of loyal Southern whites were trodden under the heel of secession­
ist-dominated reconstructed state governments, all of the work and sacrifice 
of the Civil War would have been in vain. Having saved the nation from dis­
union, Lincoln considered it just as important to the national well-being 
that the re-unlflcatlon of the states be based upon solidly loyal institu­
tions with sound guarantees for the liberty of the freed slaves. Thus, even 
though the events of reconstruction did not threaten the nation with dissolu­
tion at the hands of rebel soldiers, they nevertheless raised Issues that 
concerned the future of the Union and republican government. There was, 
therefore, a real Just ification— as much as was present during the darkest 
days of the war— for Lincoln to take an expansive view of executive power if 
he felt that he had to do so in order for the restoration process to move 
smoothly. In short, there was good cause for this former Whig, who felt 
that Congress should make policy, to act as a strong President. And yet, 
for clarity's sake, it must be pointed out that, since the government was 
no longer in dire danger of destruction, there was no longer any "necessity" 
that justified putting aside the Constitution. Lincoln did not think that 
he had any reason to act outside of the law as he had done before, and, thus, 
while employing his executive pcwers to their fullest, he still stayed within 
the bounds of the Constitution.
As a sort of corollary observation on Lincoln's policy of reconstruc­
tion, It is enlightening to point out that he handled the matter in a manner 
very similar to the way in which ha dealt with extreme war measures. The 
resemblance lies in the fact that he rejected an extreme policy in favor 
of #  more moderate, less arbitrary approach. The similarity with his
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emancipation policy is particularly striking. The* radical wing of the Repub­
lican party demanded an Immediate and arbitrary emancipation edict. Lin­
coln first advocated the adoption of a gradual, compensated emancipation 
program with public support. When this failed and the military situation
took a turn for the worse, he was then prepared to act more decisively. In
reconstruction, the radicals demanded an arbitrary policy that would employ 
extreme measures with the Union’s military muscle to force a reorganization 
of Southern society. Lincoln sought instead to restructure the South 
through building a consensus for change among loyal Southern whites. Many 
historians feel that, in his last public address, Lincoln started to show 
signs of a shift towards the adoption of more extreme measures. After all, 
these historians ask, had he not ended his speech by saying that it might 
be bis "duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South?"
Had he not told the throng in front of the White House that he was "consid­
ering," and should "not fall to act, when satisfied that action will be pro- 
per?”6
Whether or not Lincoln was really drlflng towards the radical camp will 
never be known. Only a few days after delivering that speech he was struck 
down by an assassin's bullet. What is well known, however, is that the 
beginnings of his reconstruction policy are found in his personal correspond­
ence from late 1§62. In letters he wrote during the fall of that year, he 
urged willing Southerner*, who were in areas already under federal control, 
to promote "electIons of membere to the Congress of the United States par­
ticularly, and perhaps a legislature, State officers, and United Statea Sen­
ators friendly to their object." A t  purpose of theee elections was to give 
the people of the states a chance to "aanifsst" thtif "datire" to return to
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their allegiance under the Constitution.
Thus, throughout 1862 and !863, Lincoln urged Southerners to promote 
elections in conquered areas of the Confederacy, and he ordered his mili­
tary commanders to ensure that these elections were held fairly, meaning 
that neither secessionists not uderal troops should be allowed to influ­
ence voting. "I wish it to he a m voment of the people of the District s,*' 
he wrote to the military Governor of Louisiana in November of 1862, "and 
not a movement of our military and quasi-military, authorities there. I 
merely wish our authorities to give the people a chance--to protect them 
against secession interference...the main object being to get an expres ion 
of the people." In Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana, Lincoln, hi? mili­
tary commanders, and loyal white Southerners worked to establish loyal 
state governments. Lincoln®s personal papers are filled with letters 
urging Southerners to get out as many loyal votes for the elections a s  
possible. He pleaded with Southern Unionists not to fight among them- 
selves, and, when state governments were finally formed, he admonished his 
Generals to respect the new civil authorities as much as possible.
Lincoln's correspondence makes his purpose in all of this quite c lear  
as well. In a letter to the commanding officer in Louisiana, General 
Nathaniel P. Banks, he wrote that he wanted "a tangible nucleus which the 
remainder of the State may rally around aa fast as it can, and which I can 
at once recognise and sustain as the true State government." He worried 
that "the adverae element" was seeking "inaiduously to pre~occupy the
ground* .set up a State government, r e p u diating the emancipation procla-
7
mation, and re-establiahing slavery."
Hith *»a like Andrew Johnson, George Shepley, and John Bouligny work­
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ing to organize elections and to build a loyal nucleus, Lincoln issued 
a formal "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction" on December 8, 1863. 
Stating that "ft is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said 
rebel! i to resume their allegiance to the United States, and to reinau­
gurate loyal State governments within and for their respective States," 
Lincoln promulgated his own plan of reconstruction. Citing Constitutional, 
legislative, and judicial Justifications for his right to ardon former re­
bels on any conditions that he chose, Lincoln made it "known" that:
...ail persons who have, directly or by implication, 
participated in the existing rebellion, except as here­
inafter excepted, that a full pardon is hereby granted 
to them and each of them, with restoration of all 
rights of property, except as to slaves, and in prop­
erty cases where rights of third parties shall have 
Intervened, and upon the condition that every such 
person shall take and subscribe an oath, and thence­
forward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and 
which oath shall be registered for permanent preser­
ve t ion...
The oath Lincoln spoke of required ful1 allegiance to the Union and full 
support of all legislative and executive actions concerning slavery. Those 
who held significant offices in the Confederacy, or who left such offices 
in the United States to join the Confederacy, or who had mistreated pri­
soners of war, were barred from taking the oath.
Whet! ten percent of the citizens of a formerly seceded state— as cal­
culated on the number of votes cast In the 1860 election— had taken the 
oath and re-established "a State government which shall be republican and 
in no wise contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true 
government of the State," and the state would then receive protection under 
Article Four, Section Four of the Constitution, which required the federal 
iovariimmmt to "guaranty" and "protect" republican government in each of the
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states.
Lincoln ended his proclamation by stating that any "temoorary ar­
rangement" to deal with the "present condition" of the freed slaves "as a 
laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the na­
tional Executive." He "suggested as not improper" that reconstructed 
states retain the the same names and boundaries. Most importantly, to 
"avoid misunderstanding," he wrote that "whether members sent to Congress 
from any State shall be admitted to seats, constitutionally rests ex­
clusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Exe­
cutive." Furthermore, Lincoln acknowledged that his was not the only 
plausible mode of reconstruction and that "while the mode presented is the
best the Executive can suggest, with his present impressions, it must not
8
be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.
This proclamation was sent to Capitol Hill along with the President's 
annual message to Congress. In his mes.^ge, among other things, he attempted 
to justify his policy. "On examination of this proclamation," he wrote,
"it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is attempted beyond what is 
amply justified by the Constitution...The Constitution authorises the Ex­
ecutive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute discretion; and 
this includes the power to grant on terms." Thus, Lincoln felt that he was 
wall within his rights in demanding an oath of allegiance to the govern­
ment and its anti-slavery measures.
More important was Lincoln's explanation for his plan for recon­
structing state governments:
It is also proffered that if, in any of the States named, 
a State government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set 
up, such government shall be recognised and guarantied by 
the United States, and that under it the State shall, on
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the constitutional conditions, be protected 
against invastion and domestic violence. The 
constitutional obligation of the United States 
to guaranty to every State in the Union a re­
publican form of government, and to protect the 
State, is explicit and full.
What is most striking in Lincoln’s words is the complete absence 
of any claim of an exclusive executive obligation or prerogative 
concerning reconstruction. He chose only to say that the nation 
had a "constitutional obligation. . .to guaranty every State in 
the Union a republican form of government." And on the basis of 
that obligation, he had taken it upon himself to come up with 
a plan of reconstruction. Yet Lincoln admitted that his plan 
was not the only possible plan and that only Congress could de­
cide whether or not to seat members from reconstructed states. 
Thus, it is quite clear that he was only promoting, in accordance 
with the obligations of the government, one plan of reconstruc­
tion. It was the plan that he believed in, would fight for, and 
even use the power of his office for, but he did not claim as 
President to have the final word on the subject.
Lincoln's message also outlined the reasoning behind the 
reconstruction program. Concerning the oath, he said that it 
would be absurd to allow secessionists back into government, and, 
thus, there had to "be a test by which to separate the opposing 
elements, so as to build only from the sound." On the aspects 
of the oath that required the support of anti-slavery measures, 
he said the following:
Those laws and proclamations (which struck at 
slavery) were enacted and put forth for the 
purpose of aiding in the suppression of the
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rebellion. To give them their fullest effect, 
there had to be a pledge for their maintenance 
. . .To now abandon them would be not only to 
relinquish a lever of power, but would also be 
a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I 
n.ay add at this point, that while I remain in 
my present position I shall not attempt to re­
tract or modify the emancipation proclamation; 
nor shall 1 return to slavery any person who is 
free by the terms of that proclamation, or by 
any of the acts of Congress.
Before commenting on Lincoln's words here, it is use ful to note 
that in his official statements--indeed in the oath itself--it 
was acknowledged that Congress and the Supreme Court could col­
lectively strike down every anti-slavery measure of his admin­
istration. It is also useful to note that Lincoln expressed sev­
eral times his approval of a Constitutional amendment abolishing 
slavery throughout the nation and his wish that the reconstructed 
state governments would abolish slavery in their new Constitu­
tions. The important point to be drawn from this Information is 
that, through requiring support of anti-slavery measures in the 
oath, Lincoln was trying to build support for anti-slavery action 
by the new state governments* What firmer basis upon which to 
build loyal governments than the abolition of the so-called cor­
nerstone of the Confederacy by Southerners themselves? Requiring 
ten percent of the voting populace to take the oath ensured a ready 
base of support for anti-slavery proposals— especially In light 
of the disqualification of Confederate officials and the more dif­
ficult pardon requirements for captured soldiers and parolees 
(Lincoln stipulated, through an additional proclamation, that pri­
soners of war and those on parole had to apply for executive clem­
ency and could not simply just take the oath). "By proclamation,"
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Lincoln wrote, "a plan is presented which may be accepted by them 
(loyalists) as a rallying point, and which they are assured in 
advance will not be rejected here. This may bring them to act
o
sooner than they otherwise would,"
Through working from the very early stages of federal occu­
pation to augment loyalist strength in the South, requiring pro­
mises to support emancipation in the oath, and building state 
governments on the basis of that oath, Lincoln was Indeed seek­
ing the "restoration of the Rebel States to the Union. . .upon 
the civil an^ political equality of both races." It was clas­
sic Lincolnian politics. He was trying to build a political con­
sensus in support of a far more enduring edifice of freedom-- 
state abolition of slavery and a Constitutional amendment to do 
the same--than any temporary war measure could ever create.
One gets the strong impression as well that Lincoln, who had 
given long thought to the question of race relations in America, 
realized that the ultimate quality of the freedom of the blacks 
depended upon acceptance from Southern whites. Thus, Lincoln 
found an additional reason to reconstruct the South and destroy 
slavery through building political support in the reconstructed 
states for such measures--thereby foregoing the less complicated 
and more appealing (for those who sought revenge) option of sim­
ply imposing equality on the South at the tip of a bayonet.
( 2 )
H o t  e v e r y o n e  w a s  w i l l i n g  to f o r e g o  the e m p l o y m e n t  of a r b l t -
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rary and extreme measures. The abolitionist, rabidly anti-South- 
ern wing of the Republican party--led by powerful members of 
Congress such as Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens--opposed 
Lincoln’s reconstruction program from the very first. Disgus­
ted with Lincoln's moderate approach, they desired to restructure 
the prostrate South, destroying the planter class much like a 
victorious gladiator might exact concessions from his vanquished 
opponent. They did not contemplate any attempt to build support 
in the South for anti-slavery measures. They characterized such 
attempts as useless. Instead, they proposed to ram their anti­
slavery policies, along with several other measures concerning 
the reorganization of Southern society, right down the throats 
of Southern whites.
Historians have written a fair amount about the radicals.
At first, they were despised, described as vengeful villains who 
sought to Impose a harsh peace on the South and eventually suc­
ceeded only because of the untimely death of the beneficent Lin­
coln. Later, in the wake of the civil rights movement and racial 
disturbances of the 1950s and 1960s, historians began to find a 
noble concern in the radicals for the civil and economic well­
being of the black man. Nothing more on the radicals' motives 
Is ventured here except to say that, more likely than not, both 
revenge against secessionists and a sincere concern for the black 
man were reasons for their actions. Additionally, it is important 
to note that Lincoln sought the same freedom for the black man 
that the radicals did. The difference was that he believed in
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a more legalistic approach based on establishing political sup­
port for anti-slavery measures in the S o u t h . ^
From the outset, the radicals made it known that they des­
ired to Impose the will of the government on the South regard­
less of the sentiment there. Also, they claimed that reconstruc­
tion was a Congressional matter. In February of 1862, Charles 
Sumner Introduced nine resolutions in the Senate, the gist of 
which was that, through the rebellion, the Southern states had 
reverted to the status of territories. Since territories were 
completely under the control of Congress, Sumner believed that 
the legislature had the right to order Southern institutions as 
it wished. Thaddeus Stevens went a step further when he advan­
ced the theory that the seceded states should be treated as con- 
quered provinces.11
Needless to say, these men and their compatriots were com­
pletely hostile to Lincoln's consensus-oriented plan of reconstruc­
tion. Itching to permanently emancipate the slaves, they grew 
irate and impatient with Lincoln's careful and legalistic deter­
mination that only a constitutional amendment or action by state 
governments could completely overturn the peculiar Institution.
T h e y  w a t c h e d  w i t h  m o u n t i n g  h o r r o r  as L i n c o l n  b e g a n  to u s e  h i s  
a u t h o r i t y  a s  C o m m a n d e r - I n - C h i e f  to b u i l d  s t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t s  in 
L o u i s i a n a *  A r k a n s a s *  a n d  T e n n e s s e e .  T h e y  w e r e  a s t o n i s h e d  by the 
f a c t  that* u n d e r  L i n c o l n ' s  p l a n *  o n l y  ten p e r c e n t  of a s t a t e ' s  
v o t i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  h a d  to s w e a r  an o a t h  of a l l e g i a n c e .  T h e y  w e r e  
a n g e r e d  b y  t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  that all c o n f e d e r a t e  c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y
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officers below the middle level were eligible for pardon; they 
thought this far too beneficent and a real threat to loyal South­
erners and freedmen alike. And they were positively stung by 
the revelation that, failing a Constitutional amendment or 
state action, slavery could conceivably reappear, under Lin­
coln’s plan, as a postwar Institution. It was no surprise, there­
fore, that the radicals struck at Lincoln’s entire theory and 
plan of reconstruction. Protests against the new state govern­
ments that sprung up in the wake of Lincoln's proclamation were 
rampant. More importantly, on July 2, 1864, Congress passed the 
Wade-Davis Bill, which claimed reconstruction as a Congressional 
matter and set forth a scheme that was vastly different than 
Lincoln's .
The bill put forth a reconstruction plan in the form of leg­
islation, and, thus, it implicitly asserted a Congressional pre­
rogative in the area of reconstruction. The main features of 
this plan were that over fifty percent of the former voting pop­
ulation had to swear an oath of allegiance before a state govern­
ment could be formed, almost the entire Confederate military--
f r o m  p r i v a t e  on u p  to G e n e r a l - - w a s  d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d ,  a n d  s l a v e r y
12
w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  a b o l i s h e d  for g o o d  in t h e  s e c e d e d  s t a t e s .
T h e  b i l l  w a s  b r o u g h t  to L i n c o l n  d u r i n g  the v e r y  last h o u r  
of t h a t  s e s s i o n  of C o n g r e s s ,  a n d ,  i n s t e a d  of v e t o i n g  it o u t r i g h t ,  
h e  e m p l o y e d  a p o c k e t  v e t o  b y  r e f u s i n g  to a c t  on It b e f o r e  the 
s e s s i o n  a d j o u r n e d .  In a p r o c l a m a t i o n  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  L i n c o l n  
s a i d  that he w a s  " u n p r e p a r e d  by a f o r m a l  a p p r o v a l  of t h i s  b i l l
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to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration."
He was "also unprepared'* to set aside, by signing the bill, the 
new state governments that he had nurtured in Louisiana and Ark­
ansas. Finally, he was unwilling "to declare a constitutional 
competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the States." He 
stated, however, that the system was "one very proper plan" for 
reconstruction. If the plan were adopted by the people in a re­
construction state, he promised to give "Executive aid and assis­
ts , „ 1 3tance to any such people.
Lincoln's action provoked outrage in Congress and through­
out much of the North. In a "manifesto" printed in a New York 
newspaper, the authors of the bill, Bejamin F. Wade, and Henry 
Winter Davis, savagely criticized Lincoln. One of their main 
objections to Lincoln's pocket veto was their charge that it 
amounted to "a grave Executive usurpation. . .a studied outrage 
on the legislative authority of the people."
Wade and Davis argued that Congress was the branch of gov­
ernment to oversee reconstruction. After all, they pointed out, 
it was Congress that decided whether or not to accept a state's 
leglslators--perhaps the ultimate judgment on the soundness of a 
state's republican institutions. More Importantly, they complained 
bitterly that Lincoln had transgressed the boundaries of his off­
ice by smothering the bill and then stating that he would employ 
the bill's provisions when and where he saw fit.
Congress passed a bill; the President refused 
to approve it, and then by proclamation puts
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as much of it in force as he sees fit, and pro­
poses to execute those parts by officers unknown 
to the laws of the United States, and not subject 
to the confirmation of the Senate., .the authority 
of Congress is paramount and must be respected... 
the whole body of the union men of Congress will 
not submit to be impeached by him of rash and un­
constitutional legislation; and if he wishes our 
support, he must confine himself to his executive 
duties--to obey and execute, not make the 1aws-- 
to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave 
political reorganization to Congress.
Lincoln had no right at all, Wade and Davis felt, to set forth
any sort of policy regarding reconstruction much less to frus-
1 A
trate Congressional policy in that area.
(3)
Did Lincoln really overstep the boundaries of his office?
Did this former Whig--who once stumped for Zachary Taylor because 
the old General proposed merely to execute the laws--usurp the 
law-making function from Congress? The question —  like the prob­
lem of reconstruction itself--is a difficult one to decide.
Based on the evidence presented thus far, however, the unmistak­
able conclusion is that Lincoln did not act outside the limits 
of the Presidency.
C o n s i d e r  f i r s t  the q u e s t i o n  of e x e c u t i v e  a n d  l e g i s l a t i v e  
f u n c t i o n s  in r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  B o t h  b r a n c h e s  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c l a i m e d  
a r o l e  in the p r o c e s s .  L i n c o l n  w a s  c o r r e c t  in a s s e r t i n g  that 
h i s  p a r d o n i n g  p o w e r ,  w h i c h  w a s  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  in the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
e n t i t l e d  the P r e s i d e n t  and the P r e s i d e n t  a l o n e  to d e t e r m i n e  the 
l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  e n t i r e  g r o u p s  of f o r m e r  r e b e l s *  Y e t  C o n g r e s s  
w a s  j u s t  as c o r r e c t  in a s s e r t i n g  that its e q u a l l y  o b v i o u s  p r l v l -
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lege to decide whether or not to admit a state's legislators 
entitled It to determine whether or not the reconstructed govern­
ments were truly republican.
In the middle was a vast gray area. The Constitution Is 
silent as to who Is to promulgate a reconstruction program. It 
merely assigns the federal government the responsibility of ensur­
ing republican institutions in the states. It does not assign 
that responsibility to any one branch of government. Lincoln 
seemed well aware of this when he issued his proclamation. When 
he justified his reconstruction plan in his 1863 message to Con­
gress, he cited the federal government’s obligation to "guaranty" 
and "protect" republican government in the states. Instead of 
claiming executive jurisdiction over that task, he merely said 
that his plan was only one option that the government might 
employ.
Granted, he fought for his plan by using his position as 
Commander-in-Chief to build loyal state g e m m e n t s  that he could 
recognize under his proclamation. But was that really unconsti­
tutional? Was it any more illegal than, say, Congress using its 
power to seat or unseat members to promote its own version of 
reconstruction? As head of the military, Lincoln was legiti­
mately empowered to issue orders as he saw fit and places like 
Louisiana were occupied territory in a war--under military juris­
diction .
Lincoln was also well within his rights when he pocketed the 
Wade-Davls bill. He certainly stretched the limits of his power
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when he stated that he would employ the bill’s provisions accor­
ding to his own discretion. But, here again, as supreme comman­
der of the military, he had the unquestionable right to Issue any 
set of instructions that he wished. Wade and Davis could fret 
and fume until Judgment Day but they could do nothing to inter­
fere with Lincoln’s control over the occupied areas of the South 
until after the war ended. Once the war was over, when Lincoln 
had no legitimate power to act outside of Congressional appro­
priations and laws, the promise to enforce a vetoed bill accor­
ding to his own discretion would certainly have been unconstitu­
tional .
Perhaps the radicals were right, and Lincoln could never
4 *•
hope to build an edifice of freedom In the South by trying to win 
the support of those whites who were not too terribly guilty of 
rebellion. But, true to form, Lincoln’s first crack at recon­
struction involved a relatively moderate attempt to reorganise 
Southern society with as much indigenous support as he could 
drum up. Because he saw the restoration process as crucial to 
the future of republican government, he acted strongly in asser­
ting the program that he thought best. Often insisting on a 
strict interpretation of the law, Lincoln was correct in arguing 
that the Thirteenth Amendment and free-state constitutions de­
stroyed slavery far more effectively than any wartime measures—  
whether executive or legislative. It was because he felt it 
necessary to take a strong hand in reconstruction for the good
of republican institutions and the Unlon--to build a peace based 
on loyal and free state governments--that this former Whig, who 
believed that Congress should make the government’s policy, 
acted as a strong President.
CHAPTER FIVE
EPILOGUE
If you sometimes 
get discouraged, 
consider this fellow:
He dropped out 
of grade schoo1.
Ran a country store.
Went broke.
Took 15 years 
to pay off 
his bills.
Took a wife.
Unhappy marriage.
Ran for House.
Lost twice•
Ran for Senate.
Lost twice.
Delivered speech 
that became 
a classic.
Audience indifferent.
Attacked daily 
by the press 
and despised 
by half the country.
Despite all this, 
imagine
how many people 
all over the world 
have been 
inspired
by this awkward,
rumpled,
brooding man
who signed his name
simply,
A. Lincoln.
--Courtesy of Jill Coffey 
As published in the Wall 
Street Journal by United 
Technologies Corporation
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In an essay on Lincoln's Presidency entitled "Whig in the 
White House," historian David Donald makes the case that, excep­
ting extreme war measures in defense of the Union, Lincoln was 
actually a rather weak President who deferred to Congress on any 
major legislation that was not related to the war. Donald points
to Lincoln's miniscule role in the passage of such important laws
as those that provided for the land grant colleges or for a higher
tariff. Additionally, Donald shows that, in spite of the large
amount of work delegated to him in the midst of a major war, Lin­
coln had plenty of time to get involved with the legislative pro­
cess if he wished. Presenting these factors along with other evi­
dence, Donald concludes that Lincoln was acting as a "Whig in the 
White House." Because of his Whig philosophy of a weak executive, 
Lincoln deferred to Congress in every instance where firm execu­
tive leadership was not necessary to save the government,*
D o n a l d ' s  e s s a y  Is w e l l  a r g u e d  and t h o r o u g h l y  r e s e a r c h e d .  
C e r t a i n l y ,  its m a i n  p o i n t  is in a c c o r d  w i t h  the v i e w s  e x p r e s s e d  
in t h i s  p a p e r .  T h e r e  is a s u b t l e  f l a w  in its r e a s o n i n g  in that 
D o n a l d  m a k e s  it a p p e a r  as if L i n c o l n  c a m e  to the P r e s i d e n c y  w i t h  
a f i r m  c o n c e p t i o n  of h o w  to a c t  in e v e r y  p h a s e  of the c r i s i s *
It a l l  s e e m s  so c u t  and d r y - - a s  if L i n c o l n  p l a n n e d  out h i s  f i r s t  
f o u r  y e a r s  f r o m  t h e  s t a r t .
T h i s  w a s  s i m p l y  n o t  t h e  c a s e  d u r i n g  L i n c o l n ' s  h a r r i e d  P r e s i ­
d e n c y ,  E v e n  L i n c o l n  h i m s e l f  a d m i t t e d  that the s u r p r i s i n g  e v e n t s  
of the w a r  d e f i e d  a n y  a t t e m p t  to p l a n  a l o n g - t e r m  p o l i c y *  In an
( 1 )
186A letter to a Kentucky editor, he claimed "not to have con­
trolled events but confess plainly that events have controlled 
me. . . at the end of three years struggle the nation’s condition 
is not what either party, or any man devised, or expected. God 
alone can claim it." Lincoln’s Presidency was one shocking, un­
precedented scenario after another. It was, in short, nothing
2
that "any man" could plan upon in advance.
Yet Donald is right in asserting that Lincoln, the strong 
war President, deferred to Congress wherever possible. Consider, 
for example, the message that Lincoln sent to Sherman in July of
186A.
1 have seen your despatches objecting to agents 
of Northern States opening recruiting stations 
near your camps. An act of congress authorizes 
this, giving the appointment of agents to the 
States, and not to this Executive government.
It is not for the War Department, or myself, to 
restrain, or modify the law, in it's execution, 
further than actual necessity may require. To 
be candid, I was for the passage of the law, not 
apprehending at the time it would produce such 
inconvenience to the armies in the field. . .1 
still hope some advantage from the law; and being 
a law, it must be treated as such by all of us.
Without "necessity" from dire national need, Lincoln was unwill­
ing to act outside of the bounds of his office even though he 
could have easily done so. A man less respecting of Congressional 
prerogatives would not have shown such consideration.
Perhaps the best way to describe how Lincoln made his deci­
sions in these matters is not to imply, as Donald does, that he 
had a firm plan from the beginning. Rather, it is more correct 
to point out that Lincoln had, as Stephen Oates described it, a
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"core of unshakable convictions about America's experiment and 
historic mission in the progress of human liberty" from the be­
ginning. Lincoln brought to the White House a solid Ideology 
about government and society* and, when faced by situations 
which had never before occured, he consulted that ideology and 
made decisions— often painful, drawn-out decisions, but decisions 
nonetheless.*
Thus, his Presidency is best seen as a well-thought and con­
tinual reaction to new events and dangers. He believed in a 
weak Presidency and a strong Congress. He believed in republi­
can government and the Union to the marrow of his bones. When 
he entered office, he embarked upon a Presidency that saw the 
Union and rep^olican government constantly in grave danger. 
Realizing that republican government would be destroyed if the 
Union was broken, Lincoln acted strongly and often harshly in 
defense of the nation.
And yet, as evidence like his letter to Sherman indicates, 
he was unwilling to act strongly without any necessity. Thus, 
to the extent that the danger to the federal government had 
receded, Lincoln tried to adhere to his notions of a weak Presi­
dency. He also pointed out that his extreme war powers and pol­
icies would end with the war.
It is this philosophical balance, intellectual flexi­
bility, and pure benevolence that combined in Lincoln to make 
him the greates of America's Presidents. Faced with a crisis 
unlike any other, he made sure that every action that he took,
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whether extreme or not, was directed towards preserving the 
nation. He had the great ability to think outside of accepted 
norms and to see the greater good through the mists of old con­
ventions. And yet he had a healthy respect, a sober regard, for 
what was truly noble in past beliefs and Ideas.
Through his life, Lincoln left America with a strong and 
more pure form of republican government. In a matter of decades 
after his death, America became the world power--the shining bea­
con of freedotn--that he had envisioned. He also left hiB nation 
with the notion of a crisis Presidency--the idea that a Presi­
dent may act outside of the Constitution in order to save it.
It was an Important principle. Reminding his readers of Wilson, 
Roosevelt, and Truman, political scientist Robert S. Hirschfleld 
wrote that all "subsequent American crisis governments have fol­
lowed the basic principles of emergency rule which Lincoln estab­
lished during the Rebellion."*
After Lincoln's assasina1 1 o n , many artists portrayed the 
slain President with George Washington. The portrayal is "alto­
gether fitting and proper." This man, who gave his nation "the 
last full measure of devotion," certainly is aptly described as 
a second father of the United States and a founder of internat­
ional democracy.*
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